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 The United States all-hazards homeland security operational and intelligence 
domains are multijurisdictional, multiagency, and multidisciplinary intelligence 
challenges for all-hazards intelligence analysts.  A common analytical conceptual 
framework is needed to help unify homeland security intelligence enterprise analysts who 
work in an all-hazards, all-source, all-crimes, and all-disciplinary intelligence 
environment.  A unifying all-hazards intelligence synthesis model that unites intelligence 
analysts with the law-enforcement, cybersecurity, technology, and natural science 
disciplines, would benefit the homeland security and intelligence domain enterprises.  
The purpose of the applied research was to discover and generate an all-hazards analysis 
model that enables the production of risk-informed applied intelligence products in a 
pluralistic intelligence environment that is privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 
compliant.  A comprehensive literature review was conducted following the four-step 
collect, analyze, synthesize, and apply process.  This process is derived from proven 
knowledge, information, and risk management programs, as well as proven intelligence 
analysis methodologies, for gathering information about adversarial, cyber, technological, 
and natural hazards and threats to social, technological, and environmental resources.  
The research resulted in the generation of a universal all-hazards intelligence synthesis 
model that may be applicable to systems safety engineering, criminal, political, military, 
economic, social, and medical intelligence activities. 
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crimes, All-source, Hazards, Threats, Crisis, Disaster, Catastrophe, Adversarial, Cyber, 
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 I chose an all-hazards analysis research topic because I wanted to have a deeper 
understanding of national security and intelligence from a different perspective than that 
of my U.S. Army Military Intelligence career.  Although I had experience with assessing 
security risk from weather phenomenon, restrictive terrain, and, of course, military 
forces, I wanted to challenge myself to understand the broader context of adversarial, 
cyber, technological, and natural hazards in the homeland security context.  This new 
look angle developed into a wider systemic analysis of crisis events.  Looking back—way 
back—I now know my thesis began with something I had heard many times before: we 
are part of something larger than ourselves. 
 My systems view of life, although I didn’t realize it was called that at the time, 
was stoked after reading The systems view of life by Fritjof Capra and Pier Luisi.  I am 
very glad this book was required reading in my homeland security studies curriculum 
because it made me think a lot about life’s connectivity and the relationships among all 
things social, technological, and natural.  This perspective is an imperitive for security 
studies students in their understanding of safety, security, and resilience and it became 
my analytic approach to all-hazards. 
 Lastly, a chapter in Security and Risk Management by Bruce Newsome 
established what I call my point-of-entry-test into all-hazards research because of his 
explanation about the transformational nature of hazards into crises.  Life is change—the 
world always is in flux so, with that understanding, the homeland security domains are 
better poised to ensure national safety, security, and resilience.  I hope other students find 
similar activators to ignite their research interest and passion.  I also hope this thesis does 
 
viii 
for them what my professors and thesis committee challenged me to do: contribute to the 
body of knowledge in the emerging homeland security studies field.  
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 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the United States federal 
government’s lead homeland security enterprise institution for ensuring the nation’s 
domestic security, resilience, and safety (Our Mission, 2018).  The homeland security 
enterprise of public and private organizational partnerships generates and operationalizes 
national resource capacity in support of the national preparedness missions.  These 
federal, state, local, and tribal governmental institutions, corporations, and homeland 
security organizations are guided by a collection of security directives, policies, 
doctrines, plans, and procedural publications.  Similarly, the operational agencies of the 
homeland security enterprise are supported by a host of resource procurement and 
intelligence generation agencies (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2016, pp. 1-28).   
 My research is focused on the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise’s 
(HSIE) (Homeland Security Committee, 2016, p. 11; Lahneman, Homeland Security 
Intelligence, 2018) all-hazards intelligence analysis and synthesis system.  The HSIE is a 
networked and nested information and analysis system, as well as a community-of-
practice, consisting of institutions, practitioners, and processes within the HSIE’s security 
enterprise (Office of Intelligence and Analysis Mission, 2018).  The HSIE’s all-hazards 
analysis community-of-practice also is a community-of-people.  Behind every 
intelligence analysis product and intelligence synthesis assessment, are all-hazards 
analysts working in a regional fusion center, critical infrastructure risk management 
office, or Intelligence Community (IC) cubicle.  They work in a networked intelligence 
and information-sharing system of dispersed physical structures, virtual collaborative 
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chat-rooms, and intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination cycles.  
This collective intelligence synthesis system informs the homeland security enterprise’s 
operational missions. 
 The population of the United States depends on the collaborative efforts of all-
hazards analysts, who work within this intelligence and information-sharing community, 
to expertly advise, inform, and participate in the nation’s homeland security decision-
making process of policy, preparedness, and practice.  The all-hazards analyst must be 
knowledgeable in a diverse range of social, scientific, and environmental disciplines 
because the broad array of homeland security threats is both human-caused and natural 
(Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide, 2013).  The nation’s 
population justifiably expects all-hazards analysts to make sense of these threats to its 
well-being, way of life, and environment.   
 The all-hazards homeland security operational environment (HSOE) is a 
multijurisdictional, multiagency, and multidisciplinary intelligence challenge for an all-
hazards analyst.  However, the intelligence enterprise’s training standards, jointly set by 
the DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ), are law enforcement centric (Global 
Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2007, 2010).  To alleviate this challenge, all-
hazards analysts need common core training, community-of-practice analysis 
methodologies, and a unifying conceptual framework.  A common analytic mindset 
would help unify analysts who work in an all-hazards, all-source, all-crimes, and all-
disciplinary intelligence field.  Thus, a unifying all-hazards analysis conceptual 
framework, that ties together the intelligence, law-enforcement, natural science, and 
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technological disciplines, would benefit the entire homeland security enterprise 
community. 
Research Problem 
 Throughout my literature review process, I have not found a DHS publication that 
is all-hazards analysis centric or one that is specifically written about common all-hazards 
analysis concepts, methods, or techniques.  Although DHS has published preparedness 
frameworks and guides on field operations; risk, incident, and crisis management; 
intelligence and information sharing; and analyst competency tasks; it has not publicly 
published a reference document that compiles common all-hazard analysis and 
intelligence synthesis frameworks, methodologies, and techniques.  To be sure, the DHS 
does not have a publicly accessible doctrinal reference solely dedicated to all-hazards 
analysis.   
 The purpose of my applied research was to discover common all-hazards analysis 
frameworks, methods, and techniques within the DHS’s HSIE at the federal government 
level, and to develop one that can be universally applied within a pluralistic all-hazards 
intelligence environment.  I generated an intelligence synthesis model and an all-hazards 
analysis model from my research as the first step.  I will apply and test them in post and 
premortem analysis scenarios to determine the extent of its usefulness as a common 
analytic framework in the HSIE as future research.  Thus, this thesis is limited to building 
an all-hazards intelligence synthesis model (AH-ISM). 
 My research goals are grouped as personal, intellectual, and practical (Maxwell, 
2013, p. 24).  My personal research goal is to earn a master’s degree with a full-thesis 
option for self-fulfillment and a sense of accomplishment.  My military career, personal 
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obligations, and a few setbacks interfered with my earning a graduate degree until now.  
However, I have earnestly pursued this personal goal since my retirement from the Army.  
My intellectual research goal is to advance my military intelligence experience and 
criminal justice background into the homeland security domain to expand my 
understanding of national and domestic security.  Specifically, I want to better understand 
how intelligence analysis is applied in an all-hazards environment.  Lastly, my practical 
research goal is to apply the knowledge gained from my academic research as a 
practitioner or consultant in the homeland security enterprise.  Nevertheless, I am 
strongly considering doctoral programs as another personal and academic option before 
beginning a new career. 
Justification and Relevance to the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) is an established national institution since 
1949 with constitutional origins as the War Department since 1789.  As a national 
security institution, its doctrinal foundations are organized into functional categories such 
as operations, intelligence, or training (Bullock et al., 2016, pp. 156-158).  These 
organizational domains have their own catalogue of doctrinal publications that are solely 
dedicated to their unique frameworks, guiding principles, terms, methods, procedures, 
tactics, and techniques.  In comparison, the DHS was established in 2002 and is a 
relatively young national institution.  Its domestic security doctrinal foundations also are 
organized into functional categories, but not all of them have dedicated doctrinal 
publications.  Specifically, the intelligence and information sharing functions of the DHS 
lack a domain directory of all-hazards intelligence publications. 
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 The enterprise’s all-hazards analysis methods, terms, and concepts are distributed 
throughout operationally focused frameworks and field operational guides.  I read at least 
20 different DHS and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) documents, in 
addition to many more public and private non-departmental publications and academic 
textbooks, to garner a full appreciation of the all-hazards analyst’s role and 
responsibilities.  An HSIE analyst would have to read these publications and more to be 
knowledgeable of all-hazards, threats, and crises.  I believe the DHS should compile a 
catalogue of intelligence domain publications, with unifying conceptual frameworks, all-
hazards analytic methods, and intelligence process guidelines, into a single set of 
doctrinal reference materials specifically written for HSIE analysts. 
Social Context and the Homeland Security Domain’s Audience 
 The socioenvironmental system consists of the nation’s population, social 
institutions, infrastructure, and environmental resources (Pine, 2015, p. 15).  These 
systems, including technological systems, underpin the nation’s capacity for survival and 
prosperity because without them modern life would cease.  Clearly, national and 
domestic safety, security, and resilience preparedness goals are dependent upon the 
nation’s social, technological, and environmental systems and a robust domestic security 
apparatus.  In other words, the protection of lives, property, and the environment depends 
upon the homeland security enterprise’s ability to carry out its missions.   
 In turn, the homeland security enterprise depends on timely, relevant, and risk-
informed all-hazards intelligence assessments produced by the HSIE.  Security 
professionals across the nation teaching at universities, planning emergency response 
operations, conducting critical infrastructure risk assessments, and patrolling the nation’s 
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borders should have access to current and actionable intelligence products. Therefore, the 
audience for my research findings will be the all-hazards academics, analysts, and 
practitioners of the HSIE. 
Implications for the Emerging Homeland Security Studies Discipline 
 The applied knowledge of my research will help all-hazards analysts to identify, 
analyze, and assess adversarial, cyber, technological, and natural hazards, threats, and 
crisis events.  The intelligence synthesis and all-hazards analysis models, which are 
discussed in detail in chapter V, are intended to provide conceptual clarity to the 
structures, processes, functions, and purpose of the HSIE’s all-hazards intelligence 
synthesis system.  Additionally, the all-hazards analyst’s competency traits, which will be 
explained more in my findings, coupled with these analytic models are intended to 
establish a common foundation for multidisciplinary analyst-to-analyst communication, 
collaboration, and coordination. 
 These models, the baseline intelligence synthesis model (ISM) and the all-hazards 
intelligence synthesis model (AH-ISM), are intended to give multidomain all-hazards 
analyst with a set of interdisciplinary terms and analytic methods.  For example, subject 
matter experts in safety engineering, or natural hazards risk analysis, would share the 
same analytic conceptual framework as a law enforcement all-crimes analyst.  In other 
words, an all-hazards common core training standard, that goes beyond the current law 
enforcement-based training, could help unify interdisciplinary subject matter experts in 






My applied research questions are aligned with my pragmatic realist world view and are 
designed to generate a practical solution to the all-hazards conceptual framework 
problem.  They are intended to be specific, realistic, and process oriented (Maxwell, 
2013, pp. 78-83).  Like the purpose of intelligence analysis, my questions are meant to 
provide actionable findings and recommendations at the end of my research. 
 Central research question.  What is a unifying interdisciplinary all-hazards 
analysis and intelligence synthesis model for providing risk-informed applied intelligence 
in support of the United States National Preparedness Goal by the homeland security 
intelligence enterprise? 
 Research questions. 
 1.  What are the current and common all-hazards analysis and intelligence 
synthesis methods used by analysts in the homeland security intelligence enterprise at 
fusion centers and in other intelligence production and information sharing 
organizations? 
 2.  To what extent does current homeland security intelligence enterprise 
approved training and certification courses teach common all-hazards analytic 
methodologies to intelligence analysis students? 
 3.  What, if any, are the knowledge-centric and intelligence operations principles, 




 4.  What, if any, are the homeland security operational environment’s socio-
technological-environmental system components that are relevant to the all-hazards 
analysis and intelligence synthesis model? 
 5.  What, if any, are the consequential relationships among socio-technological-
environmental systems and adversarial, cyber, technological, and natural hazards, threats, 
and crisis event systems? 
 6.  To what extent is the all-hazards analysis and intelligence synthesis model 
replicable and applicable as an analytic model in the interdisciplinary homeland security 
intelligence enterprise? 
Conceptual Framework for Researching All-hazards and Intelligence Synthesis 
 My conceptual framework for researching the all-hazards analysis and 
intelligence synthesis system is influenced by a selection of practical and theoretical 
approaches beginning with a systems worldview that is reinforced by two principles 
drawn from physics and chemistry.  Together, they form my views on entities, 
interdependent relationships, transformation, emergence, and cause-effect associations 
(Ackoff & Emery, 2017, pp. 13-32; Capra & Luisi, 2014, pp. 63-83; Meadows, 2008, pp. 
1-34).  My analytic and research framework is based on the complementary views of 
holism and reduction that form my approach to the analysis phase of the intelligence 
synthesis process (Verschuuren, 2017, pp. 69-74).  My conceptual framework for 
comprehending historical and environmental context, meaning-making, and decision-
making is influence by three sense-making models: (a) Panarchy theory’s adaptive cycle 
(Gunderson & Holling, 2002, pp. 5-8), (b) the Cynefin complexity framework 
(Brougham, 2015, pp. 6-10), and (c) the critical-thinking process (Elder & Paul, 2012, pp. 
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5-7).  Lastly, my understanding of the HSOE is based on the all-hazards and the risk 
management approaches to national safety, security, and resilience; the human and 
environmental security approaches to domestic and global security; my professional 
military intelligence experience; and my personal experience with personal loss, 
hurricanes, tornadoes, and flooding disasters. 
 Worldview.  Having a worldview or an established paradigm of beliefs about the 
real world does not automatically simplify how we live.  The only way a worldview 
simplifies our life is when we surround ourselves with likeminded people.  In this way, 
life is less complicated and less confrontational—making sense of it all and making 
choices are easier.  However, I think the best way to challenge our personal worldview is 
to apply it in life.  We should be willing to apply our worldview, and sincerely attempt to 
understand the worldviews of others, because this kind of application guides how we set 
goals, find purpose, create, perceive others, and react to danger.   
 In our search to understanding life and gaining knowledge, context is everything.  
Its within historical and environmental context that we broaden our mindset about the 
human and natural worlds (Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, pp. 6-8).  Our personal 
individualistic context is our educational background multiplied by our life experiences 
and our willingness, or unwillingness, to adapt and change.  Thus, a worldview’s greater 
value is that it guides our quest to answer the why questions as well as the how questions 
in pursuit of a greater purpose. 
 Our worldview should challenge us and make us feel a little uneasy at times.  It 
should make us pause and think when we encounter complications, confrontations, and 
crises rather than make us withdraw and become headstrong.  It should cause us to 
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consider other points-of-view and reconsider our own.  It should help us understand, 
empathize, and at times compromise.  I believe a worldview is not only for meaning-
making, it also is for decision-making.  This is the multiperspective view of bricolage 
(i.e., multiperspectival knowledge generation) [Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, p. 9].  There 
are times when our worldview should make us feel conflicted in our views, force us to 
confront our personal resilience, and make us choose either to challenge, concede, 
compromise, or change—that is the value of our worldview. 
 My worldview is considered as both pragmatic realist (Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldaña, 2014, p. 7) and critical realism (Maxwell, 2013, p. 43).  As a pragmatic realist, I 
believe in the real world as it exists without human cognitive interpretation and people’s 
imaginative explanations.  I also believe that people construct their own perceptions and 
versions of the world through their personal experiences and by adopting other people’s 
perceptions.  Accordingly, conflicting views of the natural and human world are 
inevitable and must be reconciled through critical reasoning. 
 The world—life—is a mixture of human systems, technological systems, and 
natural systems.  Each type of system exists within the physical boundaries of the earth’s 
atmosphere and outer space as well as in the boundless creativity of people’s minds.  
Indeed, spy satellite orbits and ballistic missile trajectories expand our systems 
boundaries beyond the earth’s atmosphere.  Our perception of the world is a “simplified 
and incomplete attempt to grasp something about a complex reality” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 




 The pragmatic side of this worldview is that our human constructs of institutions, 
infrastructure, culture, safety, or security are subject to the natural laws of our 
environment.  Likewise, the natural environment is affected by our human constructs, 
which are based on our perceptions and belief systems (Capra & Luisi, 2014; Kincheloe 
& Berry, 2004).  There is little to no separation among human populations, technology, 
and the natural world’s intertwined systems of structures, processes, and functions, and 
purposes.  These social, technological, and environmental systems and their components 
interact daily and will influence our future as much as they have our past.   
 History shows that people inherently look for meaning in nearly everything they 
experience and do.  Humans tend to assign meaning to things, patterns, relationships, and 
our own intentions (Miles et al., 2014, p. 7) thus enhancing their perceptions of the real 
world.  In addition to searching for meaning, we—people—also create it.  We choose to 
create things, patterns, relationships, and ideas with good and bad intentions.  Benevolent 
and malevolent intentions are evident in our actions and speech acts and reveal our true 
creative purposes.  We are meaning-making and decision-making beings—purposeful 
systems—because we desire having a purpose in our lives that transcends just surviving 
(Ackoff & Emery, 2017, pp. 30-31).  Hence, we want to be part of that big something and 
we want it to be meaningful. 
 Systems view.  My approach to homeland safety, security, and resilience is 
grounded in the systems view of the world.  This viewpoint begins with the interactive 
relationship between human systems and natural systems because both types overlap as 
an all-encompassing socio-technological-environmental (STE) system.  Likewise, my 
viewpoint about the progressive relationships between meaning-making, decision-
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making, and problem-solving is grounded in the systems view of purposeful human 
systems (Ackoff & Emery, 2017; Capra & Luisi, 2014; Meadows, 2008).  According to 
the University of Pennsylvania’s Ackoff Collaboratory for Advancement of the Systems 
Approach (ACASA), there are four types of systems that exist in the world: (a) 
mechanistic, (b) animate, (c) social, and (d) ecological (ACASA, 2018).  Accordingly, 
my understanding of the similarities and differences among humans, human-created 
mechanistic systems, human social constructs, and the natural ecological world underpins 
my systems view of homeland security.  It shapes my approach to analyzing hazards, 
threats, crisis events, STE systems, and multidisciplinary all-hazards intelligence 
synthesis. 
 The four types of systems in the world are hierarchical in their structure meaning 
the larger natural ecological system subsumes the human systems of societies, individual 
people, and technology.  Each type of system is conceptually and literally nested within 
the other and they are intricately intertwined.  These tiers of systems lead to a better 
understanding of their interdependent roles in sustaining life and, consequently, the 
origins of disastrous crisis events.  In addition to knowing the types of systems in the 
world, understanding how systems work is important to my research. 
 Systems have three basic components: (a) structure, (b) process, and (c) function 
or a purpose (Ackoff & Emery, 2017, p. 13).  The interactions of these three components 
are essential to its function.  System structures can be either tangible (e.g., a tree’s roots, 
or a home’s plumbing) or intangible (e.g., ideological beliefs or claims).  The tangible 
structures of a system are more easily identifiable, measurable, and visually depicted in 
pictures, or descriptive text.  The intangible structures of a system are better represented 
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in the form of structured communication (e.g., formatted text document; verbal 
presentation; graphics) that is based on relevant data, claims, and supporting evidence. 
 System processes are the steps, phases, or methods taken by the system, within its 
structure, to achieve its function or purpose.  A distinguishing system aspect is that 
technological systems typically have a functional objective whereas humans have a goal-
oriented purpose and intent (Ackoff & Emery, 2017, p. 26).  However, machine produced 
function and human created purpose can work together to accomplish a system’s 
objective.  For instance, typing this sentence is an intentional and purposeful activity that 
is aided by the functional word processing objective of my laptop; it’s an interactive 
machine-human process with a shared objective.   
 Both function and purpose give meaning to a system’s cooperative structures and 
processes.  “A system is a set of things—people, cells, molecules, or whatever—
interconnected in such a way that they produce their own pattern of behavior over time” 
(Meadows, 2008, p. 2).  All three system components (e.g., structure, process, and 
function / purpose) coexist and form the basic components of human, societal, 
technological, and environmental systems (Ackoff & Emery, 2017; Capra & Luisi, 2014; 
Meadows, 2008).  Another important characteristic of systems to be understood for my 
research is the types of relationships among systems and their components.  
 The types of relationships between system components and other systems 
determines how they will interact with each other.  How these systems relate to and react 
with one another in either positive, negative, or neutral ways produce outcomes with 
sometimes devastating consequences (e.g., an industrial accident near a neighborhood).  
A holistic analytic view considers each of the three system components, the whole 
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system, and all the connections among them to better assess what may emerge from their 
interactions.  This is commonly stated as the sum of the parts is more than the whole 
meaning what comes from adding together the individual parts of a system is often more 
meaningful and complex than it appears to be.   
 A simple model of an intelligence synthesis system illustrates an open system that 
consists of inflows, stock, and outflows (Meadows, 2008, p. 18).  Inflows of collected 
data are added to the stock of information while the knowledge generation process 
produces an outflow of actionable intelligence.  Adding self-correcting critical 
examination as feedback loops within the process ensures higher quality, or quantity, of 
outflow intelligence products.  This systems model explanation appears to be simple; 
however, systems and systems comprised of subsystems can be quite complex.  For 
example, the intelligence synthesis system comprised of networked people, machines, 
and institutions within the national security intelligence community (IC) is a complex 
globally distributed system-of-systems.   
 “Components, whether cells or transistors, acquire new ‘causal power’ when they 
are organized into a mechanism that performs a higher-level function” (Verschuuren, 
2017, p. 72).  In other words, a system’s purpose and function can be complex and 
challenging to understand because what one sees in its structural and process elements is 
not always what one gets in return.  Sometimes, there are unintended and unforeseen 
consequences when human, technological, and natural systems interact.  I will briefly 
introduce these central types of systems before continuing with my worldview discussion. 
 Human systems.  Human and social systems are purposeful systems because they 
exhibit intentional behavior demonstrated by setting goals and objectives.  Purposeful 
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systems also display an intent to change their behavior to achieve their goals especially 
when internal or external conditions change (Ackoff & Emery, 2017, p. 14).  To better 
understand this concept, think of a criminal organization that is adaptive and changes its 
modus operandi according to its victim’s vulnerabilities and law enforcement presence.  
Meanwhile, human created technological systems are not purposeful systems, but they do 
have a functional objectives.  After all, they are created by humans as mechanical or 
digital machines for a reason.   
 Technological systems.  A technological system, more specifically, has what is 
called a system objective that is its primary purpose.  It also has a system function that is 
its underlying operational performance design meant to achieve the objective (Ericson, 
2016, p. 11).  In my research, I will equate the term function to the term purpose, so it 
will not be confused with a system’s underlying processes.  Finally, it is notable that 
natural systems are like human and technological systems because they too have 
structures, processes, and their own natural purpose or function.   
 Natural systems.  An example of a natural system with easily identifiable 
elements is a hurricane.  It has a visually recognizable eye, spiral and rotational form, and 
measurable wind speeds.  A hurricane forms under certain climatic conditions, locations, 
and time of year in a pattern that is identifiable, discoverable, and measurable.  As a 
natural weather phenomenon and cyclic climatic system, a hurricane takes in energy from 
the atmosphere and ocean, cycles it through its structure, and then discharges it in the 
form of powerful and potentially destructive winds and rain.  A hurricane’s hydrologic 
cycle and process reveals its natural purpose to transfer water between the ocean and the 
atmosphere and to transform kinetic energy from one state to another.  In addition to the 
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systems elements triad of structure, process, and function / purpose, this example 
highlights three more characteristics of systems, they are: (a) identifiable, (b) 
discoverable, and (c) measurable (Capra & Luisi, 2014, pp. 7-8). 
 Scientific disciplines.  Systems-thinking is a holistic view of the world derived 
from the combination of experience and science (i.e. experiential epistemology) that are 
the sources of knowledge.  Systems-thinking is influential in nearly all scientific 
disciplines from architecture to zoology and it frames the systematic study of matter and 
form.  A holistic approach studies quantities and constituents as well as their patterns and 
relationships (Capra & Luisi, 2014, p. 4) and reveals the links among people, technology, 
and the earth.   Systematic scientific research requires identifying and measuring the 
quantities and constituents of system elements, how they are related to each other, how 
they relate with other entities, and it recognizes their patterns and relationships.  Matter 
and form, which are akin to structure and process, are essential to the system’s elemental 
triad along with function and purpose.  Two scientific disciplines, physics and chemistry, 
contribute to my systems view of homeland security.  The constructal law of physics and 
the reaction process of chemistry both relate to the transformational processes that are 
inherent to crisis events and intelligence synthesis. 
 The constructal law of physics.  The constructal law, a physics principle, asserts 
that all natural and human systems facilitate the efficient flow of energy, information, or 
even culture, from one system to another (Bejan & Zane, 2012).  For instance, energy in a 
chemical reaction flows—transforms—from one state condition into another.  Or, in the 
example of an exothermic reaction, releases energy into the environment.  The flow of 
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energy throughout the ecosystem, from the sun to our sources of food, is a natural law of 
physics.   
 Human systems also are subject to the flow principle.  The authors state the 
constructal law “governs any system, anytime, anywhere, encompassing inanimate (rivers 
and lightning bolts), animate (trees, animals), and engineered (technology) phenomena, 
as well as the evolving flows of social constructs such as knowledge, language, and 
culture” (Bejan & Zane, 2012).  Therefore, homeland security information sharing 
structures and intelligence synthesis systems also are flow systems that “evolve over 
time, acquiring better and better configurations to provide more access for the currents 
that flow through them” (Bejan & Zane, 2012). 
 I believe that the movement of energy, information, culture, and ideas in human 
and natural systems follow the principle of efficient flow even in the presence of 
obstacles.  Although there are potential physical and virtual disruptions to flow, and 
multiple paths of least resistance that can be taken, the natural tendency is for energy and 
ideas to flow efficiently among systems.  The advent of the telegraph, telephone, 
television, and the internet demonstrate a human tendency to technologically facilitate the 
flow of information in the fastest and most efficient manner possible between individuals 
and larger communities.  Certainly, there will be disruptions, alterations, and even the 
destruction of flow systems by a wide range of threats.  Furthermore, facts, falsehoods, 
and flood waters can flow from point-to-point, point-to-area, area-to-point, or area-to-
area in both natural and human systems (Bejan & Zane, 2012, p. 4).  The flow principle is 
relevant to the all-hazards analysis of STE systems as well as adversarial, cyber, 
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technological, and natural (ACTN) threat systems because each have the capacity to 
either originate or facilitate the flow of destructive energy and ideology. 
 Three of the five preparedness missions of the National Preparedness Goal 
(NPG), which are named by their intended functional effects, are meant to prevent, 
protect, and mitigate the flow of potentially destructive energy in threat systems.  In 
agreement with flow theory, the tendency for energy to transform hazards and threats into 
disastrous crises is a natural phenomenon regardless of the hazard source.  Put in the 
context of the homeland security intelligence synthesis system, it is the all-hazards 
analyst’s responsibility to understand the safety and security consequences about the flow 
of energy and information to better generate knowledge about social, technological, and 
natural threats. 
 Chemical reactions and state changes in chemistry.  In a chemical reaction, 
substances are changed into other substances or compounds when they collide and 
transfer energy.  This process is a change of state typically from a solid form of matter to 
a liquid or into a gaseous state (Moore, 2010, pp. 6-7, 87-88).  Simply put, the chemical 
reaction process entails reactants interacting and then reacting with each to produce 
products of different types and states.  This is a common occurrence in nature and 
laboratories and is in-line with the flow principle of the constructal theory.  Like systems, 
the reaction process is recurring, identifiable, discoverable, measurable, and thereby 
predictable.  Furthermore, it serves as another example of transformative processes in 
both natural and human systems regarding cause-effect and state changes and is 
applicable to the hazard, threat, and crisis event transformation model. 
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 What is probable also is predictable and likely is preventable too; this is a 
common refrain in the security domain.  The flow principle and chemical reactions both 
give to the rationality of this security mantra because they offer guiding principles for all-
hazards analysts in understanding how hazards can transform into crisis events.  The 
concept of entity state change from one condition to another, like the dormant to active to 
realized transformation continuum, applies to a natural hazard source, a technological 
mishap, and evidentiary data during the analysis process.  The parallel flows of energy 
and information contribute to my systems view of all-hazards intelligence synthesis in 
two fundamental ways: (a) a dormant hazard condition becomes an active threat and then 
a realized disaster; and (b) analyzed data points become useful information and then 
synthesized applied intelligence.  Energy and information (i.e., ideas) can experience 
state changes under the right circumstances. 
 Holism and reduction cognitive approaches.  In addition to the systems construct 
of component structure, process, function, and purpose that is combined with the science 
principles about energy and idea flows, and transformational state changes, my 
worldview also includes two complementary concepts of holism and reduction.  I should 
point out that by using the term reduction I am not advocating reductionism.  Simply put, 
reduction is an analysis technique that reduces an object of study, an entity, to its 
elemental components or subentities.  It is an analytic step in the systemic process of 
understanding the whole.  Reductionism is a philosophy that emphasizes understanding is 
found primarily in the most elemental components with less regard for their relationships 
and emergent qualities (Verschuuren, 2017).  A pure reductionism philosophy is contrary 
to holism, so I am focused on the analytic process of reduction. 
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 Holism.  A holistic view, which is strongly correlated with systems-thinking, 
considers the whole condition of an entity, event, or an act in its appropriate context.  
This holistic view emphasizes connections, relationship qualities, networks, nodes, and 
context as necessary properties for emergent conditions and outcomes.  A holistic view of 
social, technological, and environmental systems helps with understanding how their 
entities relate and interact to create emergent patterns and themes thereby supporting the 
systems view that the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. 
 Holism also helps all-hazards analyst to anticipate outcomes and consequences 
thereby leaning towards a more predictable and preventable approach to homeland 
security.  Anticipatory and risk-based (i.e., probability calculations and likelihood 
estimates) intelligence assessments are a more reasonable goal for an intelligence analyst 
and researchers because predictive analysis is a fallacy—we cannot accurately predict the 
future.  By taking a holistic view, an all-hazards analyst is more likely to understand 
cause and effect relationships that have cross-domain, direct, secondary, and tertiary 
probabilistic consequences thereby better able to anticipate future scenarios. 
 Reduction.  Complementing the holistic approach is reduction.  It is not possible 
for an all-hazards analyst to understand the whole STE mix of people, machines, 
computers, and nature without first identifying their subsystems and parts.  Reduction is 
the disassembly of a system into its components of structure, process, function and 
purpose and then into its subsystems and their constituent entities.  Identifying the 
system’s basic elements and their relationships are the first steps towards a holistic 
understanding of the entire system. 
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 The system’s hierarchy, or levels, is composed of layered building blocks called 
part-whole relationships with emergent properties at each level (Verschuuren, 2017, p. 
21).  All-hazards analysts may begin with dissection and identification of the system’s 
parts, but they also should go a step further and recognize the system’s emergent 
properties from a holistic perspective.  Both approaches to intelligence synthesis, 
reduction and holism, are necessary systems-thinking and critical-thinking qualities. 
 Meaning-Making Conceptual Frameworks.  Moving from systems theory, 
scientific principles, and cognitive concepts, the next influential conceptual framework in 
understanding all-hazards intelligence synthesis is the symbiotic meaning-making and 
decision-making relationship.  Although each one can occur without the other, they are 
incomplete as stand-alone frameworks.  Understanding can be attained without follow-on 
action and decisive action can be taken with little thought.  Well informed and effective 
homeland security decisions on policy, standards, training, and operations must come 
after a comprehensive intelligence analysis and synthesis process.  Good decisions that 
solve problems follow good analysis that attempts to make sense of the situation.  In the 
preparedness and risk management processes of the DHS and the United States Army for 
example, the process steps are easily separated into meaning-making initial steps 
followed by decision-making final steps.  It is a logical and necessary method of 
generating knowledge and action by following the meaning-making to decision-making 
to problem-solving continuum. 
 Two conceptual frameworks that are useful in making sense of an operational 
situation, environmental context, and change are the Panarchy theory and the Cynefin 
complexity framework (Brougham, 2015; Gunderson & Holling, 2002).  The adaptive 
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cycle, which comes from Panarchy, and the five Cynefin realms, ranging from obvious to 
disorder, provide invaluable context to the all-hazards analyst’s understanding of the 
socio-technological-environmental domain.  Existing within the adaptive cycle and the 
Cynefin realms are the populations, institutions, infrastructure, and environmental 
systems of the world.  Accordingly, the hazard, threat, and crisis event interactive 
processes are found in these realms and the cycle.  It is important to understanding how 
the adaptive cycle and the Cynefin realms apply to the homeland security operational 
environment and enterprise. 
 Panarchy.  “Panarchy is an integrative theory to help understand the source and 
role of change in systems, and to identify development paths that are truly sustainable” 
(Gunderson & Holling, 2002, p. 2).  It is an interdisciplinary systems approach to 
understanding that the human, technological, and natural worlds are linked together with 
far reaching cause-effect relationships.  “Fundamental to panarchy is an understanding of 
the adaptive cycle—a pattern of rapid, opportunistic growth, conservation, destruction, 
and renewal—and the concept of scale” (Gunderson & Holling, 2002, p. 3).  The adaptive 
cycle reveals the dynamic systems of the human and natural world through its four phases 
and its cyclical nature; therefore, it also is predictable under certain conditions.  Thus, 
knowing the current phase, as well as the historical context, of the cycle allows an all-
hazards analyst to anticipate likely future events. 
 Cynefin.  The Cynefin framework realms of (a) obvious, (b) complicated, (c) 
complex, (d) chaotic, and (e) disorder also help the all-hazards analyst to assess the 
current situation and anticipate future conditions.  The separation line between Panarchy 
and Cynefin is best explained temporally (i.e., by time).  Panarchy is a broad view of 
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natural cycles that also are human-influenced or human-caused that cycles over periods 
of time from months, years, or even extended periods of geologic time eras.  Although it 
is applicable to other domains such as economics and business, it is better served as 
meaning-making model for long-term socioenvironmental cycles.   
 Cynefin realms offer a clearer perspective of the current operating environment as 
a model of identifying simple solutions to an obvious situation, for example, or for 
understanding how complexity contributes to uncertainty.  It is better explained as a 
short-term situational awareness model that recognizes that systems are not always stable 
and that the state of a system will change over time (Brougham, 2015, p. 8).  In this 
context, the adaptive cycle and the Cynefin realms help analysts with current situation 
and contextual meaning-making and helps the decision-maker with managerial decisions. 
 Security theories.  Social and security theories attempt to explain why and how 
humanity manages hazards, threats, and crises of all types.  These theoretical perspectives 
range from a pessimistic tinted realism to a more optimistic liberalism.  A realist 
perspective tends to advocate the needs of the state over the individual as a matter of 
domestic or national security.  A liberal viewpoint places the liberty of the individual 
higher with an emphasis on identifying and eradicating the causes of human insecurity.  
Another perspective is the environmental security point-of-view that places the earth and 
its ecosystems on an even higher priority level (Smith, 2015, pp. 12-30).  Regardless of 
their differences, the inescapable link between each security perspective is the complex 
relationships among people, technology, and nature.  In their own way, they all place 
people at the center of the security problem.  The challenge for the all-hazards analyst is 
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to balance human-centric, state-centric, and eco-centric perspectives while analyzing STE 
systems and their threats. 
 I believe the links among populations, technology, and the environment have 
become inseparable since the industrial revolution and the age of information (i.e., the 
internet age).  The dependencies among environmental resources, cyberspace, economics, 
and society are meshed together as a single STE system.  Thus, the need for a balanced 
human-centric and eco-centric meaning-making and decision-making process for 
homeland security that respects both human-centric and eco-centric views is self-evident.   
 In broad terms, the well-being of both people and the environment are ultimately 
linked to the safety and security of the individual person.  This means human-centric 
policies and laws that ensure the dignity and well-being of the individual will lead to the 
respect and well-being of the planet (Hampson, 2013, pp. 279-294).  The premise is that 
for both human systems and environmental systems to be safe, secure, and resilient, the 
civil liberties and civil rights of the individual should be respected first before moving on 
to the collective wants and needs of society and the world.  This is the genesis of my 
homeland security worldview and of the homeland security and intelligence domains. 
 Homeland Security Operational Frameworks.  Homeland security is one part of 
our overall national security framework.  It is focused on ensuring the domestic safety, 
security, and resilience of our national interest and population from ACTN threats.  The 
homeland security enterprise’s partnership with the IC and other national defense 
institutions enhances the nation’s domestic security and advances its national interest 
globally.  From a federal government perspective, this framework places the DoD as the 
primary institution for national defense and the DHS as the primary institution 
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responsible for domestic security.  Arguably, law enforcement is a third security domain 
more narrowly focused on crime and criminals (i.e., all-crimes) therefore placing it 
within the homeland security’s all-hazards domain which is a subdomain of the 
overarching national security domain (Carter, 2009, pp. 10-12). 
 As the lead department of the homeland security enterprise, DHS must coordinate 
the activities of numerous federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector agencies and 
organizations.  The all-hazards STE setting of the homeland security enterprise is called 
the HSOE.  Two look-angles helps describe the HSOE.  The first is an institutional and 
operational-centric perspective (e.g., the DHS and the HSIE).  The second is a threat-
centric all-hazards environment viewpoint (i.e., the all-hazards HSOE). 
 The homeland security enterprise institutional and operational perspective.  The 
homeland security enterprise consists of security entities at all levels of public service 
and private industry sectors.  They are the enterprise stakeholders with vested interest in 
effective preparedness measures, generating response and recovery capacity, reducing 
risks, and increasing resilience.  The collaborative effort of homeland security enterprise 
depends on the leadership and action of not only the DHS, but also other departments 
such as the Department of State, DoD, Department of Treasury, Department of 
Commerce, and the IC along with many other departments, agencies, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (Bullock et al., 2016, pp. 113-197). 
 The DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis “is the only element of the U.S. IC 
statutorily charged with delivering intelligence to our state, local, tribal, territorial and 
private sector partners, and developing intelligence from those partners for the 
Department and the IC” (DHS, 2018).  As a DHS institution, this office facilitates all-
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hazards analysis, the production of intelligence products, and their dissemination to the 
network of state and urban area fusion centers, and public and private agencies where all-
hazards analysts work. 
 The all-hazards homeland security operational environment perspective.  All-
hazards threats are defined as: 
an incident, natural or manmade, that warrants action to protect life, property, the 
environment, and public health or safety, and to minimize disruptions of 
government, social, or economic activities. It includes natural disasters, cyber 
incidents, industrial accidents, pandemics, acts of terrorism, sabotage, and 
destructive criminal activity targeting critical infrastructure. (National Response 
Framework, 2016, p. 7) 
Additionally, all-hazards and their related crisis events are grouped into three categories: 
(a) natural, (b) technological/accidental, (c) and adversarial/human-caused (The strategic 
national risk assessment, 2011).  Thus, the all-hazards approach is the focal point of 
homeland security preparedness goals, core mission sets, operational strategy, and the 
risk management process. 
 The all-hazards approach to homeland security serves as both a forcing 
mechanism for policy formulation and an enabling means for capacity generation.  
“Developing and maintaining an understanding of the variety of risks faced by 
communities and the Nation, and how this information can be used to build and sustain 
preparedness, are essential components of the National Preparedness System” (National 
Preparedness System, 2011).  By identifying, analyzing, and assessing common hazards 
and threats through the intelligence synthesis and risk management process, the homeland 
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security enterprise is forced to prioritize each threat and make preparedness policy and 
budgetary decisions.  The next step of integrating the threat assessments into the 
preparedness system and homeland security framework is to formulate policy, develop 
plans, and to properly resource homeland security practitioners.  
 Personal and professional experience.  The final two lenses that contribute my 
worldview and approach to homeland security are my personal experiences with human-
caused and natural disasters, and my professional experience as a United States Army 
Military Intelligence Officer.  Specifically, my local community and my parent’s home 
flooded during Hurricane Harvey with significant un-insured property losses requiring 
federal assistance through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  Other 
volunteer organizations and non-governmental organizations generously contributed 
labor and other resources to the response and recovery efforts in my neighborhood and 
for my parents. 
 While I was in the military, I served during Operation Desert Storm to protect 
critical military assets and I participated in Operation Provide Comfort to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish people.  As an intelligence officer in the Korea 
Theater of Operations, I directed the intelligence process, intelligence production 
management, analysts professional training, and the military decision-making process 
from various security and safety operational levels and management.  During my nearly 
22-year career, I was a recipient of risk-informed all-source intelligence assessments and 
I managed the production of both single-source and all-source products.  I also have 
experienced personal loss that is similar to the loss experienced by others in crisis 
situations.  I only call attention to these professional and personal experiences because 
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they have significantly shaped my worldview of safety, security, and resilience at home 
and abroad.   
 Approach.  My all-hazards analysis research approach narrows my worldview 
into a more focused homeland security perspective and guides how I will design my 
research methodology.  I will approach all-hazards analysis research within the 
frameworks of balancing respect for human and natural systems, applied qualitative 
research with emphasis on the needs of the homeland security practitioner (i.e., all-
hazards intelligence analysts), and a grounded knowledge in my own experience and 
scientific enquiry.  This is a constructed research approach that is built on my personal 
worldview, my professional experiences, and with those I have adopted from other 
researchers and practitioners during my security studies and the literature review process 
(Maxwell, 2013, p. 41).   
 Human-centric and Eco-centric.  There is no escaping an interconnected world 
of natural systems, human systems, and technological systems.  I believe the best 
approach to sustaining the well-being of humanity today and posterity, is to advance 
complementary human-centric and eco-centric security frameworks, governmental 
policies, and operational action plans.  World, national, and local leaders, both public and 
private, are obligated to ensure the safety, security, and resilience of people, wildlife, and 
natural resources.  Consequently, human-centric and eco-centric policy decisions should 
be hard to make when the needs of one problem challenges the other.  I believe struggles 
in problem-solving concerning humanity and nature are unavoidable if its grounded in the 
mutual respect for both.  Otherwise, it would be too easy to choose one over the other and 
open the door for opportunistic exploitation.  I also hold onto the optimistic belief that 
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equity is possible and the sustainment of one system should not discount the prosperity of 
the other. 
 Applied research and the homeland security enterprise.  “Applied research uses 
the scientific methodology to develop information to help solve an immediate, yet usually 
persistent, societal problem” (Bickman & Rog, 2009, p. x).  My purpose in taking an 
applied research approach is to provide usable knowledge to produce a practical solution 
to all-hazards analysis in the HSIE.  I also will take a United States DHS and HSIE 
research perspective.  Thus, my findings will primarily be directed towards national level 
homeland security all-hazards analysts, their associated intelligence and information 
sharing communities-of-practice, and security studies researchers.  I am concerned with 
real-world outcomes directly related to the problem of insufficient DHS all-hazards 
analysis frameworks and unifying conceptual models. 
 Qualitative, epistemological, and ontological research approaches.  My research 
will be almost exclusively qualitative.  I will focus my efforts on exploring and 
examining the works of other researchers and authors to better understand how all-
hazards analysis is currently conducted in the HSIE.  I will not concentrate on statistics or 
other quantifiable research data by itself because my approach is to qualitatively 
understand the structures, processes, and functions of the all-hazards intelligence 
synthesis system that is in use.  I will draw upon my own experiences as an all-source 
intelligence officer and research the all-hazards analysis process to gain an empirical, 
ontological, and qualitative perspective of the research problem.  This ontological realism 
perspective (i.e., there is a real world independent of our perception) and the 
epistemological constructivism perspective (i.e., we construct our own understanding of 
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the world) is compatible with my pragmatic realist / critical realism worldview (Maxwell, 
2013, p. 43). 
 The benefit of this approach is its “pragmatic compatibility” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 
6) that allows me to design my research method around a flexible literature review 
framework.  In this way, I can allow my research to flow from any source and into any 
direction that generates knowledge on my subject.  By not following a rigid method, I am 
free to move among the different information sources that are available to me in peer-
reviewed articles, documentaries, government publications, direct observation and 
experience, and textbooks.   
 Thus far in my research, I have followed leads from one author to another and one 
DHS publication to another only to discover new data points, references, and ideas on all-
hazards analysis.  This spontaneous and adaptive approach to qualitative research is 
known as bricolage and it already has helped me to create the baseline ISM and the AH-
ISM.  As a bricoleur, I adapt “to the situation, creatively employing the available tools 
and materials to come up with unique solutions to problems” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 42).  So, 
what I will offer in chapter V will be a new and different way of looking at on old 
problem. 
 Design.  My research design follows my multiple perspective, qualitative, 
homeland security, and applied research approach by fusing material and ideas from 
other author’s research, doctrinal publications, and professional experience.  My 
literature review covered three broad topics of homeland security, intelligence, 
knowledge management, and risk management as well as other related subtopics.  
Additionally, I read textbooks and government documents on environmental security, 
31 
 
technological hazards, terrorism, hazard analysis, research methods, structured analytic 
techniques, and their related publications.  The result of this research is an overall design 
that fuses established qualitative research methods with a practical analysis model.  
 I concluded my literature review by forming a universal baseline ISM and an 
HSIE-centric AH-ISM that will be analyzed and discussed in chapters IV and V.  Thus, I 
began my research and comprehensive literature review in an exploratory manner and 
concluded it with applied research products.  My exploratory goal was to learn more 
about all-hazards, all-hazards analysis, and the potential application of intelligence 
analysis models in the HSOE.  My confirmatory goal was to build upon my preliminary 
concepts of the intelligence synthesis and all-hazards analysis models.  I will offer 
explanations of my findings and an all-hazards analysis prescription at the end of my 
applied research journey in the form of the two intelligence synthesis models.  My 
research design combined reputable qualitative exploratory, confirmatory, and descriptive 
research methods with my own analysis model to offer a prescriptive conclusion 
(Maxwell, 2013; Miles et al., 2014; Newsome B. O., 2016; Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016). 
 The overall design of my research followed the qualitative research analysis 
approach and comprehensive literature review method presented by three research 
publications: 
 Qualitative research design by Joseph A. Maxwell for his conceptual 
framework of qualitative research and design. 
 Qualitative data analysis by Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman, 




 7 Steps to a comprehensive literature review: a multimodal and cultural 
approach by Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie and Rebecca Frels for their 
methodological approach to conducting a multisource literature review. 
I selected these references for their in-depth explanations, examples, and visualizations 
on qualitative research, methods, and data analysis.  They are companion resources to my 
own analytic approach.  Additionally, I applied the ISM that I created during my initial 
literature review to my final research product.  In fact, these intelligence synthesis models 
comprised my orientating ideas that I intended to confirm during this research process 
(Miles et al., 2014, p. 23).  My research design is a combination of qualitative data 
analysis methodologies and my own intelligence synthesis model.  Together, they form 
the structure of my research methodology. 
Common Terms and Definitions 
 Throughout my thesis, I use terms with definitions that I formed (i.e., synthesized) 
during my literature review.  It is common for different authors and government 
institutions to use similar terms with varying meanings depending upon their contextual 
usage. These terms and their definition amalgamations, which I use, are intended to 
clarify their meaning throughout my research: 
 Activator: the cause of an active threat resulting from its interaction with a 
dormant hazard (non-threatening hazard state). 
 Analysis: the organized method of reducing, relating, and evaluating the 
components of an entity or system to generate synthesized information and 
actionable intelligence.  It is essential to the intelligence synthesis system 
of meaning-making and decision-making. 
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 Assessments: an all-inclusive term for pre and postmortem analytic 
products, forecast, anticipatory intelligence reports, presentations, and 
other materials created for intelligence customers to be used in meaning-
making and decision-making. 
 Crisis Events: the realized consequence of the interaction between an 
active threat and a socio-technological-environmental system with the 
potential to cause harm to life, information, operations, property, and the 
environment. 
 Entities: people, places, things, or concepts that have spatial, temporal, 
and identifiable attributes that are detectable and measurable. 
 Framework: provides a uniform structure, taxonomy, and mindset within a 
community-of-practice to guide effective communication, collaboration, 
coordination, and productivity.  A conceptual framework can be 
communicated to its audience in textual documents or visual models. 
 HARTE: hazard-activator-relationship-threat-event (HARTE) all-hazards 
transition and analysis model. 
 Hazard: the source of a potential threat in a harmless or dormant state. 
 Homeland security enterprise: all public and private organizations directly 
involved in ensuring the safety, security, and resilience of the nation’s 
socio-technological-environmental assets and resources. 
 Homeland security intelligence enterprise: all DHS and other intelligence 
and information sharing entities of the Federal, state, tribal, regional, and 
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local levels of government.  The homeland security enterprises’ 
intelligence community-of-practice. 
 Intelligence: the process and the products associated with the generation of 
knowledge for meaning-making and decision-making. 
 Model: a communication tool for simplifying and visualizing a conceptual 
framework, system, structure, process, method, physical object, or idea.  It 
is used for describing, explaining, or analyzing what it represents. 
 Pluralistic intelligence:  in a homeland security domain context, is defined 
as an interdisciplinary approach to generating all-hazards knowledge and 
providing risk-informed applied intelligence products to homeland 
security enterprise leadership and practitioners in support of the National 
Preparedness Goal 
 Population: all people who are citizens, non-citizens, or transients present 
in a nation, state, region, territory, tribe, or municipality. 
 Relationships: the links or connections among entities that give or 
strengthen their meaning, function, purpose, process, structure, or 
productivity. 
 Socio-technological-environmental system: the interdependent assets and 
resources of the human, technological, and environmental systems of the 
world. 
 Synthesis: the comprehensive and pluralistic fusion of relevant data, 
information, knowledge, and intelligence that is derived from multiple 
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intelligence and operational sources, disciplines, agencies, and 
jurisdictions for producing applied intelligence products. 
 System: a dynamic, adaptive, nonlinear network of entities, relationships, 
elemental structures, and processes that has a function or purpose. 







 My literature review of government publications, text books, and academic 
articles are grouped into nine topic areas that are relevant to domestic all-hazards 
intelligence analysis in the United States: (a) the homeland security domain, (b) the all-
hazards homeland security operational environment, (c) the intelligence domain, (d) 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, (e) knowledge management and information 
management, (f) risk management, (g) emergency management, (h) law enforcement, and 
(i) environmental sciences.  I grouped the literature topics and their subtopics like this 
because each group is dependent upon the other to ensure our national population and 
ecosystems are safe, secure, and resilient according to the DHS’s vision.  Lastly, the 
literature review chapter is intended to serve as a backdrop for the overall research and 
analysis processes that I conducted.  The information in this chapter summarizes key 
research points found in the literature; analysis is provided in chapter IV. 
 Within these nine interdisciplinary categories of all-hazards intelligence 
relevance, are numerous subtopics about public and private sector hazards and threats 
analysis approaches that are discussed by the authors in the contexts of domestic safety 
and security; national critical infrastructure security; business management; law 
enforcement; crisis management; and social and environmental vulnerabilities.  Other 
topics focused on structured analytic techniques, data sources, national information 
collection platforms, and professional training and certification programs for 
practitioners.  These literature sources were written for audiences ranging from new 
security studies students at the university level to career practitioners in self-study 
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programs wanting to enhance their content knowledge or advance their careers in the 
safety and security fields.   
The Homeland Security Domain 
 The DHS publishes documents that are written to advise, inform, and guide public 
and private sector practitioners in the public safety and security fields while highlighting 
the need for resilience at all levels of government from municipal to federal.  These 
documents are publicly accessible on the internet and are doctrinal in their approach to 
the homeland security enterprise’s all-hazards operational planning and mission 
execution tasks.  They are written to define, describe, and explain the all-hazards security 
environment and to provide a common knowledge base on how the homeland security 
enterprises’ public and private sectors communicate, coordinate, and collaborate to 
accomplish our nation’s preparedness missions.  They are intended to doctrinally unite 
multiple scientific disciplines, academic institutions, governing jurisdictions, and private 
and public departments, agencies, and sectors across the federal, state, local, tribal, and 
territorial (FSLTT) safety and security enterprises.    
 These publications also address the diversity of structures, processes, and 
functions that are inherent to the myriad of institutional and infrastructural systems that 
comprise the all-hazards homeland security enterprise.  Altogether, the public-private 
partnership (P3) concept of a whole community-of-practice in the homeland security 
enterprise is thematic in these publications.  However, often there is ambiguity in the 
usage of the terms regarding hazards and threats and all-hazards analysis methodology. 
 The following publications either directly contributed to or strongly influenced 
my preliminary findings and literature review of the homeland security enterprise, the 
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HSIE, and the all-hazards HSOE.  I chose to review and summarize key points from DHS 
publications individually in my literature review chapter because of their direct influence 
on the homeland security intelligence and operations domains.  On the other hand, in the 
subsequent literature review sections, I chose to provide a consolidated summary of the 
publications.  Although I did not cite each one in the following sections of my literature 
review, all the reviewed publications should be recognized before proceeding: 
 DHS Risk Lexicon (2010). 
 DHS Instruction Manual 262-12-001-01 DHS Lexicon Terms and 
Definitions (2017). 
 U.S. Army ATP 5-19, Risk Management publication (2014). 
 DHS Risk Management Fundamentals (2011). 
 DHS National Preparedness Goal (2011). 
 DHS National Preparedness System (2011).  
 DHS National Incident Management System (2017). 
 DHS Federal Interagency Operational Plans (2016). 
 DHS Planning Frameworks. 
 DHS Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide (2013). 
 FEMA Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (1997). 
 FEMA Understanding Your Risks (2001). 
 FEMA Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans (2010). 
 DHS Considerations for Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center 
Coordination (2010). 
 Homeland Security by Charles P. Nemeth (2013). 
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 Homeland Security and Terrorism by James J. F. Forest, Russell D. 
Howard, and Joanne C. Moore (2014). 
 Introduction to Homeland Security by Jane A. Bullock, George D. 
Haddow, and Damon P. Coppola (2016). 
 All-hazards lexicon and operational approaches.  The terms hazards and 
threats are used extensively throughout the DHS’s publications.  Often, the two terms are 
used interchangeably (e.g., hazards and threats, or hazards/threats) indicating they are 
identical with similar characteristics in the context of safety and security.  Although their 
definitions as stated in glossaries and risk lexicon publications separate the two terms in a 
distinct manner, this ambiguity in their usage within the text and in the provided context 
in DHS publications increases the risk of misunderstanding by the readers.  Also, inter 
and intradepartmental miscommunication could result because of the inconsistent or 
inaccurate conceptualization of hazards and threats during analysis and in published 
assessments. 
 DHS Risk Lexicon publications. These publications, DHS Risk Lexicon and 
DHS Lexicon Terms and Definitions, defines the terms most commonly associated with 
homeland security and risk management by the DHS and the homeland security 
enterprise.  Although the terms hazards and threats are often used interchangeably or 
together as a single entity in most DHS publications, these publications identify two 
common and one differing characteristic of hazards and threats.  First, their origins are 
either natural or human caused.  Second, they have a cause-effect relationship as either 
the cause of or having the potential to cause harm to “life, information, operations, the 
environment, and/or property” (DHS risk lexicon, 2010, p. 36).  Third, they differ in that 
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a threat is directed at an entity whereas a hazard is not (DHS risk lexicon, 2010, pp. 17, 
36).  Therefore, these definitions are indicative of a transformative change of state that 
occurs from a hazard into a threat.  Stated another way, an identifiable change in 
condition is detectable from an objectiveless dormant hazard with hazardous potential 
when it becomes an active threat that is target-oriented.  At this phase, the hazard 
becomes an actualized threat with increased potential to cause harm to a target.   
 U.S. Army ATP 5-19, Risk Management publication.  The United States Army’s 
approach to defining hazards and threats is explained in its 2014 risk management 
publication, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-19 Risk Management that is approved 
for public release and available online.  I reviewed this document because of the Army’s 
extensive experience with inherently dangerous missions and operational environments.  
Thus, its risk management techniques are worthy for comparison to other security 
departments such as DHS. 
 To maximize unit capability, save lives, and preserve resources through its risk 
management process, the U.S. Army defines hazards as conditions with potential to cause 
injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or 
mission degradation, and create potential for harmful events (Department of the Army, 
2014, pp. 1-2, 1-4).  Additionally, hazards increase risk for specific events when they 
interact with people, equipment, or the environment.  The term threat is not defined or 
used in this publication.  Enemy actions and their effects, however, are considered and 
included in the Army’s holistic all-hazards approach to risk assessments.  For example, 
the effects of enemy artillery near possible snow avalanche slopes resulting in blocked 
routes is an example scenario used in the publication showing cause and effect 
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possibilities (Department of the Army, 2014, p. 4-10).  Understanding the historical and 
environmental context, having situational awareness of enemy effects and other hazards, 
and familiarity with the sequence of events in the state changes from a hazard to an event 
are essential to the Army’s risk management process. 
 DHS Risk Management Fundamentals publication.  The DHS Risk 
Management Fundamentals publication adheres to the hazard and threat definitions of the 
DHS Risk Lexicon publication.  However, it offers more context by explaining the 
potential sources of hazards as either internal or external (Risk Management 
Fundamentals, 2011, p. 13).  This is a mindset clarifier for analysts when choosing an 
analytic perspective to identify and assess hazards and threats.  Another clarifier in this 
publication is categorizing hazards and risks as either strategic, operational, or 
institutional (Risk Management Fundamentals, 2011, p. 14).   
 Strategic hazards are directed towards an entity’s higher-level assets such as an 
institutional or governmental hierarchy.  An example is an adversary leveraging social 
media to sway national elections four years from now.  Operational hazards are directed 
towards an entity’s capacity responsible for the carrying out its tasks or missions.  An 
example is a hurricane forecasted to hit a metropolitan area’s thriving business district or 
a travel and tourism industry cruise ship.  Institutional hazards and risk are primarily 
internally focused on an institution’s capacity to carry out its mission or operational 
function.  An example would be corrupt or flawed accounting practices that result in 
corporate bankruptcy or a non-governmental organization’s loss of charitable 
contributions.  These analytic perspectives of internal, external, strategic, operational, and 
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institutional all contribute to the expanded understanding of hazards, threats, events, and 
their context. 
 Another contribution of the DHS Risk Management Fundamentals publication is 
that the 6-step risk management process emphasizes the significance of context in 
assessing hazards and risk.  Context includes the historical, time, relational, political, and 
environmental aspects surrounding an entity or event.  This publication list 9 contextual 
variables to be considered when analyzing hazards and designing hazard scenarios in the 
meaning-making phases as well as the decision-making phase (Risk Management 
Fundamentals, 2011, pp. 16-18).  The significance of context variables is another cross-
cutting theme throughout the reviewed literature.   
 The DHS risk management process can be divided into the first three steps 
dedicated to meaning-making and last three steps dedicate to decision-making (Risk 
Management Fundamentals, 2011, p. 15).  These halves of the hazards and risk analysis 
process are a fundamental concept in all analytic frameworks that are driven by policy 
formulation, planning, and practical application.  The DHS risk management process 
follows the meaning-making to decision-making to problem solving continuum. 
 DHS National Preparedness Goal publication.  The National Preparedness Goal 
is to provide a secure and resilient nation across the whole community of the nation’s 
population and practitioners.  This publication establishes safety (implied), security, and 
resilience as national goals to be achieved by the whole homeland security enterprise 
community.  The whole community is everyone with a stake in preserving our nation’s 
way of life including volunteer citizens, elected officials, law enforcement officers, and 
all-hazards analysts.  The whole community concept extends beyond the individual to 
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just about any public, private, for profit, and not-for-profit organization that is either 
directly or indirectly involved with the five preparedness missions (e.g., prevent, protect, 
mitigate, respond, and recover) to hazards, threats, and crisis events at any level from 
local to national (National Preparedness Goal, 2015).   
 The National Preparedness Goal publication also explains the four types of 
hazards that our nation must be prepared to manage: (a) adversarial, (b) cyber, (c) 
technological, and (d) natural (National Preparedness Goal, 2015, pp. 4, 5).  The 
examples of each type of hazard given in the National Preparedness Goal include weather 
related storms, infectious diseases, accidental hazardous materials, terrorism and crime, 
and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.  These four types of hazards have the potential 
to become threats to our nation’s social systems, technological infrastructure, and 
environmental resources. 
 DHS National Preparedness System publication.  The National Preparedness 
System builds upon the logical and sequential relationship between meaning-making and 
decision-making with its 6 mission area components that are focused on capacity 
generation.  These capacity-centric mission areas are preceded by the analytic task of 
hazard and risk identification and assessment.  Identifying and understanding the ACTN 
hazards and threats to the national preparedness capacity generation institutions and 
process are critical to overall national resilience efforts. 
 It is in this National Preparedness System publication that the purposes of the 
Threat Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and the Strategic National Risk 
Assessment (SNRA) publications are introduced to the homeland security enterprise.  
These documents, along with specialized risk assessments, “provide an integrated picture 
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of the risks facing our Nation” (National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 2).  National 
safety, security, and resilience capacity generation is the focus of the National 
Preparedness System that is driven by risk-informed applied intelligence that is based 
upon threat identification and risk assessments. 
 DHS National Incident Management System publication.  The National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) publication is a detailed set of guidelines for the whole 
community of public and private sector security practitioners who implement the five 
preparedness missions of the National Preparedness Goal.  This document specifically 
addresses operational systems such as the Incident Command System (ICS), Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC), and Multi-Agency Coordination Groups (MAC Groups).  It 
guides homeland security enterprise in resource management, command and 
coordination, and communications and information management (National Incident 
Management System, 2013, pp. 1-2).   
 It is in the NIMS document that variations of the terms hazards, threats, and 
events are identifiable.  The NIMS glossary defines hazards and threats the same way as 
the Risk Lexicon publication and the two terms are often used together.  However, the 
significant term difference is with the use of the word event.  In NIMS, an event is a 
planned non-emergency activity and it is replaced by the term incident as a realized crisis 
(National Incident Management System, 2013, p. 68).  In my literature review, the use of 
the term event also could indicate an emergency, incident, disaster, or catastrophe so I 
will clarify its usage with the all-inclusive term crisis event.  A crisis event, whether an 
incident, disaster, or catastrophe, requires a coordinated response to protect life, 
information, operations, property, and the environment. 
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 Another key term that is important to the all-hazards analyst is defined in the 
NIMS publication.  The process of analysis is explained in the context of incident 
management with clearly identified tasks of data validation, support to decision-making, 
reductional analysis, relational analysis, timeliness, and awareness of information gaps.  
Like the concept of hazard maturation and transformation into a crisis event over a period 
of time, the NIMS definition of analysis points out the need to “turn raw data into 
information that is useful for decision-making” (National Incident Management System, 
2013, p. 56).  The explanation about analysis that is found in the NIMS document 
indicates a narrowing of doctrinal and policy emphasis by DHS in its publications from a 
macro to micro viewpoint.   
 DHS Federal Interagency Operational Plans.  The Federal Interagency 
Operational Plans (FIOP) tie together the roles and responsibilities of the federal 
homeland security community to accomplish the five preparedness missions.  They are 
written to guide the collective response across the public and private sectors and within 
the governmental hierarchy of federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and insular areas.  
They also address core responsibilities, critical tasks, and resourcing requirements at the 
Federal level (Overview of the Federal Interagency Operational Plans, 2016).  The core 
capabilities of the preparedness missions that are identified in the FIOPs also highlight 
the importance of the Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability that supports 
each mission area.  The essential need for comprehensive all-hazards intelligence analysis 
and multidisciplinary all-hazards analysts is reiterated in the FIOPs. 
 DHS Protection Federal Interagency Operational Plan.  The Prevention FIOP is 
a For Official Use Only (FOUO) document and is not available online. However, the 
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seven prevention core capabilities (e.g., planning, public information and warning, 
operational coordination, forensics and attribution, intelligence and information sharing) 
are briefly discussed in the FIOP overview publication with Intelligence and Information 
Sharing being one of them.  The Prevention FIOP is primarily focused on terror threats 
and includes prevention measures directed towards chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) weapons and cyberattack methods as well as countering 
radicalization and violent extremism (Overview of the Federal Interagency Operational 
Plans, 2016, p. 1). 
 DHS Protection Federal Interagency Operational Plan.  Appendix 3 to Annex B 
of the Protection FIOP explains the Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability.  
It is one of 11 protection core capabilities along with cybersecurity.  The eleven 
protection core capabilities are: (a) planning, (b) public information and warning, (c) 
operational coordination, (d) access control and identity verification, (e) intelligence and 
information sharing, (f) interdiction and disruption, (g) screening, search, and detection, 
(h) physical protective measures, (i) risk management for protection programs and 
activities, (j) cybersecurity, (j) supply chain integrity and security.  This appendix delves 
deeper into the specific tasks and responsibilities of all-hazards analysis and analysts in 
the federal agencies that are dedicated to identifying and assessing hazards and threats to 
public safety and security.  These critical tasks include information sharing, 
collaboration, coordination, training, analysis, and production of actionable intelligence.  
These tasks validate the all-hazards analysts’ responsibility to turn raw data into 
actionable intelligence for decision-makers as well as the need for training programs to 
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teach multidisciplinary analyst in all-hazards analysis methodologies (Protection Federal 
Interagency Operational Plan, 2016, pp. B.3-1). 
 DHS Mitigation Federal Interagency Operational Plan.  Appendix B of the 
Mitigation FIOP identifies the critical tasks of Threats and Hazards Identification (THID) 
and Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment (RDRA) in support of the mitigation core 
capabilities (e.g., planning, public information and warning, operational coordination, 
community resilience, long-term vulnerability reduction, risk and disaster resilience 
assessment, and threats and hazards identification).  Aside from the THIRA document, 
this is the first appearance of specific instructions and tasks from DHS on how to perform 
all-hazards analysis in a publicly accessible operational level document.   
 The THID and RDRA process are two of the seven mitigation core capabilities 
and are cross-cutting capabilities that support all five preparedness mission areas’ core 
capabilities.  THID and RDRA also are conceptual models that are at the heart of all-
hazards intelligence, meaning-making, and decision-making in the homeland security 
environment.  Specifically, the mitigation FIOP states THID and RDRA “will inform and 
drive operational guidance in the other National Planning Frameworks” (Mitigation 
Federal Interagency Operational Plan, 2016, p. 7). 
 This document also explains the differences between steady state operations and 
incident-driven operations.  This means intelligence support also is conducted in a steady 
state and in a reactionary state to support the National Preparedness Goal.  Additionally, 
three elements of consideration are identified for integration of intelligence and 
operations: (a) internal, (b) horizontal, and (c) vertical.  These integration considerations 
are meant to ease the unity of effort among HSIE partners within their organizations (i.e., 
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internal), across communities-of-practice (i.e., horizontal), and up and down the 
hierarchical organizations (i.e., vertical).  Altogether, these operational states and 
integration considerations are easily integrated into the framework of intelligence 
analysis and product dissemination within the HSIE (Mitigation Federal Interagency 
Operational Plan, 2016, p. 29).  
 The Mitigation FIOP provides an in-depth explanation on how and why the THID 
and RDRA conceptual models and process are integrated into each preparedness mission 
area.  This FIOP’s emphasis on the reliance of all mission areas on actionable intelligence 
to achieve safety, security, and resilience is apparent.  The Mitigation FIOP and the 
THIRA document are closely related in their intent to guide all-hazards analysis and offer 
analysts with conceptual models and methods to follow in their work. 
 DHS Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan.  The Response FIOP 
identifies 15 core capabilities all requiring all-hazards analysis and assessment support.  
Although Intelligence and Information Sharing is not specifically identified as a response 
capability, all the response capabilities and their associated Emergency Support 
Functions (ESF) need it.  Situational Assessment is the one response core capability that 
requires a direct link to all-hazards analysis and assessment.  This is an incident-driven 
operation that must have real-time intelligence support to assess the current situation and 
its immediate threats and likely causes.   
 Table B.1-1 on page B.1-2 of the Response FIOP identifies common natural, 
technological, and human-caused hazards and threats at the national strategic and 
operational levels in accordance with the SNRA and THIRA.  These are some of the 
hazardous incidents that are likely to require implementing the National Incident 
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Management System and the Incident Command System (ICS).  Incident Commanders 
and emergency response personnel rely upon incident-driven tactical intelligence, which 
is backed by on-going steady-state intelligence assessments, to understand their response 
requirements to save lives, protect property, and the environment (Response Federal 
Interagency Operational Plan, 2016).  The response preparedness mission area is almost 
exclusively incident-driven because its framework is “based upon a no-notice incident” 
(Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan, 2016, pp. B-12).  The mitigation and 
recovery mission areas are primarily steady-state intelligence centric whereas the 
prevention and protection mission areas depend on both steady-state anticipatory 
assessments and quick-response tactical intelligence information to interdict or eliminate 
threats before a crisis event occurs. 
 DHS Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plan.  The Recovery FIOP 
identifies eight core capabilities (e.g., planning, public information and warning, 
operational coordination, economic recovery, health and social services, housing, 
infrastructure systems, natural and cultural resources) and, like the other FIOP core 
capabilities, requires actionable all-hazards intelligence for it to be carried out.  An 
intelligence specific capability is not recognized in the recovery phase.  However, 
coordination, planning, warning, and other recovery oriented public services cannot begin 
without an informed decision-making process that is backed by a systemic meaning-
making process as well as action-based intelligence assessments of the environment, 




 DHS Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide publication.  
The THIRA publication provides the all-hazards intelligence community-of-practice with 
a broad doctrinal approach to all-hazards identification, analysis, and assessment.  The 
key points for all-hazards analysts in this publication are included in the 4-step THIRA 
process: (1) identify threats and hazards, (2) give them context, (3) establish capability 
targets, and (4) apply the results.  Additionally, THIRA emphasizes the whole-
community approach to understanding hazard and threat categories as well as emphasis 
on understanding their context (e.g., timing, location, history, conditions) for 
communities to build emergency management, economic, and overall preparedness 
capacity [THIRA Guide, 2013, p. 9]. 
 FEMA Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment publication.  The 
FEMA publication on multi-hazards is over 20 years old but it is still available online.  
The multi-hazards term is now replaced with all-hazards and is the term I will continue 
to use.  The publication is an excellent source of knowledge for arranging natural hazards 
into types and source regions such as atmospheric, geologic, hydrologic, seismic, 
volcanic, wildfire, and technological hazards.  It also addresses these threats in the 
context of the STE relationship between human engineering and nature.   
 FEMA Understanding Your Risks publication.  The FEMA publication 386-2 
Understanding Your Risks also is outdated but it serves as a guideline for all-hazards 
analysts and practitioners in their understanding of systemic processes that incorporate 
analysis and assessments in the mitigation of crisis events.  A note of interest is this 
document identifies four important characteristics in all-hazards analysis and risk 
assessments in four clearly stated statements on page iii: (a) threat interaction with 
51 
 
communities, (b) types of assets, (c) vulnerabilities, and (d) consequences.  These four 
points emphasize the need for understanding the consequences of an active target-
oriented threat when it encounters a community or other natural resource vulnerabilities. 
 FEMA Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans publication.  
The Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 is a FEMA publication guiding the 
whole community of the homeland security enterprise on the development of emergency 
operations plans.  The significance of this planning document is its emphasis on the 
community-based planning process that considers the nation’s population.  This guide 
expands upon nearly all preparedness, planning, operational execution, and intelligence 
and information capabilities that are discussed in the collective DHS and FEMA 
documents that I have reviewed so far.  Developing and executing emergency operations 
plans, as explained in this publication, requires the whole community of meaning-makers, 
decision-makers, and problem-solvers.  The next set of DHS publications are guiding 
frameworks based on the five preparedness missions for the whole community in its 
safety, security, and resilience efforts. 
 DHS Planning Frameworks.  The five national preparedness mission areas of 
prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover that are outlined in the DHS National 
Preparedness Goal publication are explained in more detail in separate national 
framework publications.  Each of the frameworks outlines a common conceptual 
understanding of the collaboration, planning, and operational efforts for all-hazards 
practitioners.  Similarly, the risk management framework is published by the DHS for the 
same purpose.  The nesting of these frameworks within overarching doctrinal concepts 
gives the whole community of diverse homeland security practitioners a common set of 
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principles to follow.  In turn, this allows for more cohesive safety, security, resilience, 
and preparedness policy and procedures that are based on proven conceptual models, 
effective continuity plans, and valid decision points.  Together, these frameworks guide 
the building of national preparedness capacity. 
 National Prevention Framework.  The National Prevention Framework, like all 
DHS framework publications, is a whole community approach guideline that spans across 
all public, private, and non-profit sectors of our nation’s communities of populations and 
practice in their prevention mission area efforts.  This publication identifies the numerous 
federal, state, local, tribal, regional, metropolitan, and territorial organizations and 
agencies that contribute to intelligence analysis and their coordination structures.  It is 
one of the many DHS documents that includes orientational information for all-hazards 
analysts who need to understand the HSOE. 
 The National Prevention Framework is terrorism centric with a law enforcement 
emphasis on all-crimes.  It identifies cyber threats as a unique security threat because 
cyberspace now is essential to the homeland security enterprise’s preparedness efforts.  
The National Prevention Framework recommends integrating cyber-threat analysis tasks 
in its core capabilities (National Prevention Framework, 2016, p. 4).  Although the threat 
of terrorism is central to the prevention mission set, an all-crimes approach serves as a 
reminder to analysts that other types of crimes and criminals threaten domestic tranquility 
daily. 
 National Protection Framework.  The National Protection Framework offers 
similar lessons for the all-hazards analyst as the prevention framework with added 
emphasis on steady-state and incident-driven operations.  While prevention looks 
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outward and is threat target-focused, protection looks inward at threatened social, 
technological, or environmental targets to be more risk-based.  This operational 
distinction is important for all-hazards analysts to better understand their analytic 
approach and role in intelligence support to the preparedness mission areas. 
 National Mitigation Framework.  The National Mitigation Framework, like the 
Mitigation FIOP, is an informative and explanatory DHS publication.  It has visual 
depictions of the coordinating structures, concepts, procedures, hazards and threats, of the 
whole community that are ideal for informing the all-hazards practitioner of the public 
and private sector’s mitigation efforts (National Mitigation Framework, 2016).  
Moreover, it is the DHS document that robustly addresses the necessity of creating 
resilience within the nation’s communities. 
 National Response Framework.  The National Response Framework provides 
information about the Emergency Support Functions as well as planning, operational, and 
intelligence support to the entire homeland security enterprise.  The Emergency Support 
Functions are the coordinating structures at the federal government level for managing 
response resources.  The NRF reminds the all-hazards analysts of their role in providing 
steady-state and incident-driven intelligence assessments to the whole community-of-
populations and practice at all levels of government (National Response Framework, 
2016, p. 49).  The nesting of operations plans and frameworks, including the Strategic 
National Risk Assessment, emphasizes the importance of an established federal, state, 
local, tribal, territorial, and regional all-hazards analysis structure with codified common 
functions and processes.   
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 National Disaster Recovery Framework.  The National Disaster Recovery 
Framework’s (NDRF) significance to an all-hazards analyst is its focus on post crisis 
event planning and operations requiring real-time intelligence assessments and 
information.  This is an operational move beyond normal steady-state and incident-driven 
intelligence because it introduces a third type of intelligence.  It requires a return to 
normal steady-state intelligence, yet it also is reactionary by way of anticipating and 
assessing secondary and tertiary post event hazards during on-going recovery operations.  
For example, water-borne disease, respiratory ailments, and unsafe infrastructure posing 
risk to first responders and survivors while they are treating survivors, conducting 
mortuary affairs tasks, and clearing debris. 
 DHS Considerations for Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center 
Coordination publication.  The Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 502 is about 
the internal and external coordination activities of fusion centers and emergency 
operations centers (EOCs).  It provides all-hazards analysts with another insight into their 
role and responsibilities within the coordinating structures of their centers.  Although this 
publication is intended to establish a coordination and cooperation concept of operations 
between two types of operations centers, much can be garnered from it from an analytic 
perspective. 
 Like the previously reviewed DHS and FEMA publications, CPG 502 emphasizes 
the all-hazards multiagency environment; intelligence and information organizational and 
coordination structure; intelligence process; data maturation and actionable intelligence 
process; the all-hazards operational environment; and the analytic process 
(Considerations for fusion center and emergency operations center coordination, 2010).  
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It is within the fusion center that true all-hazards, all-crimes, all-jurisdictions, and all-
disciplines unite. 
The All-Hazards Homeland Security Operational Environment   
 The DHS vision and mission statement “is to ensure a homeland that is safe, 
secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards” (Our Mission, 2018).  Similarly, 
the National Preparedness Goal is “a secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities 
required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, 
and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk” (National 
Preparedness Goal, 2015, p. 1).  Fusion center mission sets range from a terrorism, all-
crimes, or all-hazards approach tailored to their geographic region of responsibility 
(Considerations for fusion center and emergency operations center coordination, 2010, p. 
9).  Lastly, the types of hazards and threats are variously explained as adversarial / 
human-caused, technological / accidental, or natural (National Mitigation Framework, 
2016, p. 7) or as natural, intentional, and technological (Considerations for fusion center 
and emergency operations center coordination, 2010, p. 19). 
 The following publications, in addition to the above-mentioned materials, either 
directly contributed to or strongly influenced my preliminary findings and literature 
review of the all-hazards, threats, events, STE systems, and critical infrastructure topics.  
Although I did not cite each one in the following sections of my literature review chapter, 
they should be recognized before proceeding: 
 Hazards Analysis by John C. Pine (2015). 




 Natural Hazards by Keller and DeVecchio (2015). 
 Inside Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman (2006). 
 Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism by James J. F. Forest and 
Russell D. Howard (2013). 
 Disasters by Design by Dennis S. Mileti (1999). 
 Cybersecurity and Cyberwar by P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman (2014). 
 The Basics of Information Security by Jason Andress (2014). 
 Critical Infrastructure by Robert Radvanovsky and Allan McDougal 
(2013). 
 Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security by Ted G. Lewis 
(2006). 
 All-hazards Risks and Resilience published by the ASME Innovative 
Technologies Institute (2009). 
 Adversarial systems: hazards, threats, and events.  Adversarial hazards and 
threats differ from technological and natural because of their inherent human trait of 
having intent.  Thus, adversarial threats are intentionally carried out against a target or 
victim to cause harm.  This is the crime and criminals’ characteristics of the all-crimes 
approach to crime analysis.  It is important to note that humans are typed as purposeful 
systems meaning their behavior is goal oriented and decision based with a cause and 
effect relationship (Ackoff & Emery, 2017).  And, like other systems, human purposeful 
systems live and act within the triad of structure, process, and purpose.  This means 
adversarial systems are triadic systems that an analyst can study from a systems 
perspective.   
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 A cyber-attack, biological attack, school shooting, or an arsonist’s wildfire can be 
classified as adversarial because of the intentional or purposeful action of the perpetrator.  
Moreover, the decision-making process, a bomb-making process, and physical and virtual 
structural characteristics of facilities, networks, and resources are considered alongside 
the human intent—purpose—forming a systems triad.  A systems triadic perspective of 
hazards and threats helps the all-hazards analyst to better understand the sources, 
characteristics, and effects of threats and crisis events (Osborne, 2006; Vellani & 
Nahoun, 2001). 
 Cyber systems: hazards, threats, and events.  Cyber threats differ from 
adversarial threats primarily by the complex cyberspace environment in which they 
operate.  Within cyberspace are purposeful systems—people—acting with the intent to 
cause harm.  Indeed, in cyberspace there are people inside the machines, the problems, 
and the solutions (Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 10).  This means cyber-hazards and 
threats are a hybrid of adversarial and complex technological systems.  They are 
cognitive, digital, and physical at the same time (Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 14).   
 Within cyberspace, all-hazards analysts will find advanced persistent threats 
(APT), part-time hackers, and professional nation-state spies conducting a range of crime 
from terrorism, ransom hijacking, espionage, theft of intellectual property, voyeurism, 
and even acts of war.   Like people in the physical world, they can leave an evidence trail 
of data and digital fingerprints that reveal their modus operandi and identity.  
Additionally, like adversarial and other criminal threats, cyber threats also fit into the law 
enforcement problem triad of offender, victim, and vulnerability (Osborne, 2006, p. 74; 
Walker & Drawve, 2018, p. 42).  Adversarial and cyber threats share similar 
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characteristics, yet cyberspace is a unique and complex realm for security practitioners.  
Aside from its security concerns, it also is the host for many legitimate and legal 
activities that are critical to our nation’s economy, politics, military, and critical 
infrastructure sectors. 
 Technological systems: hazards, threats, and events.  Technological threats 
evolve from human created systems that have inherent hazards due to their complex 
system characteristics.  For example, hardware and software can wear out and fail 
causing safety hazards or life-threatening incidents.  Technological hazards are 
unintentional thus accidental events or called mishaps.  This is not to imply the absence 
of legal fault or responsibility because people make mistakes.  Furthermore, adversaries 
also can intentionally, and covertly, activate or initiate a cascading sequence of events 
anywhere in the system leading to a technological crisis event.   
 Accidental technological hazards and threats are triad-based systems.  All three 
elements of structure, process, and function comprise a technological system too.  The 
term function is used in lieu of purpose in technological systems.  For example, a nuclear 
reactor is a physical structure at a specific location, it performs a controlled process of 
nuclear fission, and its function is to produce energy for cities, industries, homes, and 
businesses.  A nuclear reactor, if it were to leak radiation, would become a hazard source 
in the triad of hazard source, initiating mechanism, and the target / threat outcome 
(Ericson, 2016, p. 35).   
 Natural systems: hazards, threats, and events.  Natural hazards, threats, and 
events cover a wide range of origin sources or spatial zones.  These types of hazard zones 
and sources are, according to FEMA’s Multi-Hazard publication, (a) atmospheric, (b) 
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geologic, (c) hydrologic, (d) seismic, (e) volcanic, and (f) wildfire.  Another grouping of 
natural hazard zones and sources are (a) the atmosphere, (b) hydrosphere, (c) biosphere, 
(d) lithosphere, and (e) seismic zones (Keller & DeVecchio, 2015).  A third grouping of 
natural hazard zones and sources are atmospheric, geologic, hydrologic, and biologic 
(Pine, 2015, p. 15).  The fourth grouping of natural hazards is narrower, and it also 
includes human-caused sources: (a) climatological, (b) geophysical, and (c) technological 
(Mileti, 1999).  Finally, another source is the anthrosphere zone consisting of humans, 
their habitats, and their activities (Montello & Sutton, 2013, pp. 77, 87). 
 Although some natural hazards are human-caused, the term natural-hazards 
typically refers to natural processes and events that potentially threaten environmental 
resources and populations (Abbott, 2017; Keller & DeVecchio, 2015; Pine, 2015).  An 
eco-centric approach to homeland security considers a natural event’s impact on the 
environment and natural resources (Hough, 2015, pp. 211-224).  A human-centric 
approach considers a natural event’s impact on society and human resources (Hampson, 
2013, pp. 279-294).  Accordingly, a balanced socioecological approach considers how 
natural events affect the resilience and sustainability of both the natural and human 
domains because, keeping with a systems-thinking perspective, they are interdependent. 
 Socio-technological-environmental systems.  The whole community approach 
to all-hazards safety, security, and resilience preparedness involves the entire homeland 
security enterprise as well as our nation’s communities-of-population and practice.  The 
whole community consist of all individuals of diverse demographics, non-profit and non-
governmental organizations, religious communities, business communities, law 
enforcement and military agencies, government, academia, utilities, and even mineral 
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resources and wildlife of the environmental domain.  In the combined social and 
environmental systems context of all-hazards, it not only is the human domain, it also is 
the natural domain that must be considered.   
 The human ecology approach to the pairing of human and environmental 
considerations in crisis management is based on the philosophy that human insecurity is 
the result of innate hazards in the coexisting human and the natural worlds (Mileti, 1999, 
p. 18).  The STE systems view complements human ecology philosophy as an all-
inclusive all-hazards approach to human and environmental security.  It considers the 
full-spectrum of hazards, threats, and events alongside the full-spectrum of societal and 
environmental system elements.  By adding the unique technological characteristic of our 
world because it stretches from beneath the land well into outer space, the combined STE 
system view is more accurate. 
 Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources.  All-hazards analysts support 
critical infrastructure protection (CIP) efforts across the nation as public and private 
sector security practitioners.  The nodes, links, and network of interdependent 
infrastructure that are critical to the nation’s prosperity are at risk of ACTN hazards and 
threats daily.  An all-hazards analyst must understand the threats, the systemic nature of 
the critical asset, its components, and their relationships with each other as well as with 
the nation’s population, infrastructure, institutions, economy, and the environment.   
 Critical infrastructure assets range from national monuments of cultural heritage 
significance to industrial and military defense capacity.  Accordingly, all-hazards analysts 
should have a working knowledge of multiple scientific disciplines and business-related 
fields.  It is not feasible for an all-hazards analyst to earn multiple degrees and to be 
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educated as a civil engineer or as a petroleum engineer as well as extensive experience in 
legislative and cultural history or natural resources.  For this reason, the DHS training 
guidelines emphasize the importance of an all-hazards analyst to become a subject matter 
expert on one or a few hazards areas that are relevant to their critical infrastructure sector 
or geographic region (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2007, 2010).  The 
range of Fusion Center missions, Information and Analysis Center (ISAC) focus areas, 
and critical infrastructure protection requirements highlight the risk of setting 
expectations too high for an all-hazards analyst to be an expert in all career fields and 
disciplines related to STE assets and all-hazards.  It is more practical for HSIE all-
hazards analysts to be familiar with the transdisciplinary nature of their analytical and 
collaborative work which is a goal of the AH-ISM. 
The Intelligence Domain 
 Intelligence experts and academic researchers’ resident in the DHS, the IC, 
university centers of excellence, and other research and development think tanks, 
frequently publish books and articles.  Their topics cover hazards analysis, threat 
analysis, the intelligence cycle, national intelligence collection assets, research 
methodologies, law enforcement crime analysis techniques, cognitive and critical-
thinking methods, business intelligence analysis, and commonly used structured analytic 
techniques.  In some form, these publications contribute to the body of knowledge that is 
required within the intelligence domain of security institutions, information sharing 
infrastructure, and intelligence analysis capacity.  These references are easily obtained on 
internet sites, public bookstores, and university bookstores as open-source publications.   
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 The following publications, in addition to the above-mentioned materials, either 
directly contributed to or strongly influenced my literature review and research of the 
intelligence domain.  Although I did not cite each one in this section of my literature 
review chapter, they should be recognized before proceeding: 
 Data Fusion Support to Activity-Based Intelligence by Richard T. Antony 
(2016). 
 Activity-Based Intelligence Principles and Applications by Patrick 
Biltegen and Stephen Ryan (2016). 
 Analyzing Intelligence by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (2014). 
 Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach by Robert M. Clark 
(2017). 
 The 5 Disciplines of Intelligence Collection by Mark M. Lowenthal and 
Robert M. Clark (2011). 
 The Thinker’s Guide to Analytic Thinking by Linda Elder and Richard 
Paul (2012). 
 Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards Heuer (2017). 
 Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community by Rob Johnston 
(2005). 
 Summary: Thinking Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman (2018). 
 Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy by Mark M. Lowenthal (2015). 
 Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis by Richards J. 
Heuer and Randolph H. Pherson (2011). 
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 Critical-thinking for Strategic Intelligence by Katherine Hibbs Pherson 
and Randolph H. Pherson (2017). 
 Analyst’s Guide to Indicators by Randolph H. Pherson and John Pyrik 
(2018). 
 The Back of the Napkin by Dan Roam (2009). 
 Intelligence for an Age of Terror by Gregory F. Treverton (2009). 
 Critical-thinking and Communication by Edward S. Inch and Barbara 
Warnick (2010). 
 Be-Know-Do Leadership the Army Way extracted from the Army’s 
leadership manual (2003).  
 Minimum Intelligence Training Standards for Law Enforcement and Other 
Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States by the Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative (2007). 
 Analyst Toolbox: A Toolbox for Intelligence Analyst by the Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative (2006). 
 Law Enforcement Analytic Standards by the Global Justice Information 
Sharing Initiative (2012). 
 Analyst Professional Development Road Map by the DOJ (2015). 
 The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan by the Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative (2003). 
 JCAT Intelligence Guide for First Responders by the Joint 
Counterterrorism Assessment Team (2014). 
 Department of Homeland Security Target Capabilities Lists by the DHS. 
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 Common Competencies for State, Local, and Tribal Intelligence Analysts 
by the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (2010). 
 Reviewing the Department of Homeland Security’s Intelligence Enterprise 
published by the Homeland Security Committee (2016). 
 Homeland Security Intelligence by James E. Steiner (2015). 
 The intelligence cycle.  The intelligence process is how an analyst accesses 
single-source and all-source datum that was previously collected and then analyze it to 
produce meaningful information.  Analyst further evaluates the data and information to 
produce actionable intelligence assessments that meets the needs of a decision-maker or 
policy maker often referred to as either a client, customer, or consumer of the intelligence 
products.  Once the intelligence product is decided to be actionable, it is integrated into 
the planning documents, policies, or the practitioner’s operations.  The intelligence 
process follows the applied intelligence path of meaning-making to decision-making to 
problem-solving. 
 The intelligence process is not linear because many actions are taken 
simultaneously to process information.  A talented analyst can simultaneously evaluate 
data and information for its meaning and usefulness while analyzing its entity 
components and drafting a structured argument for the final assessment.  Likewise, a 
team of analysts can delegate the intelligence process tasks and cross-talk as one group 
researches historical and contextual information while another group coordinates with the 
customer on the integration process.  Whether it’s an individual or group effort, time is a 
factor to be considered in the daily steady-state and the moment-by-moment incident-
driven state when minutes matter for first responders and survivors. 
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 The intelligence process is multilayered and is glued together by feedback loops 
that ensure smooth transitions or even simultaneous execution of each phase of the 
process.  Collectors, analysts, producers, clients, customers, and consumers are all 
stakeholders of varying degrees in the intelligence domain and they must continuously 
communicate, coordinate, and cooperate throughout the system’s life-cycle.  Each actor 
in the system must tend to their own collection, analysis, processing, and dissemination 
subsystem to ensure the whole system’s structure, process, and function are balanced and 
productive.  Whether it is a private-sector corporation managing critical infrastructure 
assets or a public-sector homeland security agency studying climate change, the 
intelligence synthesis system for each is essentially a system-of-systems consisting of 
interconnected people, technology, organizations, networks, and goals.   
 All-source national and domestic intelligence.  All-source intelligence is used by 
national and domestic intelligence analysts in the intelligence synthesis system.  This 
type of intelligence is derived from multiple sources of collection such as images taken 
by satellites, confessions, intercepted conversations, news articles on the internet, 
annotated maps, and scientific measurements.  Each collection source is the origin of the 
five disciplines of intelligence known as the 5-INTs: (a) open source (OSINT), (b) human 
(HUMINT), (c) signals (SIGINT), (d) geospatial (GEOINT), and (e) measurement and 
signature (MASINT) [Lowenthal & Clark, 2016].  Each one can be processed as single-
source of data, information, and intelligence.  However, as single-sources their products 
may be narrowly focused, limited in scope and contain unverifiable data points.  All-
source intelligence, which combines as many INTs as possible, maximizes the benefits of 
each INT and provides better context and clarity to the finished intelligence product.  
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Within intelligence collection are sources of depth and breadth (Lowenthal, 2015, p. 91) 
allowing all-hazards analysts access to diverse categories of data. Both national defense 
and domestic homeland security departments and agencies, public and private, benefit 
from 5-INTs “all-source” fused (i.e. integrated) intelligence. 
 All-hazards homeland security intelligence.  All-hazards intelligence synthesis 
draws from all-source, all-crimes, and all-disciplines intelligence sources.  All-discipline 
sources of intelligence are derived from the engineering and science disciplines of 
chemical, civil, electrical, mechanical, biomedical, software, aerospace, agriculture, 
environmental engineering as well as mathematics, physics, architecture, psychology, 
criminology, sociology, and organizational management.  This is considered pluralistic 
intelligence—the nexus of multiple disciplines, jurisdictions, and sources to create 
meaning for decisions to solve problems (McEntire, 2006). 
 All-hazards intelligence synthesis is an all-inclusive process that spans the 
hierarchical and horizontal planes of public and private institutions, government, 
organizations, academic, and scientific fields of study.  At any given time, an all-hazards 
analyst may be called upon to analyze an individual person’s motive for committing an 
act of terror or the safety and security issues surrounding a national movement arising 
from a mass-shooting.  In the context of homeland security, all really means all-
dimensions, all-disciplines, all-sources, all-crimes, and all-hazards.  Again, the homeland 
security’s all-hazards intelligence domain is pluralistic. 
Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in the Intelligence and Security Domains 
 “DHS is required by law to execute its mission in a manner that protects civil 
rights and civil liberties” (Civil Rights / Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support 
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to the National Network of Fusion Centers, 2013, p. ii).  Furthermore, DHS is required to 
ensure its departmental activities, programs, and efforts do not diminish the civil rights 
and civil liberties, as well as lawful privacy, of persons.  The department has, therefore, 
adopted the stance of safeguarding and providing enhanced compliance with privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties (PCRCL) guaranteed by the constitution, statutory laws, 
other regulations, and policies rather than mere minimal legal compliance (Civil Rights / 
Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion 
Centers, 2013, p. 28). 
 The specific PCRCL’s addressed by the DHS are the “First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; the Privacy Act of 1974; 28 C.F.R. Part 23; 
Executive Order (EO) 12333; and the Department’s Guidance on the Use of Race in Law 
Enforcement Activities” (Civil Rights / Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support 
to the National Network of Fusion Centers, 2013, p. 2).  These are the foundational 
PCRCL constraints set upon the intelligence and law enforcement activities of the HSIE 
for the rightful purpose of guaranteeing governmental respect and assurance of the 
population’s privacy and rights.  Compliance of PCRCL is always required during the 
conduct of collection, analysis, synthesis, and application of intelligence within the 
homeland security and intelligence domains and their associated disciplines and 
programs. 
 The following publications, in addition to the above-mentioned materials, either 
directly contributed to or strongly influenced my literature review and research of the 
PCRCL requirements in the homeland security and intelligence domains.  Although I did 
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not cite each one in this section of my literature review chapter, they should be 
recognized: 
 DHS Civil Rights / Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the 
National Network of Fusion Centers (2013. 
 National Security and Civil Liberty by Michael Geary (2014). 
 Recommendations for First Amendment Protected Events for State and 
Local Law Enforcement Agencies published by The Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative (2011). 
 The Constitution: An Introduction by Michael Stokes Paulsen and Luke 
Paulsen (2015). 
Knowledge, Information, and Professional Management Programs 
 The management of data, information, and knowledge is the purpose of 
institutional knowledge management (KM) programs.  It includes the people, processes, 
tools, systems, and supporting technologies to discover, capture, share, and apply 
knowledge at the individual and institutional levels as well as ensuring longevity and 
continuity of knowledge for future use (Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal, 2015, pp. xi-
xiii).  Closely related to KM is information management (IM).  IM is primarily focused 
on the technology, system processes, and technicians who support KM by way of 
collecting, processing, storing, displaying, disseminating, and protection of data, 
information, and knowledge products (Department of the Army, 2014, pp. 3-6).  
Together, KM and IM underlie the knowledge generation and intelligence production 
cycle of intelligence analysts regardless of their employing organization.  Each subfield 
of KM and IM are distinct domains requiring skilled technicians, practitioners, system 
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applications of software and hardware, and methodologies to accomplish.  For example, 
collectors of data require unique knowledge, skills, and abilities to conduct the collection 
activity “that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and 
assets as well as the processing, exploitation and dissemination of systems in direct 
support of current and future operations.” (Department of the Army, 2012, pp. 1-1) 
 The following publications either directly contributed to or influenced my 
literature review and research of the KM and IM programs in the homeland security and 
intelligence domains.  Although I did not cite each one in the literature review chapter 
they should be recognized:  
 Knowledge Management: systems and processes by Irma Becerra-
Fernandez and Rajiv Sabherwal (2015). 
 Commander and Staff Organizations and Operations published by the 
Department of the Army (2014). 
 Information Collection published by the Department of the Army (2012). 
 Training Units and Developing Leaders published by the Department of 
the Army (2012). 
 World Class: How to Build a 21st-Century School System by Andreas 
Schleicher (2018). 
 Neuro Teach: Brain Science and the Future of Education by Glenn 
Whitman and Ian Kelleher (2016) 
 The data, information, knowledge, intelligence continuum.  Knowledge 
management offers a conceptual framework in the form of a continuum about the 
maturation process of data to information to knowledge to intelligence.  This knowledge 
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generation conceptual model of intelligence production and is one of four primary KM 
tasks conducted by intelligence analysts.  The other three are organizing, applying, and 
transferring knowledge (Department of the Army, 2014, pp. 3-6).  This knowledge 
generation process, based on critical reasoning, is a foundational concept in my thesis 
research and it will be discussed and referenced throughout chapters IV and V because of 
its interdisciplinary applicability within the HSIE. 
 Information and evidence are useful in the structuring or formatting of effective 
communication products when it is processed through pattern, theme, contextual, or 
statistical analysis methodologies.  Once again, this is the continuum of gaining 
knowledge referred to as the data, information, knowledge, and intelligence (DIKI) 
continuum (Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 71).  The terms data fusion, analysis and synthesis have 
somewhat different meanings and will be explained later in this section.  To be sure, all 
are integral in the management of knowledge in the intelligence synthesis process. 
 A similar continuum of gaining knowledge is found in the research and 
communication fields.  Using the Toulmin model (Inch & Warnick, 2010, p. 42), a claim 
is derived from data that is grounded in supporting evidence in the forms of warrant and 
backing.  This is both a structure and a process flow of knowledge.  The data, warrant, 
backing, and claim sequence provides both a knowledge continuum model and a 
structured form for a written product—structured communication.  Similarly, evidence 
follows the same path as data for it to become a factual claim.  To summarize, regardless 
of the all-source, all-crimes, or all-hazards analysis environment, analyst use the DIKI 
knowledge generation continuum as both a functional process and as a communication 
structure to achieve an applied intelligence purpose.   
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 Critical-thinking and synthesis.  Generating content knowledge about a subject 
requires the organized synthesis of multiple information sources and then sharing that 
synthesized intelligence with others for application.  These tasks are the products of 
knowledge management and information management convergence.  In other words, one 
program manages the creation and retention of individual and institutional knowledge 
while the other manages the technological enablers and sharing systems needed for its 
use by individuals and institutions.  Both KM and IM disciplines are linked together by 
the critical reasoning process of analysis, fusion, and synthesis (i.e., intelligence 
analysis). 
 These following common knowledge management and information management 
terms and their definitions help with the understanding of these two disciplines and their 
contribution to pluralistic intelligence.  Synthesis is the process of “putting together parts 
or elements to form a whole” (Clark, 2017, p. 80).  Fusion “results in meaningful and 
actionable intelligence and information” when combined with analysis (Considerations 
for fusion center and emergency operations center coordination, 2010, p. 10).  Fusion 
also includes data from all-sources of intelligence collection platforms as well as their 
single-intelligence analytic products (Lowenthal, 2015, p. 91).  Analysis is “breaking an 
entity into its component parts” (Pherson & Pherson, 2017, p. 24).  And, critical-thinking 
is structured systematic thinking used to “answer questions, solve problems, and resolve 
issues” (Elder & Paul, 2012, p. 5).  These four forms of intelligence production—critical-
thinking, analysis, fusion, and synthesis—are closely related and “complementary and 




Risk Management in the Homeland Security Domain 
 Authors of risk management text books and governmental risk guidelines offer an 
integrated all-discipline and all-hazards approach to risk, vulnerability, and consequence 
analysis.  It is the risk manager’s responsibility to integrate all-hazards intelligence 
synthesis products into the risk management process to reduce adverse risk, increase 
resilience, and, for entrepreneurs, to increase opportunities.  The risk management 
process includes vulnerability analysis, consequence analysis, and risk analysis supported 
by comprehensive all-hazards analysis.  In the context of homeland security this process 
is designed to provide risk-informed applied intelligence to decision-makers. 
 The following publications either directly contributed to or strongly influenced 
my literature review and research of the risk management process.  Although I did not 
cite each one in the literature review chapter they should be recognized before 
proceeding:  
 A Practical Introduction to Security and Risk Management by Bruce 
Newsome (2014). 
 Risk Management by Carl L. Pritchard (2015). 
 A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge—PMBOK Guide 
published by the Project Management Institute (2017). 
 Project Management for Dummies by Stanley E. Portny (2017).  
 DHS publications incorporating intelligence into the risk assessment and 
management process. 
 Intelligence and the risk assessment process.  Risk management is a process 
that closely follows the intelligence process to identify hazards, threats, and the risks that 
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may be associated with an asset or an activity (Department of Homeland Security, 2011; 
Department of the Army, 2014; Pritchard, 2015).  Businesses assess the risk of 
investment and expanding their product line, corporations assess the risk of operating 
facilities near the coastal ports or away from established transportation routes, whereas 
government agencies assess the risk of immigration policy, climate change, and the 
opioid epidemic.  Many assess the risk of operating in cyberspace, social media, the 
global economy, and a polluted environment.  Certainly, all sectors assess the risk of the 
all-hazards HSOE on their operations and assets. 
 Approaching risk from the perspective of an all-hazards analyst in either the 
public or private sectors, the purpose of their efforts is to produced risk-informed 
intelligence analysis assessments.  Risk analysis may not be the client’s priority in target-
centric (Clark, 2017) or activity-based (Antony, 2016; Biltgen & Ryan, 2016) analysis 
that is intended to assess capabilities, capacity, and intent of a terror cell or crime 
organization.  Risk, however, is a client’s priority in analysis that is intended to assess a 
valued resource, asset, technology, or even intellectual property’s vulnerability to a threat 
and the consequences of an attack or interaction.  Risk-based intelligence places the 
valued STE resource or entity at the center of the problem and then assesses its 
vulnerability and likelihood of it becoming the target of a threat. 
 DHS all-hazards risk management.  The DHS risk management process is 6 
steps evenly divided between meaning-making and decision-making phases.  The all-
hazards analyst is the lead actor in defining context, identifying potential risk, and 
assessing and analyzing risk in the first three steps.  The next three steps are primarily the 
responsibilities of the risk manager and decision-makers.  The DHS risk management 
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process places the mission sets of safety, security, and resilience alongside the homeland 
security asset (e.g., critical infrastructure and key resource, or community) to be assessed.  
However, like all other intelligence and risk processes, it is not a purely linear method 
and is better done with feedback loops and threat reassessments to ensure quality risk 
assessment products are provided (Risk Management Fundamentals, 2011). 
 U.S. Army all-hazards risk management.  The U.S. Army’s risk management 
process similarly allows for all-hazards analyst to begin the process with identifying and 
assessing hazards while risk managers and military leaders develop control measures, 
make decisions, and implement controls.  These are the first four steps of the process 
with the final step emphasizing the need for feedback loops in the form of supervision 
and evaluation (Department of the Army, 2014).  The U.S. Army’s risk management 
process is implemented to protect the combat force, its military communities of family 
members and institutions, and all other assets of significant operational value.  Also, 
these risk-informed assessments are routinely integrated into the intelligence cycle and 
the commander’s decision-making process. 
 Business community risk management.  In the business community, project 
management’s risk management input is a 7-step process (e.g., plan, identify, qualitative 
analysis, quantitative analysis, response, implement, and monitor) that also includes 
identification and assessment of hazards as critical initial steps.  However, a difference 
between it and the DHS risk management process is that the assessment step is split into 
two separate steps of qualitative and quantitative assessments.  These two steps are all-
hazards focused and include technical, managerial, commercial, and external risks.  Like 
the U.S. Army, the PMBOK Guide’s risk management process includes specific steps 
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that are focused on feedback loops and monitoring the risk to ensure the process is 
continuous and not linearly limited (Project Management Institute, 2017). 
Law Enforcement in the Homeland Security Domain 
 All-crimes intelligence analysis is law enforcement’s process and product of 
analyzed crimes and criminals based on data and information that has been collected and 
compiled to prevent and monitor criminal activity (Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 69).  It includes 
crime pattern, association, network, demographic, financial, and many other crime and 
criminals related analysis methods.  The relevance of this all-crimes analysis focus to an 
all-hazards operating environment is that the DHS all-hazards analyst training program is 
law-enforcement centric with a crime-fighting approach.  It is based on the International 
Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) and DOJ standards 
outlined in the Law Enforcement Analytic Standards, and Global Justice Information 
Sharing Initiative’s Analyst Toolbox, and Target Capabilities List (TCL) published by 
DHS.  This law enforcement focus of crime and terrorism may diminish the importance 
of and the opportunities for common core all-hazards training that includes emphasis on 
technological and natural threats.   
 The following publications either directly contributed to or strongly influenced 
my literature review and research of law enforcement crime analysis.  Although I did not 
cite each one in the literature review chapter they should be recognized:  
 Law Enforcement Intelligence by David L. Carter (2009). 
 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers by John E. Eck, Ronald V. 
Clarke, and Gohar Petrossian (2018). 
 Applied Crime Analysis by Karim H. Vellanni and Joel D. Nahoun (2001). 
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 Fundamentals of Crime Analysis by Jeffery T. Walker and Grant R. 
Drawve (2018).  
 Intelligence-Led Policing by Jerry H. Ratcliffe (2016). 
 Out of Bounds by Deborah Osborne (2006). 
Emergency Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Homeland 
Security Domain   
 Emergency management, or crisis management, of crisis events that originate 
from hazard sources and threats interacting with society requires a comprehensive 
approach to all-hazards risk assessments.  Regardless of “public, policy, and media 
agendas, emergency management must be guided by scientific and statistical risk 
analysis” (Bullock et al., 2014, p. xvii).  Scientific and statistical risk analysis, as this 
statement implies, must derived from the systematic critical-thinking methodologies that 
produce risk-based data, statistics, and ultimately intelligence products for emergency 
managers who prepare emergency plans, FSLTT policies that are in support of the 
National Preparedness Goal, and implement these plans and policies in their field 
practice. 
 Emergency management is grounded in the safety and security goals to protect 
property, environmental resources, and save lives.  This is the foundation of the DHS 
NIMS publication and system as well as the Incident Command System (ICS) 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2013; FEMA, 2008; Ferlemann, 2015).  Emergency 
management practitioners include public services ranging from police, ambulance service 
providers, health care providers, fire departments, voluntary organizations active in 
disaster (VOAD), and any other public and private first responder to an incident, disaster, 
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or catastrophe (Bullock et al., 2014, pp. 181 - 187).  Emergency management 
practitioners and academics contributes to the all-hazards intelligence through applied 
research and practical application through their focus on understanding the discipline’s 
dangerous operational environment and missions. 
 Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is focused on supporting the protect 
preparedness mission and emergency management is primarily focused on supporting the 
response and recovery missions.  Like emergency management, CIP is a risk-based 
endeavor to ensure national social, technological, or natural infrastructure resources (e.g., 
transportation, energy production, or health services) are not disrupted, dismantled, or 
destroyed by a threat.  Indeed, critical infrastructures are both physical and logical 
systems and functions that are derived from people, physical assets, and cyber systems 
(Radvanovsky & McDougall, 2013, p. 4).  Similar to CIP is critical infrastructure 
assurance (CIA) that is focused on assuring critical infrastructure resilience and capacity 
to function during a crisis (Radvanovsky & McDougall, 2013, p. 6).  Homeland 
security’s emergency management, CIP, and CIA are both concerned with applying risk-
informed intelligence to protect, respond, and recover from hazards, threats, and crisis 
events. 
 The following publications either directly contributed to or strongly influenced 
my literature review and research of emergency management’s contribution to all-hazards 
intelligence synthesis.  Although I did not cite each one in the literature review chapter 
they should be recognized:  
 An Introduction to Emergency Management by George D. Haddow, Jane 
A. Bullock, and Damon P. Coppola (2014). 
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 Technology and Emergency Management by John C. Pine (2018). 
 A Practical Introduction to Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management From Home to Abroad by Bruce O. Newsome and Jack A. 
Jarmon (2016). 
 Emergency Management and Social Intelligence: A Comprehensive All-
Hazards Approach by Charna R. Epstein, Ameya Pawar, and Scott C. 
Simon (2015).  
 Incident Command System (ICS) by Kyle Ferlemann (2015). 
 Incident Command System Training published by FEMA (2008). 
 Critical Infrastructure: Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 
by Robert Radvanovsky and Allan McDougall (2013). 
 Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a 
Networked Nation by Ted G. Lewis (2006). 
 All-Hazards Risk and Resilience: Prioritizing Critical Infrastructure 
Using the RAMCAP PlusSMApproach published by ASME Innovative 
Technologies Institute, LLC (2009).  
 Ten safety and security domains where covered in my literature review: homeland 
security; its all-hazards operational environment; intelligence; the domain of privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties; knowledge management; information management; risk 
management; law enforcement’s crime analysis; emergency management; and critical 
infrastructure protection.   The literature review answered five of the six research 
questions (research questions 1-5) that I posed because my research was conducted 
almost solely from the exploratory review of government publications and academic 
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textbooks.  The central research question and research question six are synthesis-centric 
thus they are answered in the analysis and discussion chapter’s IV and V respectively.  
And, research questions one through five are answered in chapter V’s CORE Reflexivity 
Discussion section where I address each research question in my evaluation of the 
research process and its products.   
 My literature review relied upon media sources like websites, my personal 
observation from my experiences, and, most significantly, documents and publications by 
the U.S. government and non-governmental education and academic publishers.  Fifty 
percent of my literature review came from non-governmental publications, textbooks, and 
other academic articles.  Forty-five percent came from governmental publications, 







 The literature review discovered, or more accurately revealed, how the homeland 
security and intelligence domains historically viewed and currently approach the all-
hazards operational environment and its analytical challenges.  The range of hazards, 
threats, crises, and their social, technological, and environmental impacts are well 
documented in governmental and academic publications.  However, my preliminary 
findings discovered the need for and the structure of two conceptual models for an all-
purpose and all-hazards intelligence synthesis focus.  Also, throughout the literature 
review process, institutional and individual analysts core competency traits became 
apparent.  I further researched the commonality of these competency traits and their 
relationships to the two preliminary intelligence synthesis models during my subsequent 
research.  The results of my research into institutional and professional analytical core 
competencies and intelligence synthesis models will be presented in chapters IV and V.  
At this time, I would like to note that my qualitative research methodology was derived 
from five research and analysis methods sources: 
 Research design by John W. Creswell for his qualitative methods outlined 
in chapter nine of his book (2014, pp. 183-213). 
 7 Steps to a comprehensive literature review by Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie 
and Rebecca Frels for their step-by-step methodology on conducting a 
literature review as a research method (2016, pp. 62-63).  The 
comprehensive literature review methodology is central to my research as 
a process and product.  It will inform my research during each phase by 
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relying on “multimodal texts and settings in a systematic, holistic, 
synergistic, and cyclical process of exploring interpreting, synthesizing 
and communicating published and/or unpublished information” 
(Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 4). 
 An introduction to research, analysis, and writing by Bruce Oliver 
Newsome for his explanations on how to analyze evidence and data (2016, 
pp. 259-282). 
 Qualitative data analysis by Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman, 
and Johnny Saldaña for their focused, sequential, and visualized data 
analysis methods (2014). 
The Researchers Role 
 I was the only researcher throughout my research process.  As I stated in my 
research design and approach sections, I took a qualitative pragmatic realist approach in 
my research.  My methodology was bricoleur in its style, but I also was rigorous in my 
efforts.  I conducted it almost exclusively from my home because nearly all my literature 
sources and materials are publicly available online or located at my home in print 
version.  As the sole researcher, I collected, analyzed, synthesized, and am now reporting 
on my findings without the help of research assistants or other secondary research or 
review sources.  My personal, academic, and professional experience guided my selection 
of topics and reference materials.  Any personal biases I may have are grounded in my 
experiences of personal loss, which is expressed as an empathy for others during times of 
crisis, and a first-hand understanding of post-flooding recovery challenges after my 
parents’ home was flooded during Hurricane Harvey.  My professional biases are rooted 
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in my military career of ensuring national security and, more specifically, our nations 
constitutionally protected privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.  My security studies 
academic bias is based on balancing these human rights with scientifically informed 
environmental security policy and practice. 
Bounding the Research 
 Setting, audience, process, and ethical considerations.  I conducted my 
research primarily from my home in Houston, Texas, and I accessed publicly available 
literature and media sources through my home internet provider on my personal laptop, 
iPad Pro, iPhone, and television cable provider.  My audience is the homeland security 
and intelligence domain practitioner, specifically, those in employed within the HSIE, 
and academic researchers and students of security studies and all-hazards crises.  My 
research only used publicly available unclassified resources. 
 My research process integrated the collect, analyze, synthesize, and apply (i.e., 
evaluate and report) process, referred as CASA, that is based on my preliminary findings.  
The CASA process is a synthesis of commonly used intelligence and research methods 
derived from government and academic intelligence analysis publications.  I collected 
data and information primarily from public and academic sources, analyzed it following 
the RREI steps (e.g., reduce, relate, evaluate, integrate), synthesized my findings into this 
text report with illustrative figures, evaluated my findings for any discrepancies, and 
provided my research findings to my thesis committee.  The structure of my research 
findings will follow the Toulmin structured argumentation format (Inch & Warnick, 
2010, pp. 22, 42; Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, pp. 162-164) and it is compliant with the 
Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (2010).  Moreover, there 
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are no other participants so my main ethical considerations during my research are 
avoiding unintentional plagiarism or misrepresentation, and ensuring I only use open-
source unclassified material. 
Data Collection Procedures 
 Types of data sources.  The homeland security all-hazards operational 
environment is a multidisciplinary, multiagency, and multijurisdictional domain.  
Therefore, access to open-source literature databases that represent multiple career fields 
and scientific disciplines was required (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 88).  The types of 
data sources that I used consisted of audio and visual media; my personal experiences and 
observations an intelligence officer; publicly accessible documents; the expertise of other 
authors and researchers derived from media and documents; and publicly available 
secondary data collected by other researchers in the form of textbooks and research 
publications.  This is the MODES method of collecting multidisciplinary, 
interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary literature sources (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016).  
All literature sources provide authoritative data or an alternative interpretation of the 
topic.  This separation is aligned with my critical realist world view. 
 Media.  I viewed and recorded pertinent information from documentaries and 
interviews (e.g., Public Broadcasting Station, Home Box Office) about homeland 
security, national and domestic intelligence processes, ACTN disasters, and risk 
management to better understand them from a systems, participants, and documentary 
contextual perspective.  For example, journalistic interviews with current and former 
homeland security officials, first responders, and other practitioners as well as 
documentaries of past disasters.  I understand that the selection of visual and audio media 
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that I considered to be valid was subjective and required my utmost scrutiny to ensure its 
veracity. 
 Observations.  Direct observations incorporated into my research were my own 
and based on either my professional expertise as an intelligence officer in support of 
military intelligence and operational missions across the world, or my personal 
experiences during Hurricane Harvey’s flooding in the Houston metropolitan area.  I 
relied upon my experience with planning and conducting all-source and 
counterintelligence support to the United States Eighth Army and Republic of Korea 
forces opposed to North Korea and other Foreign Intelligence Services operating in South 
Korea; Turkey during Operation Desert Storm as a PATRIOT Air Defense Officer and 
briefly supported Operation Provide Comfort humanitarian mission to the Kurdish 
population; and also my command experience of an imagery intelligence unit in support 
of U.S. Central Command.  My observations, and potential biases, about intelligence 
synthesis and crisis management are grounded in these national security experiences. 
 Documents.  Publicly accessible U.S. Government and United Nations 
publications, non-governmental organization references, academic textbooks, peer-
reviewed journals, and investigative reports were my primary literature sources.  These 
sources were selected for their relevance to the topics of domestic safety, security, 
resilience, intelligence analysis, risk, and crisis management in the all-hazards HSIE.  
Mapping services (e.g., Google Earth or Google Maps) and their products were utilized 
as references in support of my understanding of document and media sources content.  
My interpretation of these mapping products should be considered my own observations.  
I did not request any legal or public records for my research. 
85 
 
 Experts.  Expert opinions of authors and other researches came from my selected 
literature sources and they are cited appropriately.  There are no other participants in my 
research. 
 Secondary data.  Additional research data collected by others was derived from 
my literature sources.  I did not request or access secondary quantitative data from any 
other sources because my research was primarily qualitative. 
 Data collection sensors and instruments.  I used the public internet (e.g., Safari, 
Google, and Google Scholar) as my primary research instrument to obtain publicly 
available literature materials from government, academic, and private websites.  I 
accessed the Homeland Security Digital Library, the FEMA Emergency Management 
Institute (EMI) Academic Emergency Management and Related Courses (AEMRC) 
online resource library, the Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s (CHDS) 
University and Agency Partnership Initiative’s (UAPI) online educational resources, and 
the Sam Houston State University Newton Gresham Library (e.g., EBSCOhost access to 
386 databases) through their websites using my own student subscription accounts.  I 
used key term, keyword, and Boolean search strategies on the internet and library sites.  
The key references I have listed in my research methods introduction paragraph offer 
numerous tables and lists of open-source websites I used when choosing literature 
sources. 
Data Recording and Storage Procedures 
 I used the Microsoft Office 365 suite of word processing, data organization, and 
presentation software to record and display my research.  MS Word, Excel, and 
PowerPoint were my primary electronic data recording tools; however, I took written 
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notes and sketches on loose-leaf paper, white-board, and in a note taking application on 
my personal iPad during my research.  I stored my research files and documents on my 
personal laptop computer (e.g., my documents folder), iPad, and they were backed-up in 
my Drop Box and OneDrive cloud folders.  I have sole access to these storage devices 
and files using a personal login and password. 
Data Validation, Analysis, Synthesis, and Interpretation of Collected Information 
 Collected data validation.  I used multiple literature sources (i.e., MODES) to 
validate the accuracy of the research data and information.  I do not use quantitative data 
to triangulate my collected data and my findings because I used the qualitative literature 
review as my research method.  Therefore, I relied upon the different modes of data 
sources for validation.  For example, I compared documentary evidence, government 
publications, and independent reports to verify the accuracy and acceptability of data, 
claims, and findings. 
 Analysis of data and information.  I separated analysis from synthesis in 
accordance with my preliminary findings about intelligence synthesis methods.  Analysis 
is the systematic breaking down of information into its constituent parts and synthesis 
involves making connections among the parts (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 224).  
Moreover, research is acquiring knowledge (Newsome, 2016, p. 129).  Therefore, I 
simultaneously conducted research, analysis, and synthesis using the four analysis phases 
of reduce, relate, evaluate, and integrate (RREI).  I also drew from the data analysis 
display and application methods of Qualitative Data Analysis as a primary source. 
 As I read and collect data and information, I recorded the results of the RREI 
phases and applied appropriate analytic techniques of reductional and relational analysis.  
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My general analytic approach was intended to be descriptive, analytical, and evaluative 
(Newsome, 2016, p. 124) to accomplish two objectives: apply the RREI analysis phases 
as a method of research and continue to refine it as a proven product of my research.  
This method helped me classify and group qualitative data and determine its level of 
analysis (e.g., hierarchy) [Newsome B. O., 2016, pp. 266-270].  In my research I drew 
upon qualitative data analysis and coding techniques to add rigor to my analysis and 
synthesis efforts. 
 Reductional analysis.  By conducting reductional analysis, I reduced the studied 
source or entity into keywords, topics, concepts, subentities, subsystems, and system 
elements of structure, process, and function or purpose.  This task categorized and 
recorded basic attributes, variables, and identifying characteristics.  I focused on ACTN 
hazard sources and STE entities.  Throughout my research I collected data that related to 
my central research question and created acronym codes to categorize, label, and 
summarize the data as general method of reductional analysis (Miles et al., 2014, pp. 73-
75). 
 Relational analysis.  By conducting relational analysis, I related the basic 
components of my data to discover sequences, patterns, themes, links, associations, 
relationships, and likely meanings between STE entities and ACTN hazard sources.  This 
task connected and combined entities, concepts, interdependence, anomalies, and context.  
This was the production phase of organized research information.  Throughout my 
research I identified relationship types and characteristics such as values, attitudes, 
beliefs, conflicts, emotions (Miles et al., 2014, p. 75), transactions, activities, and 
networks as a general method of relational analysis. 
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 Evaluative analysis.  I conducted evaluative analysis to continue the refinement, 
understanding, relevance, and the impact of systemic elements, entities, themes, concepts, 
context, and their relationships to my central research question.  This was the final phase 
of meaning-making regarding my research findings.  Evaluative analysis is the collation 
and comprehension of researcher-accepted organized information into actionable 
intelligence or applied knowledge.  It is important to note that the evaluation phase serves 
as a reminder to the researcher to pause and reflect on the findings and determine its 
usefulness, replicability, and potential application.  In other words, this is when I asked so 
what? about my findings to test its usefulness for my intended audience.  Throughout my 
research, I assigned “judgements about the merit, worth, or significance” (Miles et al., 
2014, p. 76) of my organized information, conclusions, and findings as a general method 
of evaluative analysis. 
 Integration and synthesis.  Integration and synthesis of my research findings into 
policy formulation, legislation, operational planning, decision-making, and problem-
solving practice is the final phase of my analysis.  This task of advising, informing, and 
acting on the “assertions and propositions, or connected sets of explanations, reflecting 
the findings and conclusions of the study” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 99) were done by 
creating five complete interdisciplinary all-hazards intelligence synthesis models.  I will 
display my data, information, conclusions, and findings in this written report that 
includes illustrative figures.  As stated previously, the practical application of these 
models within the HSIE are recommended for future research.  My analysis and 
discussion in chapters IV and V build the intelligence synthesis models and integrate 
them in an interdisciplinary way, but it does not apply them in practice for validation.   
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The CORE Method for Validity and Reliability of the Findings 
 I used the comprehensive literature review methodology in my research because it 
helped me accomplish five purposes during my research.  These reasons are topic-driven, 
method-driven, and connection-driven (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 15): 
 1.  To inform me and contribute to the body-of-knowledge on all-hazards 
analysis. 
 2.  To narrow my topic to ensure its relevance to the all-hazards community-of-
practice. 
 3.  To discover new multidisciplinary perspectives on my topic. 
 4.  To explore new methods of all-hazards analysis. 
 5.  To understand the interdisciplinary relationships on my topic. 
As my own research instrument, I worked towards my objectives with these reasons in 
mind.  Accordingly, I was in a more advantageous position to validate my findings, 
determine their reliability, and their potential application within the HSIE.  An 
explanation of the CORE reflexivity method, which I used, is in the next section. 
 CORE reflexivity method.  I applied the CORE reflexivity method during each 
phase of my research process (e.g., collect, analyze, synthesize, and report).  The CORE 
process helped me recognize potential biases and reflection opportunities, and to 
critically examine both the process and the product of my research (Onwuegbuzie & 
Frels, 2016, pp. 20-21).  In a multimodal context, the CORE process helped with the 
triangulation of data, information, and analytic findings by cross-examination of my 
MODES literature sources.  It also will help me flush out any biases and discrepant 
information.  The CORE process of critical examination is: 
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 Critical examination: What did I learn and why?   
 Organization: How can I organize and display the content of what I 
learned? 
 Reflection: What was the research process or analysis method like (i.e., 
did it work?) and how does it relate to the central research questions?  
Where there any biases or discrepancies? 







 My literature review drew from all-hazards, all-crimes, all-sources, and all-
disciplines resources related to homeland security, risk management, academic research, 
and intelligence.  This multidisciplinary resource collection of scientific disciplines, 
academic perspectives, institutional knowledge, and experienced practitioners in the 
homeland security domain are the data and information sources of the pluralistic HSIE. 
Accordingly, my analytic approach and conceptual framework about homeland security 
intelligence synthesis is influenced by this diverse environment and its interrelated 
concepts of systems, networks, relationships, synthesis, and context.  These pluralistic 
aspects, combined with my security studies education, military intelligence training, and 
my personal experiences with natural disasters, undoubtedly shaped my analysis and 
research findings.   
 In this chapter, I will begin with a reductional analysis approach and deconstruct 
the United States’ homeland security domain’s operational environment to identify its 
essential elements that are important for understanding the homeland security intelligence 
domain and all-hazards analysts—answering research questions four and five.  Next, I 
will take a relational and integrative analysis approach and explain how the HSIE fits into 
its operating environment to support the National Preparedness Goal and Department of 
Homeland Security missions from a pluralistic intelligence perspective—answering 
research questions one and three.  Lastly, I will explain the institutional and professional 
core competencies essential to the training and development of an all-hazards intelligence 
analyst—answering research question two.  The conceptual framework derived from the 
92 
 
HSOE, the HSIE, and the competencies of all-hazards intelligence analyst will then be 
evaluated and synthesized in chapter V to create the AH-ISM—answering research 
question six and the central research question.  
Deconstructing the Homeland Security Operational Environment 
 The HSOE is a security domain within the larger national security domain that 
encompasses national, international, and global security issues.  National security 
agencies are focused on both external and internal threats to national interests.  The 
international security domain includes threats such as another nation’s military, their 
sponsored militant proxies, transnational terror organizations, organized crime 
syndicates, or the effects of climate change.  The HSOE is primarily focused on domestic 
threats and it is comprised of three distinct hazard and threat subdomains that overlap in 
inventive, complementary, and even destructive ways.   
 These three HSOE subdomains are comprised of people, technology, and nature.  
Certainly, each of these subdomains are associated with necessary and beneficial critical 
infrastructure sectors, vital natural resources, and public safety and security assets.  
Because the U.S. national population depends upon all three domains for survival and 
prosperity, DHS is mandated to keep the homeland safe and secure.  However, these 
domains also are sources of hazards and threats to the U.S. homeland. 
 In their own unique ways, the human, technological, and natural worlds have the 
capacity to create new life, sustain it, and even kill it.  From a systems viewpoint, each 
domain is made of systems within systems (i.e., a system-of-systems) and they are 
intertwined by complex and wide-ranging networks of independent persons, virtual 
communities, national institutions, economic partnerships, interstate highways, internet 
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cables, and wireless information sharing intranets.  The array of STE systems within the 
HSOE are seemingly countless.  Accordingly, the DHS mission set of providing national 
safety, security, and resilience applies to the STE systems of the HSOE.   DHS and the 
HSIE also are charged with identifying and countering inherent STE hazards and threats 
within the framework of the five National Preparedness Missions (e.g., prevent, protect, 
mitigate, respond, recover). 
 The HSOE not only consist of STE systems, it also is the territory of DHS 
operational missions and intelligence activities.  The functional and hierarchical 
organization of DHS is designed to carry out its missions.  The DHS operational missions 
are: (a) prevent terrorism and enhance security, (b) secure and manage our borders, (c) 
enforce and administer our immigration laws, (d) safeguard and secure cyberspace, (e) 
ensure resilience to disasters (Our Mission, 2018).  These five departmental missions are 
the operational activities carried out daily by DHS organizational and support 
components within the United States and in coordination with other FSLTT entities.   
 Supporting these operational components are DHS intelligence activities that are 
coordinated with the other 16 members of the intelligence community (IC).  This is the 
HSIE.  Through various component intelligence programs (CIP) mission support and 
intelligence sharing networks, HSIE agencies and private sector organizations work 
together in this collective national and homeland security domain.  Altogether, the 
domestic STE systems and these operational and intelligence activities comprise the 
HSOE.  Before continuing the discussion about the HSOE’s STE systems and ACTN 
threat systems, an explanation about what comprises a system is necessary. 
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 Systems in the security domain.  The HSOE, like all other security domains, 
must identify what must be secured, what threatens its security, and then how to secure it.  
Considering the principal theory of a systems view of life, that everything is connected, 
one can determine that the safety and security fields are primarily concerned about 
securing STE systems that provide essential services to and have vital resources for the 
national population (i.e., critical STE infrastructure).  Also, security practitioners must 
understand the STE origins of hazards and threats systems.  A breakdown of a system 
into is functional components and identifiable characteristics helps security practitioners 
to understand the security problem. 
 Systems components and characteristics.  There are four types of systems: (a) 
mechanistic (i.e., technology), (b) animate (i.e., people), (c) social (i.e., institutions), and 
(d) ecological (i.e., environmental) (ACASA, 2018).  These types of systems are 
hierarchical because, for example, the natural or ecological system of the world includes 
the social systems of humans.  And, human created social systems include individual 
people as well as the technological achievements and activities that are invented by 
people.  I will refer to these systems more concisely as STE systems by combining the 
animate and social systems into one social grouping. 
 Systems consists of components and characteristics that form the baseline of 
analytical understanding in the HSOE.  To understand the homeland security problem 
and its context, practitioners must first understand the nature of the systems within the 
HSOE.  For example, preventing a potential flood hazard (e.g., a water reservoir) from 
ever becoming a threatening flood to a nearby community of homes and businesses, 
requires an understanding of natural systems (e.g., hydrology and meteorology), social 
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systems (e.g., economics and public administration), and technological systems (e.g., 
hydraulic engineering and architecture).  The basic components and characteristics of 
systems are multidisciplinary and applicable to the security domain. 
 Systems Components.  Systems have three basic components that must be present 
for the system to exist: (a) structure, (b) process, and (c) a function and / or a purpose 
(Ackoff & Emery, 2017, pp. 13-32; Clark, 2017, p. 39; Meadows, 2008, pp. 11-43).  The 
structure of a system can be its physical or tangible shape and size, identifiable 
boundaries, and its subelements (e.g., a factory or a person) and their relationships.  Also, 
the structure of a system can be intangible elements such as tacit knowledge or esprit de 
corps (Meadows, 2008, p. 13).  Examples of systems structures are the formal and 
informal information networks of people and machines, the hardline and wireless 
infrastructure of an office building, the neurotransmitters of the human brain, or the 
physical structure of a nuclear reactor.  
 Technically, the processes of a system are the transformational activities that 
occur in support of the system’s objective.  A system’s objective is its technological 
function or goal-oriented purpose (e.g., smelting steel or critical reasoning).  In other 
words, a system’s process is the “sequence of events or activities that produce results” 
(Clark, 2017, p. 39).  This can be a mechanistic process like the temperature control 
process of a home’s air conditioner that measures, adjusts, and regulates air flow and 
temperature (Ericson, 2016, p. 20; Meadows, 2008, p. 20).  Process also can be cognitive 
such as the critical thinking steps (Elder & Paul, 2012).  Furthermore, it can be a 
combination of technologically enabled processes and cognitive process.  The 
intelligence cycle illustrates this hybrid process as both an analytical synthesis process 
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aided by technical collection systems and data exploitation software.  As a matter of 
practicality, the technical process and the functional stages or phases of a system work 
together towards the purpose or objective of the system. 
 The function of a system is the technological reason or the human purpose of the 
system (e.g., produce steel for building construction or generate intelligence products for 
decision-makers).  The function or purpose of a system is best identified from its 
behavior, actions, or products rather what is stated or said (Meadows, 2008, p. 14).  It is 
noteworthy that functions and purposes can be nested as essential subsystems within 
larger systems to accomplish, for example, a higher-level technical function or a greater 
humanitarian purpose.   
 Although function is generally associated with technological systems (i.e., 
objective driven systems) and purpose with human systems (i.e., purposeful systems), 
both can be combined in a hybrid function-purpose (Ackoff & Emery, 2017, p. 31; 
Ericson, 2016, p. 10).  For example, knowledge generation in the intelligence domain, 
like technical collection or cognitive analysis processes, requires the functional and 
purposeful transformation of data into structured knowledge through the application and 
interaction of both human minds and software applications. 
 Systems Functional components. As mentioned above, the technical processes and 
functional stages of a system work together to achieve the objective or purpose of the 
systems.  Because systems are either machines or people, or a symbiotic hybrid of both, 
they are objective and goal driven.  Open functional systems are characterized by three 
essential components: (a) input, (b) transformation, and (c) output (ACASA, 2018; Clark, 
2017; Bejan & Zane, 2012; Ericson, 2016; Meadows, 2008).  The functional and 
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purposeful objective of either mechanistic or human systems requires an input typically 
of either energy, a stock, or information.  Then, a transformational or synergistic change 
occurs to produce an output from the system.  That output is the product of the systemic 
process and function.  Simply put, something goes in, something transformational 
happens to it, and then something different comes out. 
 The functional components of a system, whether it is a money laundering scheme, 
industrial chemical spill, or a hurricane, requires a process supported functional 
transformation (i.e., a state change) in its stock.  The stock of a system are the elements, 
or entities, of a system that can be identified and measured as input flows, 
transformational activities, and output flows (Meadows, 2008, pp. 18-19).  For example, 
“dirty” money acquired from criminal activities is invested into a financial institution 
(i.e., inflow stock).  Then, it is transferred to multiple investments and organizations to 
hide it (i.e., transformational stock).  Finally, the “clean” money is reinvested into 
different financial institutions under the guise of legitimate earnings (i.e., outflow stock).  
This same functional process can be applied to the inflow, synthesis, and outflow of 
ideas, knowledge, and intelligence products.  In summary, the three basic system 
components and the three functional components are interrelated and interact to form a 
complex and unified whole that has a specific function or purpose that is greater than the 
individual parts, entities, or components of the system (Ericson, 2016, p. 11).   
 Systems Characteristics.  In addition to structure, process, function, and purpose 
components and the inflow, transformation, and outflow functional components, a system 
has three distinguishing characteristics about each of its components.  System 
components, tangible or intangible, are: (a) identifiable, (b) detectable, and (c) 
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measurable (ACASA, 2018; Clark, 2017; Bejan & Zane, 2012; Ericson, 2016; Meadows, 
2008).  This means systems can be perceived, located, and studied by researchers and 
analysts. 
 The identifying characteristics of a system encompass its size, color, shape, odor, 
or any other descriptive characteristic based on the senses of sight, smell, touch, sound, or 
taste.  People can distinguish the similarities and differences among entities and systems 
by their senses as well as by technical means.  Sensors and instruments are designed to 
replicate human senses at a higher level of fidelity to detect and measure an entity’s 
identifiable characteristics.  For example, satellites can take pictures of objects on the 
earth’s surface from great distances in outer space that are undetectable by the human 
eye. 
 These finely calibrated sensors and instruments are instrumental in the detection 
and measurement of systems for further research and analysis.  In the safety and security 
domain, the detection of a toxic chemical in the air, that is measured at a life-threatening 
level, is an example of detection and measurement.  Coupled with the understanding of a 
chemical plant’s operating process, functional components, and products, an analyst 
could then identify the source of the hazard or threat.  Analysts who know STE system 
components and characteristics that are identifiable, detectable, and measurable are better 
positioned to carry out safety, security, and resilience efforts within the HSOE.  Figure 1 




Figure 1. An Open System.  A system is comprised of three components: (a) its tangible 
or intangible structure, (b) its sequential or cyclic process, and (c) its functional and / or 
purposeful objective.  A system’s three sequential functional components are: (1) input, 
(2) transformation, and (3) output.  The functional components are supported by the 
system’s process to achieve its objective output.  Additionally, a system’s components 
are (a) identifiable, (b) detectable, (c) and measurable.  This means a social, 
technological, or environmental system can be perceived, located, and analyzed.  This 
figure is an amalgam of systems descriptions from The systems view of life by Capra & 
Luisi, (2014), Intelligence analysis: a target-centric approach by Robert M. Clark (2017), 
Thinking in systems by Donnella H. Meadows (2008), and Hazard analysis techniques 
for system safety by Clifton A. Ericson (2016). 
 Entities.  Systems can be further deconstructed into smaller elements or entities; 
whole systems can be classified as entities too.  Entities are the essential objects of a 
system and should not be confused with the system elements of structure, process, 
function, and purpose.  Entities are commonly depicted as triads composed of three 
essential characteristics: (a) the thing or object, (b) its location in time and space, and (c) 
its associated properties or characteristics (Antony, 2016, pp. 17-42).   
100 
 
 An entity, like a system, is identifiable, discoverable, and measurable.  For 
example, in the natural world, matter is an entity composed of mass (i.e., measurable), 
occupies space (i.e., discoverable), and has distinguishing properties (i.e., identifiable) 
such as its current state of being in relation to time.  In other words, all systems and 
entities exhibit or emit spatiotemporal (a) properties or attributes, (b) it’s entity state or 
activity, and (c) its likely relationship to other entities.  The significance of entities is that 
hazards, activators, threats, and events are entities that can be systematically collected 
and analyzed.  To be sure, relationships are intangible entities that are identifiable, 
detectable, and measurable.  Whether they are of STE or ACTN origin, entities are 
subject to reductional, relational, and evaluative analysis.  
 Socio-technological-environmental (STE) systems in the HSOE.  The types of 
STE systems in the HSOE are identified throughout the publications and documents of 
chapter II’s literature review.  Social systems are comprised of people, communities, 
businesses, infrastructure, government, and institutions that are both private and public.  
Accordingly, social and technological systems are derived from multidisciplinary human 
ingenuity, innovation, and creativity.  This means social systems are products of the 
sciences as much as humanity.  Engineers, economist, politicians, and many more people 
from all academic and practitioner-based career fields comprise the STE systems.  And, 
environmental systems originate from the natural world of mineral resources, plants, 
animals, and natural phenomenon like earthquakes and storms.   
 Mnemonics, or memory aids, are useful tools for maintaining organized 
information and thinking in complex information environments. Two memory aids can 
help researchers and analysts categorize and recall the common types of STE systems: 
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PIE and S3E.  The first is PIE: population, infrastructure and institutions, economy and 
environment.  The second is S3E: social, engineered, economic, environmental.  Another 
tool for organizing the types of hazards, threats, and crises that originate from STE 
systems is ACTN or ACTioN (pronounced action).  ACTN hazards, threats, and their 
consequential crisis events come from STE systems.  Both STE and ACTN systems will 
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  Clearly, researchers and analysts can 
create or choose their own mnemonics, but I will use these three memory aids in my 
discussion about the human, technological, and natural worlds.   
 The human world.  The human world is, as the term implies, human-centric 
meaning its population strives to survive and thrive for its own sake just like all other 
species.  However, from a human-centric security perspective, emphasis is placed on the 
dignified humanity of the individual person and the humane treatment of all people.  This 
means institutional safety and security efforts are intended to protect a person’s right to 
live in a humanitarian environment, safeguard their natural civil liberties and rights, and 
guarantee their legal rights through an impartial social justice system (Hampson, 2013, p. 
281; Haynes, Hough, Malik, & Pettiford, 2011, p. 552).  This human security viewpoint 
has had a significant influence on the policy formulation and practical application of 
homeland security and intelligence activities in the United States.  For example, U.S. 
governmental PCRCL guarantees, judicial oversight, and departmental compliance 
assessments are rooted in these concepts of protecting fundamental freedoms, inalienable 
rights, constitutional rights, and the right to life and liberty.  Compliance with these 
human security based PCRCL safeguards will better assure the national population that it 
can live in freedom from want and fear (Malik, 2015, p. 70).  On the other hand, when 
102 
 
the homeland security and intelligence domains do not comply with PCRCL guarantees, 
public discontent can manifest as robust demonstrations—a Constitutionally protected 
activity. 
 Human security and safety.  The human-centric FSLTT homeland security 
domain relies upon a federal government that creates and maintains “political, social, 
environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that together give people the 
building blocks of survival” (Hampson, 2013, p. 282).  Certainly, human security directly 
links an individual’s sense of security to the larger whole-community security apparatus 
found at the municipal, state, and national levels.  To accomplish this task, DHS must 
balance human-centric and state-centric policy and practitioner requirements through the 
routine and deliberative administration of intelligence analysis, risk management, and 
operational tasks within the parameters of PCRCL compliance.  Human-centric safety 
and security planning, policy formulation, and practice considers the types of adversarial 
threats that originate from the human domain as well as the equally relevant technology-
centric and eco-centric concerns that influence the human domain. 
 The spectrum of threats to human social systems includes a broad range of 
potential crises originating from economic collapse, food scarcity, environmental 
resource depletion, political breakdown, demographic tension, criminal proliferation, 
natural phenomenon, violence, war, or genocide (Malik, 2015, p. 65).  Planning for 
crises, formulating preparedness policies, and resourcing emergency practitioners must 
be balanced by the competitive safety and security needs that come out human and 
environmental domains.  As indicated by the broad range of threats in the above-
mentioned list, human-centric threats in the HSOE are categorized into four groupings for 
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intelligence analysis and operational focus and clarity.  Again, the four categories of 
hazards, threats, and crisis events are adversarial, cyber, technological, and natural 
(ACTN).  
 Adversarial hazards, threats, and crisis events.  The hazards and threats that 
originate from the human domain are adversarial by nature.  This is because people are 
purposeful systems driven by goals and intent (Ackoff & Emery, 2017).  Therefore, 
criminals, terrorist, and their crimes are adversarial and threatening to the national 
population’s right to live, to enjoy their civil liberties, and exercise their legal rights.  For 
example, crimes such as burglary, murder, tax evasion, discrimination, and mass 
shootings, despite their violent and non-violent differences, can deprive victims of their 
lives, their income, opportunities, and their freedom from living in fear.  Certainly, this is 
not a comprehensive list of all adversarial hazards, threats, and criminally initiated crisis 
events (e.g., disorderly conduct and arson) that can be found in state or federal 
jurisdictional penal codes.  The significance of adversarial hazards to an HSIE all-hazards 
analyst is that analysis of criminals, terrorist, and crimes—all-crimes analysis—must also 
include compliance with PCRCL policies and legal statutory mandates.  DHS and the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) all-crimes intelligence activities, law enforcement 
operations, and social justice verdicts within the HSOE, must be PCRCL compliant 
(PCRCL for Fusion Centers, 2018). 
 Social systems.  Social systems and human systems (i.e., animate systems) are 
purposeful systems that interact with their natural and technological environments as well 
as with other social systems.  They must interact with their environment to survive 
(ACASA, 2018).  Human systems such as neighborhoods, cities, and businesses rely on 
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social and technological inflows and outflows such as municipal services and financial 
transactions.  Also, they rely on rainfall, sunshine, and clean air as part of their basic 
needs for survival.  Other social systems, also called social assets, include emergency 
services, utility companies, health care facilities, schools, public administration, jails, 
online support groups, and volunteer organizations (Pine, 2015, pp. 2-44).  This is not a 
comprehensive list because the scope of human social systems is quite extensive. 
The technological world.  Technological innovation is the result of human creativity 
when it is coupled with human problem-solving abilities.  Undoubtedly, not all 
technology is created with a problem in mind.  For example, video games are imaginative 
and technically advanced forms of entertainment that were not intentionally created to 
solve problems other than boredom.  Arguably, decades later, these forms of 
entertainment are financially lucrative and form an estimated $78 billion economic base 
as of 2017 (WePC, 2018) thus contributing to solving economic security and human 
security problems.  On the other hand, video game piracy and other cybersecurity 
concerns illustrate the extent of technological proliferation throughout the human-world.  
Many more examples of technological integration into society are available for 
discussion: automobiles, nuclear power generation, global positioning systems (GPS) to 
name a few.  Simply said, people and technological systems are so extensively entwined 
that nearly all aspects of modern life depend upon their interaction (Ericson, 2016, p. 1). 
 Physical security and technological safety.  The Department of Energy (DOE) 
and DHS both deliver safety, security, and resilience planning, policy making, and 
practical application efforts for the national population.  The DOE’s security programs 
include nuclear nonproliferation, security of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 
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management of the strategic petroleum reserve, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure 
security, worker health and safety, and emergency preparedness training (Department of 
Energy, 2018).  The DHS also is engaged in safety and security efforts alongside other 
FSLTT departments and agencies like DOE through its National Protection and Programs 
Directorate, Science and Technology Directorate, and Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office.  These directorates and offices are supported by other DHS 
operational and intelligence offices in their efforts to protect critical infrastructure, 
technological research and development, and countering nuclear proliferation and attack 
(Operational and Support Components, 2018).  Physical and virtual security measures are 
implemented by DHS in the prevention and protection from technological hazards and 
threats as well as the mitigation of technological crises. 
 Physical security and systems safety measures are designed to prevent and protect 
the nation’s population of technological accidents, mishaps, and failures through 
preemptive forensic engineering (e.g., anticipating potential mishaps and causal factors) 
(Ericson, 2016, p. 2) and the implementation of physical security standards and resources 
(Interagency Security Committee, 2015).  An example of a physical security approach to 
public and private institutions is Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
(CPTED).  The CPTED approach to physical security emphasizes the relationship 
between human behavior and design of the physical environment (Fennelly, 2017, pp. 1-
21).  This is a multidisciplinary approach to physical security including expert studies and 
expertise from law enforcement personnel, crime analysis, environmental engineering, 
structural engineering, and behavioral science to better design physical sites and security 
measures.  CPTED’s interdisciplinary approach considers police and community 
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relations, urban problems, geography, neighborhood crime problems, business practices, 
and public administration in its physical and environmental engineering designs. 
 Systems safety measures are based on hazard risk analysis conducted from a 
system engineering perspective.  Technological systems contain inherent hazards that are 
statistically predictable thus preventable.  “Systems safety… is a form of preemptive 
forensic engineering, whereby potential mishaps are identified, evaluated, and controlled 
before they occur” (Ericson, 2016, p. 2).  Across the FSLTT technological systems safety 
field, MIL-STD-882, System Safety Standard Practice, is considered the doctrinal guide 
for implementing systems safety engineering and hazards risk analysis with the primary 
objective to “identify, eliminate or control, and document system hazards” (Ericson, 
2016, p. 3).   
 Thus far, the adversaries and technology discussions have recognized two of four 
categories of hazards, threats, and crises within the HSOE.  DHS’s CPG 201: Threat and 
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide—Second Edition groups hazards and 
threats into three categories: (a) natural, (b) technological, and (c) human-caused (2013, 
p. 6).  However, a third, cyber, is a technology derivative that is of such significance to 
modern life that I have elevated it to a category of its own.   
 Cybersecurity.  Just as the HSOE is the habitat of a broad range of hazards and 
threats, security institutions, safety engineers, and analysts, cyberspace is the home a 
diverse hybrid culture of people and machines.  Cyberspace also has a niche culture 
consisting of hazards, threats, virtual and real institutions, computer science engineers, 
and digital forensics analysts.  “Cyberspace is the realm of computer networks (and the 
users behind them) in which information is stored, shared, and communicated online” 
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(Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 13).  It is important to recognize that this information 
environment is not only virtual; it also is physical and human.  Cyberspace truly is a 
hybrid environment of hardline internet cables, submarine fiber-optic cables, desktop 
computers, wireless routers, virtual chatrooms, and social media applications, as well as 
the people who distribute information, currency, and ideology in it.  Accordingly, 
cyberspace has physical, digital, and cognitive characteristics that are both benevolent 
and malevolent in their nature. 
 Cybercrime consist of four deviant, criminal, and terrorist behaviors using cyber-
technology: (a) cyber-trespass, (b) cyber-deception and theft, (c) cyber-porn and 
obscenity, and (d) cyber-violence (Holt, Bossler, & Seigfried-Spellar, 2018, p. 23).  
Within these four categories are a variety of undesirable cyber-behaviors ranging from 
malicious hacking, privacy violations, digital piracy, fraud, exploitation, harassment, and 
terrorist recruitment.  The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team’s (US-CERT) 
definition of a cyber incident reveals how a cybercriminal exploits cyber-vulnerabilities.  
A cyber incident is a computer network event that jeopardizes the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of computers, information, communications systems, networks, 
or infrastructure (National Cyber Incident Response Plan, 2016, p. 8).  The CIA triad 
(e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) are the security goals in an information 
environment from cyber-threats (Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 35) 
 The CIA triad is grounded in ensuring data and user privacy (i.e., confidentiality), 
unaltered data (i.e., integrity), and system availability.  To counter cyber-threats and 
respond to cyber-incidents that reside in or occur within the HSOE’s cyber-domain, the 
DHS takes on a whole-of-nation approach to planning, policy, and practice approach that 
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includes private and public partnerships.  This is a shared responsibility between the 
private sector and government agencies that own, operate, and protect national critical 
infrastructure, safeguard and implement PCRCL compliance measures, and synchronize 
their cybersecurity capacities (National Cyber Incident Response Plan, 2016, p. 7). 
 Information security.  Private and public sector departments and agencies counter 
cyber-incidents through risk-informed information security programs.  Information 
security programs add a measure of analysis and applied intelligence to the cybersecurity 
efforts of critical infrastructure protection and network security by following the risk 
management and risk assessment models of identifying assets, threats, vulnerabilities and 
cyber-risks.  A typical risk-informed cyber-incident process would consist of six phases: 
(1) preparation, (2) detection and analysis, (3) containment, (4) eradication, (5) recovery, 
(6) post incident activity (Andress, 2014, p. 16).  Also, an information security defensive 
strategy and analytic approach would consider five zones based on the physical, digital, 
and cognitive characteristics of cyberspace: (a) data, (b) application, (c) host, (d) internal 
network, (e) external network (Andress, 2014, p. 19).  Together, the risk-informed 
cybersecurity process and the identification of basic cyber analytic-zones combine into a 
baseline cyber-analysis process and analytic point-of-entry approach to understanding 
cybersecurity problems.  I will discuss this analytic approach in more detail in chapter V. 
 Technological hazards, threats, and crisis events.  Technological and cyber 
hazards, threats, and crisis events clearly have a direct relationship with the people who 
either created, caused, or are affected by them.  In the physical world, technological 
systems safety is focused on the management principles and engineering design of 
machinery, transportation, or computers with a low or acceptable probability of failure 
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that can cause harm during its life cycle (e.g., system safety, system safety engineering, 
and system safety management) (Ericson, 2016, p. 5).  Examples of technological crises 
of concern in the HSOE are bridge collapse due to aging infrastructure and outdated 
design practices, aircraft engine failure due to stress fractures, and industrial toxic 
chemical release due to accidental safety precaution failures.  Technological threats, 
including cyber-threats, are both safety and security threats because the primary effects 
and follow-on secondary consequences could impact critical infrastructure and key 
resources as well as the at-risk communities.  Prolonged power outages, economic 
distress, poor sanitation, and disease related health risk are a few examples of secondary 
consequences. 
 Technological systems.  The technological systems (i.e., mechanistic and cyber 
systems) do not have purposes of their own because they did not create themselves.  
These types of systems were created by people to serve the purposes or needs of people 
(ACASA, 2018).  Examples are homes, watches, cellular phones, satellites, refineries, 
dams, and water purification facilities designed to protect the environment for the needs 
of people.  Like social systems, technological systems are extensive and too numerous to 
itemize. 
 The natural world.  The natural world and the human world share similarities 
that, when taken into consideration, makes the natural environment’s hazards, threats, 
and disasters easier to comprehend.  Humans, like other species, are inherently connected 
to their natural environment for the basic resources to fulfil their physical needs of air, 
water, food, and shelter (Burton, 2018).  Indeed, technological advancements in chemical 
engineering and the production of synthetic materials in agriculture and building 
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materials are derived from natural resources such as crude oil, animals, and plants.  Earth, 
like people, creates as well as destroys. 
 Natural processes “concentrate energy and then release it, killing life and causing 
destruction” (Abbott, 2017, p. 1).  As an active planet, energy flows from the earth’s 
interior, the sun, gravity, and impacts from asteroids and comets.  This flow of energy, 
whether it is internal or external, is the source for environmental hazards, threats to 
society, and natural disasters.  In fact, the constructal theory of flow that I discussed in 
chapter I is grounded in the understanding of energy flows through all forms of matter 
and even ideology.  This constant flow of energy is responsible for natural disaster 
sources such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, erosion, and drought.  This is the 
process of construction and destruction that create landmasses in the form of volcanic 
rock and then slowly weathers it to gravel and sand.  Also noted in chapter I, panarchy is 
the understanding of the adaptive cycle of the natural and human world that follows a 
pattern of growth, conservation, destruction, and renewal.  The natural world—our 
natural environment—is in a constant state of change caused by the flow of energy. 
 The DHS agency central to responding to and helping others recover from natural 
disasters is FEMA.  Although FEMA is resourced and prepared to respond to all types of 
disasters, man-made and natural, it is the DHS agency that leads the response to federally 
declared disasters in accordance with the statutory authorities outlined in the Stafford Act 
(i.e., Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act—Public Law 93-
288).  FEMA relies on the whole-community approach to implement national planning 
frameworks, the national preparedness goal, and to provide disaster assistance when 
SLTT governmental agencies are overwhelmed. 
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 Environmental security.  Environmental problems that originate from the natural 
world and human world are holistic, long term, and political challenges (Hough, 2014, p. 
33).  The systemic characteristic of the natural environment, evident by the continuous 
inflows and outflows of energy and its transformative process of creation and destruction, 
is an interdisciplinary problem that requires the expertise of the natural sciences, 
humanities, mathematics, and civil engineering to name a few.  A coordinated holistic 
problem-solving approach by practitioners of varying expertise in law enforcement, 
biology, architecture, geography, or meteorology is required for environmental security 
issues that arise suddenly and can last for many years.  Plainly, public administration and 
policy formulation in environmental security requires determined political support.  The 
whole-community approach to environmental security cannot rest solely on local 
communities because political will is needed to ensure the national population lives in a 
safe, secure, and resilient environment. 
 The HSOE includes environmental security concerns as much as it does human 
security.  Human innovation, population growth, and industrial expansion throughout the 
world has proliferated technology, quickly uses natural resources, and has dramatically 
changed human and physical geography (Dalby, 2013, p. 312).  Human actions are 
changing the earth’s lithosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, and even outer 
space.  These human-caused environmental alterations contribute to significant 
environmental hazards and threats to society.  For example, the construction of dams to 
create water reservoirs and hydroelectric power also destroys river ecosystems and 
disrupts the flow of water to outlying communities.  Resilient populations and 
infrastructure require adaptive political mindsets, departmental programs, and practical 
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environmental security models.  It is in the climate and environmental change scenario 
that mitigation measures gain prominence among the prevent, protect, respond, and 
recover preparedness missions carried out by FSLTT governmental agencies and non-
governmental organizations.  
 Natural hazards, threats, and crisis events.  Natural hazards are generally 
grouped into three categories that are based on the physical world: (a) geological, (b) 
metrological, and (c) hydrological (Hough, 2014, pp. 119-125).  This grouping, however, 
does not address non-human caused biological hazards such as micro-organisms, viruses, 
and toxins.  An expanded grouping of natural hazard sources can be found in the physical 
zones of the natural world that originate from the earth’s core to outer space: (a) 
lithosphere, (b) biosphere, (c) hydrosphere, and the (d) atmosphere.  Adding the human 
domain of the anthroposphere offers at least five analytic points-of-entry (APOE) for 
natural and human caused crises. 
 The lithosphere zone is the realm of seismic activity and produces hazards and 
threats such as earthquakes that are non-human caused (e.g., natural faultline quakes 
compared to nuclear detonation caused).  Other threats and disasters occur in the 
lithosphere zone but may have causal factors other than seismic (e.g., subsidence, soil 
erosion, wildfires, or mass wasting).  The biosphere zone is the habitat of natural 
pathogens, viruses, animal venom, and disease to name a few.  The hydrosphere zone is 
the domain of water borne disease, tsunamis, floods, coastal hazards, and hurricanes.  The 
atmosphere is the origin of metrological and climatic hazards and threats severe storms 
and tornadoes (Keller & DeVecchio, 2016).  Naturally, some natural hazards and threats 
are hybrid phenomenon like a hurricane that originates in both the hydrosphere and 
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atmosphere.  For clarity, I will group natural hazards by the four abovementioned zones 
and add the anthroposphere (i.e., the human sphere) as a fifth primary analytic zone.  
Nevertheless, there are at least 45 analytic subzones (i.e., APOEs) within the five primary 
physical world analytic zones and this tally does not consider outer space beyond the 
earth’s atmosphere (Hassenzahl, Hager, & Berg, 2011).  
 Environmental systems.  Natural environment systems unavoidably include 
social and technological systems because of the widespread proliferation of people and 
machines in the natural world (ACASA, 2018).  In their purest form, environmental 
systems are weather phenomenon, the ocean’s circulation system, the climate change 
cycle, and wildlife ecosystems (Hassenzahl et al., 2011).  Consequently, the unavoidable 
convergence of STE systems has shaped the human-centric and eco-centric mindset of 
society and decision-makers.  Human security and environmental security convergence 
also has shaped sustainable development discussions and disputes about planning and 
policy decisions by local communities and federal government entities. 
 At the planning and policy formulation level of government that includes DHS 
influence as a homeland security practitioner, are three factors: (a) environmentally 
focused decisions about environment and natural resources; (b) socially focused decisions 
about the needs of society; and (c) economic decisions about near- and long-term cost of 
environmental and social policies (Hassenzahl et al., 2011, p. 28).  The significance of 
these factors to the homeland security practitioner are likely to be found in prioritization 
of homeland security, safety, and resilience resources and their application in the tasks of 
providing security for lives, property, and the environment.  These are public safety and 
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security concerns stemming from the convergence of STE and ACTN systems within the 
HSOE. 
 The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  “The United 
States has massive, overlapping homeland security and intelligence enterprises” (Steiner, 
2015, p. 12).  These security and intelligence domains work together to provide the 
nation with the capabilities and capacity to achieve the National Preparedness Goal “to 
prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats and hazards that 
pose the greatest risk” (National Preparedness Goal, 2015, p. 1).  Across the national 
homeland, including its territories, maritime zones, and airspace, DHS carries out various 
operational missions and intelligence activities in support of the National Preparedness 
Goal. 
 Homeland security is an all-encompassing task for DHS.  As the third-largest 
department of the federal government, it must coordinate with and establish cooperative 
agreements with at least 22 other federal departments and agencies (Mature and 
Strengthen the Homeland Security Enterprise, 2018); state and local governments; private 
sector industry; nongovernmental organizations; and the national population to maintain a 
prosperous way of life.  The DHS missions are goal-oriented and functional because they 
are integrated into the five preparedness missions as well as the department’s 
organizational structure. 
 Departmental missions.  The missions of DHS and their preparedness goals 
specifically address ACTN hazards and threats ranging from terrorist attacks; chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials; organized crime, unlawful 
immigration, and cyber.  Although not specified in the DHS mission statements, implied 
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ACTN hazards and threats are all-hazards risks; air, land, and sea-borne adversaries; and 
illegal trade and travel (Steiner, 2015, pp. 17-18).  The six DHS missions are: (a) enforce 
and administer immigration laws, (b) ensure resilience to disasters, (c) prevent terrorism 
and enhance security, (d) safeguard and secure cyberspace, (e) secure and manage the 
nation’s borders, and (f) mature and strengthen the homeland security enterprise (Our 
Mission, 2018).  These intelligence enterprise supported missions are conducted daily by 
DHS personnel in coordination with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private 
organizations in a complex multijurisdictional, widely distributed, and diverse (Steiner, 
2015, p. 21) operational environment.   
  National preparedness missions.   The homeland security enterprise of FSLTT 
and private sector organizations are viewed by DHS as an “all-of-Nation approach 
(National Preparedness Goal, 2015, p. 1)” to capacity generation and core capability 
sustainment in support of the five preparedness missions.  Building the resources, 
capabilities, and trained workforce to, for example, carry out intelligence and information 
sharing, threats and hazards identification, mass care services, or economic recovery 
capabilities is the responsibility of the whole national community.  Both public and 
private sector practitioners are involved with the planning and operational coordination 
activities of the National Preparedness System (NPS), the DHS missions, and the five 
national preparedness missions (5PM).  Preventing terrorism; protecting the national 
population, property, and natural resources; mitigating the loss of life and property; 
responding to save lives and meet basic needs; and recovering the economy, 
infrastructure, health, and environmental systems after a crisis event are the 5PMs 
(National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 1). 
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 The NPS enables the all-of-Nation homeland security approach to “support 
decision-making, resource allocation, and measure progress toward these outcomes” 
(National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 1).  In other words, the NPS is a system-of-
systems involving intelligence activities, interagency operational planning, resource 
building, and logistics.  The NPS’s components are meant to build, sustain, and deliver 
the 5PM’s core capabilities to achieve the NPG (National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 
6).  The six NPS components follow the meaning-making, decision-making, and 
problem-solving continuum: (1) identifying and assessing risk, (2) estimating capability 
requirements, (3) building and sustain capabilities, (4) planning to deliver capabilities, (5) 
validating capabilities, and (6) reviewing and updating. 
 There is no way to eliminate every type of hazard or threat to the nation.  
Adversaries are cunning, technology is imperfect, and the natural cycle of creating and 
destroying is eternal.  It is through understanding this context and by pragmatic 
acceptance of this fact that risk-informed applied intelligence gains significance.  While 
the NPS strives to generate and allocate limited resources and the 5PMs guide homeland 
security operational planning, policy, and practice, the HSIE must be cognizant of the 
importance of providing timely and relevant risk-informed intelligence products to DHS 
leadership and its operational and support components. 
 Departmental organizations.  The current organizational and support components 
of DHS have missions that are directly linked to the department’s six missions.  This is a 
hierarchical nesting of operational, intelligence, research and development, and 
managerial missions among the department’s subordinate offices, directorates, and 
agencies.  The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) enforces and 
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administers immigration laws; the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
component secures and manages the nation’s borders; the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) secures and manages maritime borders, saves lives during disasters, and 
prevents terrorism and enhances security; the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) ensures resilience to disasters; the United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) enforces and administers immigration laws; the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) prevents terrorism and enhances security; and the United 
States Secret Service (USSS) prevents terrorism and enhances security and safeguards 
financial infrastructure. 
 Other components support DHS missions in the areas of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) counterproliferation (e.g., Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Office); conduct research and development (e.g., Science and Technology Directorate); 
and conducts intelligence analysis and information sharing (e.g., Office of Intelligence 
Analysis) (Operational and Support Components, 2018).  The organization of DHS 
components not only coordinate with other federal departments and agencies, they also 
coordinate and conduct research, intelligence, and operations with SLTT and private 
industry through the Office of Public-Private Partnerships (P3), fusion centers (FC), 
critical infrastructure Information and Analysis Centers (ISAC), and other HSOE and 
HSIE initiatives like the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (Lahneman, Homeland 
Security Intelligence, 2018; Steiner, 2015, pp. 21-27).  More specifically and relevant to 
the development of the AH-ISM are the intelligence activities of the HSIE and the 




Integrating the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise 
 The HSOE assuredly encompasses all-hazards in all-regions and jurisdictions of 
the homeland security enterprise.  The HSIE is empowered to make sense of it for FSLTT 
decision-makers.  This next section will integrate the HSIE into this HSOE domain of 
meaning-making, decision-making, and problem-solving. 
 HSIE communities-of-interest and communities-of-practice.  HSIE is the 
umbrella term for all FSLTT and private organizations that provide risk-informed applied 
intelligence to the leadership, customers, and components of the homeland security 
domain.  Although there are differing views about which organizations should be 
included in the HSIE (i.e., the entire IC and other national security stakeholders 
[Lahneman, Homeland Security Intelligence, 2018]), I have selected a more narrow 
viewpoint that limits the HSIE to DHS components, their component intelligence 
programs (CIP), and its intelligence clients, customers, and consumers in the public and 
private sectors.  This view recognizes that the HSIE is a component of the larger federal 
intelligence enterprise (Richelson, 2016, p. xv) and the homeland security enterprise that 
operates within the HSOE. 
 The HSIE is not defined by statute; however, it is referenced in DHS policy and 
practice.  DHS identifies the HSIE as the intelligence offices and CIPs of the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, CBP, ICE, USCIS, USCG, TSA, USSS, and FEMA.  
Furthermore, CIPs are defined as any organization within DHS’s components that 
conducts the complete intelligence cycle (Homeland Security Committee, 2016, p. 11).  
This viewpoint of the HSIE couples its intelligence and operations components with that 
of the broader homeland security enterprise leads to an acknowledgement that homeland 
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security is characterized as a multijurisdictional, multiagency, and multidisciplinary 
domain. 
 The stakeholders (e.g., clients, customers, and consumers) of homeland security 
intelligence include the nation’s leadership at all levels of government, owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure and key resources in the private sectors, the nation’s 
population, and their economic base.  All of which are necessary for the nation to survive 
and thrive.  This community of stakeholders is the community-of-interest in the 
homeland security domain because each member of the whole community has a vital 
interest in the competency of the HSIE’s analytical community-of-practice. 
 The HSIE’s community-of-practice is disperesed across the nation at intelligence 
and operations centers located in each state, region, municipality, tribe, and territory to 
include private organizations such as volunteer groups.  A simple thought trigger is to 
group a community-of-interest as the recipients and beneficiaries of the active 
intelligence participants in the community-of-practice.  This simple explanation does not 
account for interagency and organizational flow of information between the groups; 
however, it does simplify understanding of them. 
 There are three characterizations of intelligence stakeholders to define before 
proceeding.  For the purpose of clarity in my research, I have grouped the recipients of 
intelligence products as clients, customers, and consumers.  Clients are actively involved 
with articulating their intelligence requirements and the overall intelligence synthesis 
process.  They have a vested interest in ensuring intelligence products meet their needs in 
a timely manner; therefore, they are active participants.  On the other hand, consumers 
are not actively involved with the requirements, analysis, and production of the 
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intelligence products that they utilize.  Consumers take what is readily available and 
determine if it is relevant to their operational and intelligence needs after it is posted or 
disseminated on information sharing networks.  Customers are between the two because 
they do not specify the timeliness nor the specificity of the products.  However, they are 
recognized by analysts as having a direct and relevant interest in the product’s topic.  
They will be included in the distribution of the product once it is completed.  This 
clarification of clients, customers, and consumers is based on my own experiences and 
observation in the intelligence domain. 
 HSIE pluralistic intelligence.  Researchers and analysts of ACTN hazards and 
STE systems come from many scientific and technical disciplines to study the 
components, characteristics, and interactions of society and disasters.  This 
interdisciplinary approach offers policy makers and other decision-makers, like on-scene 
incident commanders, a broader context of understanding about how people react and 
cope with a crisis, and what to expect from secondary and tertiary hazards and threats.  
Not only must the immediate STE vulnerabilities get attention but also the likely long-
term consequences.  Although a multidisciplinary approach includes various disciplines 
of study, an interdisciplinary—or transdisciplinary—approach takes a holistic and unified 
look at the homeland security problem (McEntire, 2006, p. 1).  This is the pluralistic 
synthesis approach to homeland security. 
 Pluralistic intelligence is the synthesis of multiple disciplines from the sciences 
and humanities to generate knowledge about all-hazards and all-crimes by utilizing all-
sources of information.  It also is applicable in all-jurisdictions of the HSOE.  Following 
the meaning-making, decision-making, and problem-solving continuum, pluralistic 
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intelligence gains two other characteristics that are found in risk management and applied 
research: probability and practicality. Thus, pluralistic intelligence, in a homeland 
security domain context, is defined as an interdisciplinary approach to generating all-
hazards knowledge and providing risk-informed applied intelligence products to 
homeland security enterprise leadership and practitioners in support of the National 
Preparedness Goal. 
 This definition of pluralistic homeland security intelligence touches upon the STE 
interdisciplinary, multijurisdictional, all-hazards, and all-crimes (i.e., ACTN) aspects of 
the HSOE and the HSIE’s core requirements of conducting analysis, generating 
knowledge, assessing risk, and managing information (i.e., intelligence and information 
sharing) with homeland security enterprise communities-of-practice to achieve the 5PM 
missions that are carried out in overlapping phases from pre to post incident.  This 
pluralistic intelligence aspect of the HSIE is best represented in the DHS sponsored, state 
and regionally operated fusion centers (FC).   
 There are 78 FC’s across the nation comprising what is called the National 
Network of Fusion Centers.  These FC’s are in disparate climatic zones and geographic 
regions including rural and densely populated cities.  Some are terrorism-centric while 
others take on an all-crimes analysis and operations approach.  Others are all-hazards 
focused—approximately 48 of the 78 are all-hazards, all-crimes, and counterterrorism 
focused.  They are functionally comprised of representative organizations and personnel 
from DHS components, state and local law enforcement, corrections, emergency 
management, the National Guard, and Privacy / Civil Rights and Civil Liberties officers 
with subject matter expert (SME) skills ranging from management, to analysis, to 
122 
 
maritime security (2016 national network of fusion centers final report, 2016, pp. 2-9).  
Fusion centers illustrate the interdisciplinary environment necessary for pluralistic 
intelligence to thrive. 
 Interdisciplinary understanding of hazards and threats in the HSOE.  The 
interdisciplinary aspects of the HSOE and HSIE’s STE systems and ACTN hazards and 
threats are shown by similarities in several of the disciplines that contribute to the 
interdisciplinary characteristics of the homeland security and intelligence domains.  Law 
enforcement is an established security discipline with proven methodologies for 
analyzing and investigating crimes and criminals; systems safety engineering has highly 
technical and methodical procedures for investigating technological mishaps; 
epidemiology uses a clinical reasoning and testing method for diagnosing diseases and 
examining epidemics.  I will present three triadic models from each discipline to illustrate 
their similarities in identifying hazards and threats: first is the law enforcement triad; 
second is the technological hazard triad, and third is the epidemiologic triad. 
 Law enforcement.  The law enforcement problem analysis triangle, or crime 
triangle, actually is two triads that are merged together.  The first depicts the routine 
activities that “must converge in time and space for crime to occur (Walker & Drawve, 
2018, p. 42)”: (a) the offender, (b) the victim, and (c) the place.  The second depicts the 
controllers that can “prevent a crime from occurring (Walker & Drawve, 2018, p. 42)”: 
(a) the offender’s handler, (b) the victim’s guardian, and (c) the manager of the place 
where the crime is committed.  This crime triad illustrates the essential interaction and 
relationships among the elements of a crime event.  First is the adversarial threat; second 
is the social system target (e.g., a person); third, is the time and location nexus of the 
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crime event.  The application of handler, guardian, and manager layers illustrates the 
potential and need for prevention, protection, and mitigation of potential crime events.  
Handlers can prevent the offender from committing a crime.  Alternately, a handler can 
encourage the commission of a crime too.  Guardians can protect victims by their 
presence or other preventative means.  Lastly, managers can apply prevention, protection, 
and mitigation measures at places they control (e.g., physical barriers, lighting, or 
employment of guardians).  The crime triad implies that offenders take advantage of a 
victim’s or place’s vulnerability while committing the crime (see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  The Law Enforcement Crime Triad.  The crime triad is two converging triads 
in time and space consisting of (a) the offender and handler, (b) the victim and guardian, 
(c) the place and its manager.  The triad illustrates the potential for prevention, 
protection, and mitigation of a crime event.  Handlers can prevent offenders from 
committing a crime.  Guardians can protect victims from the offender.  And, managers 
can mitigate the opportunity and effects of likely crime events.  This figure is adapted 
from descriptions in Law Enforcement Intelligence by David L. Carter (2009), 
Intelligence analysis for problem solvers by John E. Eck and Ronald V. Clark (2018), 
Out of bounds: innovation and change in law enforcement intelligence analysis by 
Deborah Osborne (2006), Intelligence-led policing by Jerry H. Ratcliffe (2016), and 
Foundations of crime analysis by Jeffery T. Walker and G. R. Drawve (2018). 
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 Systems safety engineering.  A technological hazard has three components that 
also must converge in time and space for a mishap or accident to occur: (a) a hazard 
source, (b) an initiating mechanism, and (c) the target and threat outcome.  The hazard 
source (HS) is the hazardous resource of energy in the technological system and it is the 
component that produces danger.  The initiating mechanism (IM) causes the hazard to 
transform from a dormant state to an active state to cause a mishap.  The target and threat 
outcome (TTO) are assets or targets that are vulnerable and the consequences of the 
mishap (Ericson, 2016, p. 34).  The interactive relationship among the three hazard triad 
components converge in time and space (see figure 3).   
 
Figure 3.  The Technological Hazard Triad.  The convergence in time and space of a 
hazard source, initiating mechanism, and the target transforms a hazard into a 
technological mishap with a threat outcome (i.e. consequences).  Systems safety 
engineers use this triadic model as their entry point to analyze and investigate 
technological hazards, threats, and accidents.  This figure is adapted from Hazard 
analysis techniques for system safety by Clifton A. Ericson (2016). 
125 
 
 Epidemiology.  Disease is the result of interacting genetic and environmental 
factors and is easily illustrated through communicable disease in the form of an 
epidemiologic triad consisting of: (a) the host (e.g., a person), (b) the agent (e.g., 
bacterium), and (c) the environment (e.g., contaminated water) (Gordis, 2014, p. 19).  
People are susceptible (i.e., vulnerable) to disease through their own bodies and the 
environment by way of transmission vector that delivers the disease.  This epidemiologic 
triadic convergence occurs in time and space like the crime and hazard triads.  Similarly, 
this triad acknowledges that a person’s vulnerability to the disease increases their 
likelihood of contracting it (see figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.  The Epidemiologic Triad.  Communicable disease is illustrated by the 
epidemiologic triad comprised of a host, an agent, and their environment.  The disease is 
transmitted via a vector and it exploits a vulnerability within the host to thrive.  The 
convergence of a person with a disease and a favorable environment for infection takes 
place in at a specific time and space.  This figure is adapted from descriptions in 
Epidemiology by Leon Gordis (2014). 
 Interdisciplinary synthesis.  These three triadic models from law enforcement, 
systems safety engineering, and epidemiology illustrate the similarities among the 
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various disciplines in the homeland security and intelligence domains.  By reducing an 
event into its most basic interactive components, an intelligence analyst or investigator is 
better able to establish the relationships among the entities as they converge in time and 
place.  Moreover, they can identify vulnerabilities, likelihood, and preparedness 
measures.  Along with an understanding of systems components, these triadic models are 
interdisciplinary and useful for conducting risk-informed applied intelligence assessments 
in the all-hazards and all-crimes security environment. 
 The interdisciplinary all-hazards crisis event predicate.  By synthesizing these 
triadic models, and the criminal predicate model, one can create an interdisciplinary all-
hazards crisis event predicate model.  The criminal predicate model, like the crime triad, 
illustrates the convergence of three necessary components in time and space to create a 
reasonable suspicion that a crime is or is about to be committed (Carter, 2009, p. 63).  
The three converging components are: (a) people or organizations, (b) the elements of a 
crime per the penal code, and (c) the time and place.  This convergence also is called the 
criminal nexus and its usefulness in understanding crime events underscores its 
interdisciplinary applicability in understanding the nexus of society, threats, and 





Figure 5.  Interdisciplinary All-Hazards Crisis Event Predicate.  A crisis event predicate 
is the convergence of an ACTN threat with a STE target’s vulnerability in time and 
space.  The crisis event is the result of a systems-based transformation process from a 
dormant hazard to an active threat to a realized crisis event.  All crisis events emerge 
from the interactive relationships among these three components and activators (i.e., 
initiating mechanisms).  The homeland security domain’s interdisciplinary FSLTT and 
private partnership plans, policies, and practitioners serve as administrative and practical 
handlers, guardians, and managers to implement the 5PMs of prevent, protect, mitigate, 
respond, and recover.  This figure is the result of research synthesis from previously cited 
sources. 
 
 Analytic approaches and points-of-entry.  The interdisciplinary convergence of 
identifying systems components, their functional components, and their characteristics 
with the crisis event predicate marks the beginning steps of establishing a unifying 
interdisciplinary analysis methodology.  Along with systems theory’s emphasis on 
connectivity and relationships, flow theory’s emphasis on the natural tendency of energy 
and ideas to flow among systems, and transformational state changes that occur within 
systems, an all-hazards analyst can identify initial APOEs to begin analysis of a 
phenomenon.  For example, an analyst who is studying the potential crisis event in a 
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region can choose an APOE from a list of STE assets (e.g., a neighborhood), from the 
ACTN hazard sources (e.g., river basin), from ACTN threats (e.g., flooding), or from a 
known crisis event (e.g., hurricane landfall).  Additionally, APOE’s can be established by 
geographic or atmospheric zones.  Rather than an APOE based on who or what questions, 
an all-hazards analyst also can begin with where and when questions. 
 An interdisciplinary method for choosing an APOE also can be found in the 
natural and human world’s geographic and atmospheric zones.  Beginning at the earth’s 
core and through the atmosphere’s layers to outer space, an analyst can select APOE 
zones to study what types of STE and ACTN systems reside there and when are they 
present.  For example, an oil and gas platform in the Gulf of Mexico extends upward 
from ocean surface into the lower atmospheric zone and below into the ocean’s 
underwater zones on into the earth’s crust.  In this example, there are at least six APOE 
zones affected by an oil and gas platform: the lithosphere, the three oceanic life zones 
(e.g., the hydrosphere), the biosphere, and the troposphere.  Moreover, the potential for a 
technological disaster on an oil and gas platform could extend the affected zones and 
APOEs higher into the atmosphere by wind, out across the ocean’s surface by currents, 
and into the depths of, and onto, coastal zones and the wide-ranging human zone called 
the anthroposphere.  Further analysis of this oil rig disaster would reveal the potential for 
secondary and tertiary STE and ACTN crisis events in affected soil zones, biomes, and 




Figure 6.  Analytic Points of Entry (APOE) Examples.  STE and ACTN systems are 
found in nearly every zone of the earth and atmosphere.  This figure represents only a 
few that can be used as APOE zones for all-hazards analysts.  A more comprehensive list 
of the natural and human world’s APOE zones identifies at least 45 in the various 
biomes, trophic levels, freshwater, ground water, coastal, oceanic, earth, atmospheric, and 
anthroposphere zones.  This figure is the result of research synthesis from previously 
cited sources. 
 
 An all-hazards analyst has at least three security and interdisciplinary analytic 
approaches in addition to the APOEs.  An analyst can approach an intelligence problem 
from a target-centric (Clark, 2017), activity-based (Biltgen & Ryan, 2016), or risk-
informed STE analysis perspective.  In other words, an all-hazards analysts can analyze 
the ACTN phenomenon as a known entity or system (e.g., the hazard or threat target-
centric analysis); the activities occurring within a zone that may reveal unknown entities 
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or systems (e.g., patterns of life and activities-based analysis); or the STE system, its 
vulnerabilities, and probability of experiencing a crisis event (e.g., risk-informed 
analysis).  Recall that systems and entities are identifiable, detectable, and measurable; 
and, events can be predictable and preventable.  Also note that not all intelligence must 
be risk-based and anticipatory because intelligence may be produced for its own sake 
without applying the fundamentals of risk assessment and risk management.  These 
approaches help the all-hazards analyst to establish an analytic approach or perspective 
that is either centrally focused on the ACTN threat, the STE asset, or the various 
activities that may identify or detect an ACTN or STE system in a zone. 
 The HARTE crisis event model.  Given the flow principle, transformational state 
changes, and the holistic significance of relationships among interconnected entities, 
another foundational conceptual model about all-hazards crisis events can be constructed.  
In this model, ACTN hazards can become threats to STE systems and on to become crisis 
events.  Like the initiating mechanisms in the technological hazards triad, activators 
initiate the transformation of a dormant hazard into an active threat to STE systems.  
And, the interaction of active threats with unsecure STE systems cause crisis events.  
This is the hazard-activator-relationship-threat-event (HARTE) crisis event model.  This 
triadic model is an ACTN and STE system continuum of hazard to threat to crisis event 
that has a spatiotemporal nexus with activators and relationships.  Incidentally, this 
transitional concept as described by Dr. Bruce Newsome in his book Security and Risk 
Management (2014) was my point-of-entry-text (POET) for the AH-ISM.  Although the 
mnemonic HARTE is my creation, I would like to give credit to the POET of my 
research because it is the original text that my research findings are layered and 
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constructed over (Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, p. 109).  The HARTE model is depicted in 
figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  The HARTE Crisis Event Model.  In this interdisciplinary all-hazards model, 
dormant hazard sources interact with activators to become threats; then, relationships 
among ACTN hazards and activators create active threats to STE systems; lastly, active 
threats interact with unsecure STE system vulnerabilities to come crisis events like 
disasters.  This figure is the result of research synthesis from previously cited sources. 
 
 The HARTE interdisciplinary crisis event model examples.  Two interdisciplinary 
examples from the natural sciences and medical sciences help illustrate the 
transdisciplinary application of the HARTE crisis event model.  The first (see figure 8) 
depicts the hazard-threat-crisis event continuum as an earthquake along with examples of 
how seismologist and municipal handlers, guardians, and managers may coordinate and 
cooperate in pre and post-event ways.  The second (see figure 9) depicts the hazard-
threat-crisis event continuum as an epidemic with examples of how medical and 
municipal handlers, guardians, and managers may coordinate and cooperate in pre and 
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post-event ways.  In both models, multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional information 
sharing from data collection (e.g., data identification, detection, and measurement) by 
sensors and instruments as well as interdisciplinary and interagency coordination and 
cooperation for policy formulation, emergency planning, and practical application based 
upon risk-informed all-hazards intelligence is evident.   
 
 
Figure 8.  Interdisciplinary Crisis Event Triad Example: Earthquake (not human caused). 
Natural earthquakes are the result of stress overcoming friction thresholds along a 
geological fault possibly near STE communities (Abbott, 2017; Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 1997; Keller & DeVecchio, Natural hazards, 2016; Mileti, 1999).  
As illustrated in this figure, (1) a faultline stress hazard source is identified and measured 
by geologist handlers using seismic sensors and instruments; (2) active threat shock wave 
are emitted and they are detected and measured for seismic event alerts as well as useful 
data for municipal guardians who make construction safety policies and building codes; 
(3) municipal managers comply with construction codes as a prevention, protection, and 
mitigation effort and respond during realized crisis events. This figure is the result of 





Figure 9.  Interdisciplinary Crisis Event Triad Example: Disease / Contamination 
Outbreak. Disease (or a hazardous material contamination) is the result of a pathogen or 
toxin infecting a host to become an epidemiological hazard source (Gordis, 2014; Stern, 
Cifu, & Altkorn, 2015).  As illustrated in this figure, (1) potential pathogen agents (i.e., 
hazard source) are identified and measured by epidemiologist handlers using medical 
sensors and instruments; (2) active threat host (e.g., human or animal) are exposed, 
infected, exhibit symptoms, and are then tested, diagnosed, and treated by medical 
guardians;  (3) additional host and vectors are detected and measured for community 
epidemic alerts as well as collecting useful data for medical and security guardians who 
make health care policy and plans; (4) municipal managers comply with epidemic 
emergency policies and plans as prevention, protection, and mitigation efforts and 
respond during realized epidemic crisis events. This figure is the result of research 
synthesis from previously cited sources. 
 
 In summary, pluralistic intelligence in the homeland security domain is innately 
interdisciplinary.  These brief explanations about analytic approaches, APOEs, and the 
HARTE crisis event model help illustrate the interdisciplinary nature of ACTN crises and 
STE systems.  Thus far, my discussion about pluralistic intelligence has not been 
comprehensive and only serves as an introduction about the multidisciplinary, 
multiagency, multijurisdictional, and multidomain characteristics of STE systems and 
their potential crisis events caused by ACTN threats.  By adopting a systems view and an 
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interdisciplinary perspective in my analysis, I created three fundamental concept models 
for analysts to reference and use: the systems components model in figure 1, the all-
hazards crisis event predicate model in figure 5, and the HARTE crisis event model in 
figure 7.  Along with selecting a systemic analytic approach and APOE entity or zone, an 
HSIE analyst is better situated to conduct intelligence analysis, academic research, or 
investigations into all-hazards analysis problems. 
 The HSIE intelligence synthesis system components.  The HSIE is an 
intelligence system-of-systems.  It is an enterprise of networked people, knowledge, 
information systems, and institutions distributed across the nation and with global 
connections.  Like the petroleum industry’s core function and purpose to produce 
petroleum-based products from oil and gas resources for the national population’s 
consumption, the HSIE’s function and purpose is to generate risk-informed applied 
intelligence products from raw data for the national leadership and stakeholder’s 
consumption.  These intelligence activities are purposeful by supporting the NPG to 
ensure national safety, security, and resilience and are functional by adhering to systemic 
core competencies and processes.  Four institutional core competencies are necessary for 
risk-informed applied intelligence production: (a) knowledge management, (b) 
information management, (c) risk management, and (d) intelligence analysis. 
 These four core programs and processes establish the cornerstone of meaning-
making and are directly linked to the system components of structure, process, function, 
and purpose.  Without information management and information technology networks, 
there would be no data collection and information sharing structure to the HSIE.  Without 
knowledge management, there would be no knowledge generation process or intelligence 
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production function.  Without intelligence analysis and risk management, there would be 
no purposeful products for application in the decision-making and problem-solving 
processes.  These core competencies will be discussed in more detail in following 
sections, but for now I will explain the HSIE’s system components.  The link among 
meaning-making core competencies and decision-making is summarized by author 
Richard Antony: 
Regardless of the application, decision-making tasks of practical interest generally 
require evidence gathering, analysis, and various forms of evaluation / 
assessment.  Given the complexity of many applications, from situational 
awareness to predicting the weather, decision-making frequently requires 
exploitation of a variety of relevant information sources, application of 
appropriate a priori knowledge, as well as intelligent combination of the evidence 
(Antony, 2016, p. 1). 
 Intelligence purpose.  Intelligence is state of being, a process, and a product.  
Intelligent people, animals, or machines are said to have intelligence like it is a 
descriptive characteristic of their state of being.  Intelligence also is a process that flows 
from the collection of data to the final production of an intelligence product for a 
customer.  Accordingly, intelligence also is the product.  It is the manifestation of data, 
information, and knowledge into a form that is useful—actionable and applicable.  It is 
the “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been 
collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal, 2015, p. 2).  
Following this definition, intelligence is attained, created, and produced for a purpose.  It 
fulfills the needs of meaning-making to support decision-making. 
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 Intelligence activities.  To do this, intelligence is derived from data sources by 
human and technical means.  The information management process of collecting, 
analyzing, and sharing intelligence begins with identifying the sources of data and the 
means to get it.  There are five means (i.e., disciplines) that also translate into sources: (a) 
open source intelligence (OSINT), (b) human intelligence (HUMINT), (c) signals 
intelligence (SIGINT), (d) geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and (e) measurement and 
signature intelligence (MASINT) (Lowenthal & Clark, 2016, p. 1).  Altogether, these are 
the primary groupings of intelligence disciplines, sensor types, and all-source data that 
will eventually become actionable and applied intelligence after a process of intelligence 
analysis and synthesis—they are called the 5-INTs.  In its entirety, the processes and 
programs that are maintained and executed by the intelligence community (IC) are 
referred to as intelligence activities.  Another way of understanding data sources is by the 
MODES (e.g., media, observation, documents, experts, and secondary sources) method 
that I discussed in chapter I and will discuss again in chapter V.  At this point, I will 
focus on the IC’s use of the 5-INTs. 
 The HSIE’s intelligence management system.  Intelligence activities are 
managed by the IC and HSIE in a systemic method through institutional policies, 
programs, and processes.  The intelligence management system, like any other system, 
has the components of process, function, purpose, and structure with identifiable inflows 
and outflows of data and information.  Surely, what happens to the inflow of raw data 
before it becomes an outflow of intelligence is a transformation process called synthesis 
because it merges and analyzes data from multiple sources. 
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 Intelligence management process.  Managing the 5-INTs is easily explained by 
the TCPED process of tasking, collecting, processing, exploiting, and disseminating 
intelligence products (Lowenthal & Clark, 2016, p. 1).  The TCPED process requires IC 
and HSIE leadership, management, and analysts working with clients and customers to 
establish collection requirements, conduct collection tasking and management, process 
raw data into an understandable format (e.g., digital data into readable text), exploit the 
data into usable information for analysis, and finally to disseminate or share the final 
product with clients, customers, and general IC consumers.  Experienced managers are 
required in each TCPED intelligence activity phase to ensure timeliness, quality, and 
reliability of the finished intelligence product.  To simplify this process and present it in 
an interdisciplinary format for academic researchers, students, and practitioners in other 
fields like emergency management, I will use the CASA mnemonic: collect, analyze, 
synthesize, and apply.  These are the four core competencies of the intelligence process 
as it relates to an all-hazards risk-informed applied intelligence model. 
 Intelligence management function.  The intelligence function of transforming raw 
data into useable information, knowledge, and actionable intelligence requires both 
human reasoning and machine aided applications.  This is the knowledge generation 
aspect of the knowledge management core competency.  Managing the intelligence 
function requires a hybrid of technology and goal-oriented humans.  The 5-INTs produce 
more data than a team of analysts can analyze; the challenge is access to too much data, 
rather than not enough, and the ability to analyze it.  Another challenge is that analysts 




 Knowledge generation follows a continuum that flows from the input of raw data 
from sensors into analysis applications like the U.S. Army’s Distributed Common 
Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) that is a system for managing large amounts of data 
from collection to production (U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, 2018).  
Information management technology systems like this help the analysts in critical 
reasoning and analysis of raw data to transform it into useful information.  Then, that 
information is further analyzed along with current and historical context to generate 
knowledge.  At this point, the knowledge gained through this functional process becomes 
applied intelligence when it is integrated into the purposeful processes of decision-
making and problem-solving.  Thus, data is synthesized into intelligence in a functional 
and purposeful manner.  This is the DIKI knowledge generation continuum (Ratcliffe, 
2016, pp. 71-74). 
 Intelligence management purpose.  The purpose of CASA and DIKI process and 
function is to produce risk-informed applied intelligence.  As previously stated, this is 
meaning-making in support of decision-making and problem-solving that is an 
intelligence management purpose.  The final intelligence products are intended to alert 
(i.e., early warning), assess, advise, anticipate, and to be applied by intelligence and 
security practitioners in at least three ways: (a) a deliberate planning process, (b) policy 
formulation, and (c) practical application.  These are the 3Ps of integrated and applied 
intelligence products.  As stated, analysts can influence the 3Ps by providing alerts, 
assessments, anticipatory estimates, or advice (4As) if desired by their clients, customers, 
or according to their institution’s normal practice.  The mnemonics CASA, DIKI, 4As, 
and 3Ps will be integrated into the AH-ISM discussion in chapter V. 
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 Intelligence management structure.  The intelligence enterprise is comprised of 
networked analysts, intellectual capacity, knowledge repositories, information technology 
systems, and institutional infrastructure, and institutional organization hierarchies.  The 
structure of the IC and subcomponent intelligence entities is physical and virtual.  It is 
comprised of cables, radio frequencies, sensors, instruments, operators, maintainers, 
analysts, facilities, information sharing communities-of-interest, human spies, and 
overhead satellites in space.  Undoubtedly, the intelligence management structure is as 
complex as the intelligence system-of-systems.  Along with the processes, functions, and 
purposes that I have described, intelligence structure, supported by information 
management policy and programs, is a required component of the overall system.  
Specifically, the intelligence management structure that I will discuss in more detail is 
structured communication because without it, applied intelligence assessments and 
products cannot be understood nor disseminated to those who need it.  A breakdown in 
structured communication means a breakdown in the entire intelligence synthesis system. 
 Intelligence activities are complex technical and human systems with distinct 
institutional structures, internal processes, technical functions, and goal-oriented 
purposes.  Each system component requires intensive intelligence management oversight 
to synchronize and synthesize.  To summarize, the CASA process populates the DIKI 
function that drives the structured communication and deliberate application of 
intelligence in the 3Ps to meet the client’s requirements.  Next, I will give a more detailed 
explanation of how the intelligence synthesis system’s four core competencies are 
integrated into risk-informed applied intelligence process. 
140 
 
 The HSIE intelligence synthesis system’s core competencies.  Intelligence 
activities and intelligence management’s systems components (e.g., intelligence process, 
function purpose, and structure) relies upon four fundamental institutional programs and 
processes to generate, organize, retain, safeguard, and disseminate intelligence.  The 
principles of these four core competency programs establish the foundation and bring 
together the people, tools, and systems needed for intelligence synthesis.  Altogether, 
knowledge management, information management, risk management, and intelligence 
analysis form the core components of the intelligence synthesis system and, together, 
they assure the diligent production of risk-informed applied intelligence within the HSIE. 
 Knowledge management core competency.  Knowledge management is “doing 
what is needed to get the most out of knowledge resources” (Becerra-Fernandez & 
Sabherwal, 2015, p. 4).  This means intelligence management must leverage the human 
capital, organizational capital, and social capital within the HSIE.  The employees and 
practitioners of the HSIE are the human resources of intellectual capital gained from their 
knowledge, technical and interpersonal skills, and productive capabilities.  Additionally, 
the HSIE’s institutional knowledge resides in its databases, doctrinal manuals, 
organizational culture, and systems components.  Lastly, the HSIE’s social capital is 
found in the relationships, formal and informal, and information sharing interactions 
among its communities-of-interest and practice (Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal, 2015, 
p. 5).  The knowledge capital and the intelligence generation capacity of the HSIE’s 
personnel, organizations, and social groups contribute to its ability to ensure long-term 
institutional knowledge continuity. 
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 Knowledge management foundations.  The problem-solving task of the homeland 
security and intelligence domains is directly connected to the three foundations of 
knowledge management (KM): (a) KM infrastructure, (b) KM mechanisms, and (c) KM 
technologies.  These three foundational tenets of KM make available the technical and 
organizational infrastructure that is needed to produce and share knowledge.  An overlap 
exists between KM foundations and information management in the use of information 
technology (IT) to support their processes; however, KM is generally focused on 
establishing enduring IT and organizational structures for long-term continuity and 
retention of knowledge resources.  In other words, KM is in the business of building 
knowledge capital and capacity and IM is in the business of enabling KM to accomplish 
those goals.   
 Knowledge management solutions.  The foundations of KM capital and capacity 
generation (i.e., meaning-making) exist to support KM solutions (i.e., decision-making 
and problem-solving).  KM solutions are the processes of gathering data, information, 
and knowledge and then retaining, sharing, and applying it by using integrated KM 
systems and technologies.  The four primary tasks that are conducted through the 
application of KM foundational principles, creating, organizing, transferring, and 
applying knowledge (Department of the Army, 2014, pp. 3-6), directly contribute to the 
KM solution principle.  Again, an information management overlap occurs here; but, it’s 
important to note that KM is a broader program dedicated to the getting the most out of 
knowledge resources to achieve organizational goals as well as long-term knowledge 
continuity (Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal, 2015, pp. 41-43).  This line of thought is 
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similar to creating institutional “deep” knowledge that will be passed along from one 
generation to the next. 
 Knowledge management and intelligence synthesis discussion.  The constructal 
theory about the natural flow of energy and ideas among entities is captured in 
knowledge management’s foundations and application.  KM aids the natural flow of 
knowledge to enhance shared understanding among people and organizations, individual 
and institutional learning, and decision-making (Department of the Army, 2014, pp. 3-2).  
Knowledge generation (i.e., the DIKI functional continuum) also is a key principle in KM 
and is often presented as DIK or DIKU: data, information, knowledge, and understanding 
(Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal, 2015, p. 20; Department of the Army, 2014, pp. 3-1).   
 The DIKI intelligence creation continuum is the primary functional component of 
purposeful intelligence synthesis.  Moreover, the KM tasks of knowledge generation, 
organization, sharing, and application are equated to the four core competencies of 
analysis (e.g., critical reasoning, knowing the subject matter, communicating, and then 
applying the knowledge).  These core competencies will be discussed in a coming section 
in this chapter. 
 Information management core competency.  Closely related and having 
overlapping processes with KM is the second core competency: information management 
(IM).  This managerial process is narrower in focus than the broader KM focus to 
generate knowledge capital, capacity, and continuity.  IM is the “science of using 
procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and 
protect data, information, and knowledge products” (Department of the Army, 2014, pp. 
3-6).  IM enables KM by providing IT systems, security measures, and technically trained 
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personnel to support intelligence activities, operational missions, managerial decisions, 
and applied solutions to problems.  IM helps intelligence analysts create accurate, timely, 
useable, complete, precise, and secure (Department of the Army, 2014, pp. 3-7) 
intelligence for the customer. 
 Information systems and technology.  Knowledge and intelligence are the 
cognitive aspects of KM and IM.  IT is the physical and virtual dimension comprised of 
collection sensors, measurement instruments, data processors, databases, display 
consoles, and information sharing networks.  Without IT, knowledge generation would be 
limited only to the human mind with limited ability to process terabytes of metadata, 
create digital situational awareness graphics, multiecheloned anticipatory and 
probabilistic threat assessments, and share them across the national and global IC 
network.  IT systems enhance the human capacity to collect, analyze, synthesize, and 
communicate information. 
 The intelligence cycle and the 5-INT disciplines are heavily reliant upon IT.  The 
CASA process of collecting, analyzing, synthesizing, and applying intelligence depends 
on technical collection platforms and instruments to collect and measure data on 
earthquakes, terrorist, and cyber criminals.  Academic researchers also rely on IT to 
collect data from the media, direct observation, documents, expert interviews, and other 
secondary sources (i.e., MODES).  The DIKI function, structured communication, and 
the integration of intelligence into the 3Ps of plans, policies, and practice, also rely on a 
robust IT infrastructure. 
 Information management and intelligence synthesis discussion.  Systems and 
entities are identifiable, detectable, and measurable because they emit information about 
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their identifying characteristic like location, size, shape, or color.  These signatures are 
emitted in many ways that are detectable by highly sensitive sensors that are calibrated to 
detect and measure what is identifiable about a system or its components.  For example, 
electromagnetic waves are emitted or reflected from on object on earth that is detectable 
from airborne collection platforms like unmanned aerial vehicles (Clark, 2011, pp. 1-35).  
Also, acoustic and chemical signatures are detectable and measurable by instruments 
positioned on the earth’s surface, in cities, or in the atmosphere.  Some of the 5-INTs 
collection platforms are satellites, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, aerostats, ships, 
submarines, ground sites, and people (Clark, 2011, pp. 37-56). 
 Sensors and instruments are IT systems used in the collection of data by 
intelligence professionals and academic researchers to better understand STE systems and 
all-hazards, threats, and crises.  I have included sensors and instruments (S/I) with the 
MODES mnemonic to become MODES-S/I because of their extensive use in research 
and development and the science and technology fields.  MODES-S/I and the 5-INTs are 
two methods to carry out the IM data collection process.  They are both data sources and 
collection methods and they are directly linked to the all-hazards intelligence analyst’s 
analytic approach (e.g., target-centric, activity-based, and risk-informed) and the selected 
APOE.  The type of 5-INT or MODES-S/I method that will be used to collect data is 
determined by the client’s requirements and the analyst’s chosen analytic approach and 
APOE.  This statement infers periodic analyst and client negotiation sessions about 




 Intelligence analysis core competency.  The third core competency program of 
HSIE intelligence synthesis is intelligence analysis.  Technically, analysis is an IM task 
like collection and dissemination; however, because of its importance in the meaning-
making process, it is considered a stand-alone process equal to KM, IM, and RM.  
Without the critical reasoning skills of all-hazards analysts—people—there would be no 
intelligence in the intelligence domain.  Although machine-learning and artificial 
intelligence is a possibility, it has not replaced the deliberate and purposeful systems of 
humans and critical reasoning. 
 Intelligence Analysis approaches and methods.  Intelligence analysis is inherently 
a cognitive process within the mind.  It is a deliberative process of understanding 
something (e.g., a system, entity, or phenomenon) and to give it meaning within the 
context of our environment to solve a problem.  Thus, analysis is critical reasoning. 
Within the interdisciplinary HSIE and IC there is no “baseline standard analytic method 
(Clark, 2017, p. 6)” for analysts to follow.  However, there are many methods and 
approaches to conducting analysis.  For example, the target-centric, activity-based, and 
risk-informed analytic approaches that were discussed previously; and, narrower 
structured analytic techniques.  Intelligence analysis is many things at once: it is short-
term, mid-term, and long-term focused; it is tailored to the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels; it decomposes a problem; it looks for relationships and patterns; it studies 
facts, assertions, presumptions, and assumptions; and it is vulnerable to human fallacy 
and biases.  Most importantly, analysis is critical reasoning with a defined purpose. 
 Analysis should follow a prescribed process to measure progress, identity 
information gaps, and for quality assurance (Carter, 2009; Clark, 2017; Eck, Clarke, & 
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Petrossian, 2018; Pherson & Pherson, 2017).  In a time-restricted environment, an 
established process helps with productivity and timeliness.  Also, an agreed upon analytic 
process is helpful in a multijurisdictional and interdisciplinary setting by providing a 
common approach for the participants. 
 Intelligence analysis synthesis discussion.  The process of analysis follows four 
phases that are meant to ensure its quality, applicability, and timeliness.  An intelligence 
product that is of poor quality, not applicable to the problem, and late is irrelevant.  The 
four phases are: (1) reductional analysis, (2) relational analysis, (3) evaluative analysis, 
and (4) integrative analysis.  These phases (RREI) of analysis, that I have derived and 
summarized from my research, will be discussed in detail along with synthesis in chapter 
V.  Like IM that has a narrower focus than KM, analysis is more narrowly focused than 
synthesis.  Synthesis includes not only the results of all-source analysis, it also includes 
interdisciplinary perspectives, operational context, the multijurisdictional needs of 
customers, and the political constraints placed on clients.  Analysts who conduct 
intelligence synthesis in the HSIE should be conscientious of the all in all-hazards, all-
crimes, all-sources, all-agencies, all-disciplines, and all-jurisdictions. 
 Risk management core competency.  Risk management (i.e. assessing risk 
probability) is the fourth core competency program of the HSIE’s intelligence synthesis.  
Although quality intelligence assessments do not always require the assessment of risk 
(e.g., vulnerabilities, likelihood, and consequences) and can be produced as informative 
products only, the benefits of risk-informed intelligence products for decision-makers in 
the security domain are numerous.  Risk-informed intelligence improves “security 
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strategy, resource allocation, planning, communications and transparency, and thereby 
confidence” (Newsome B. , 2014, p. 7) in the intelligence product. 
 Risk management and intelligence synthesis discussion.  Analysts who can advise 
and participate in the decision-making process with the client are better positioned to 
move beyond the alert and inform tasks.  Advising is a more proactive risk-informed 
management approach that improves the quality of intelligence assessments and 
anticipatory intelligence assessments.  Its noteworthy that risk-informed anticipatory 
assessments are not predictive because no one can predict the future.  Statistical analysis 
increases the estimates of likelihood and probability of a future scenario’s occurrence, but 
it does not definitively predict that it will occur.  Risk assessments and risk management 
programs are the fourth cornerstone of the HSIE’s risk-informed applied intelligence 
synthesis system. 
 Core competencies and intelligence synthesis discussion.  Thus far, I have 
described the HSOE and the HSIE as components of the larger homeland security and 
intelligence domains.  I have recognized that the HSOE is comprised of STE systems and 
ACTN hazards, threats, and crisis events.  I have discussed how the HSIE’s pluralistic 
intelligence system provides risk-informed applied intelligence to support the NPG and 
its five preparedness missions (5PM) of prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover.   
 Furthermore, I have demonstrated that the HSIE is an intelligence synthesis 
system of intelligence management structures, processes, functions, and a purpose that 
are derived from the four core institutional and programmatic competencies of 
knowledge management (KM), information management (IM), risk management (RM), 
and intelligence analysis.  All of which are essential enablers of the HSIE’s practitioners, 
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policy makers, and institutional capacity to build knowledge capital, capacity, and 
continuity.  Next, I will discuss a positive constraint that is placed on HSIE intelligence 
activities and operational missions by the United States Constitution and legal statutes: 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties compliance. 
 Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties compliance in the HSIE.  Since its 
establishment in 2002, DHS and the homeland security domain has dealt with privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties (PCRCL) issues as new federal institution (e.g., the 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 controversies).  However, PCRCL controversies have been the 
subject of numerous statutory laws, official and unofficial governmental policy, and 
judicial rulings since the founding of the United States and the Constitution.  The 
PATRIOT Act is one of the modern era PCRCL challenges to the federal government’s 
power and authority over enhanced surveillance capabilities of U.S. and foreign citizens 
by law enforcement agencies and expanded spy programs by the National Security 
Agency (NSA) for example (Geary, 2014, pp. 275-278). 
 The DHS Privacy Office is statutorily mandated to evaluate departmental PCRCL 
programs, conduct compliance oversight, promote best practices, operate departmental 
PCRCL incident response, and train departmental personnel on PCRCL laws, policy, and 
compliance measures (Privacy Overview, 2018).  To better understand the importance of 
PCRCL compliance within the HSIE, the definitions and differences between privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties are needed.  Privacy is a person’s “interests in preventing 
the inappropriate collection, use, and release of” personally identifiable information (PII) 
such as personal characteristics, social security number, address, medical records, or GIS 
locations (Global Advisory Committee, 2012, p. 40).  Privacy rights are derived from 
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judicial rulings rather than explicit declarations within the U.S. Constitution (Carter, 
2009, p. 133).   
 Civil rights are the “obligations imposed on government to promote equality” 
such as “equal protection under the law and equal opportunity to exercise the privileges 
of citizenship regardless of race, religion, sex, or other characteristics unrelated to the 
worth of the individual (Carter, 2009, p. 133) .”  Civil liberties, on the other hand, are the 
unalienable rights of people that are written into and derived from the U.S. Constitution, 
the Bill of Rights, and its amendments.  Civil liberties “offer protection to individuals 
from improper government action and arbitrary governmental interference” (Carter, 
2009, p. 133).   
 Together, privacy rights, civil rights, and civil liberties are positive constraints 
placed on HSIE policy makers and practitioners who collect, access, analyze, and share 
information about U.S. persons (i.e., EO 12333 defined persons as U.S. citizens and 
permanent resident aliens [Global Advisory Committee, 2012, p. 40]).  More specifically, 
PCRCL must be handled by HSIE personnel, including SLTT Fusion Centers, in 
accordance with “applicable law, including but not limited to the First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution; the Privacy Act of 1974; 28 C.F.R. Part 23; 
Executive Order (EO) 12333; and the Department’s Guidance on the Use of Race in Law 
Enforcement Activities” (Civil Rights / Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support 
to the National Network of Fusion Centers, 2013, p. 2). 
 The enforcement of PCRCL compliance within the HSIE does not, nor can it, 
guarantee the absence of violations.  However, the preventive and protective measures 
are in place to ensure at least minimum legal institutional and individual compliance is 
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conducted in a systemic and deliberate manner.  Thus, the HSIE’s analytic goal is to 
provide risk-informed applied intelligence that is PCRCL compliant to homeland security 
decision-makers (see figure 10).  This institutional goal is carried out by the all-hazards 
analysts that it employs and is illustrated alongside the meaning-making to decision-
making to problem-solving continuum as an intelligence synthesis continuum in figure 
11. 
 
Figure 10.  Intelligence Synthesis Core Competencies.  The knowledge, information, and 
risk management programs as well as the intelligence analysis process are the four core 
competencies of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties compliant intelligence synthesis 











Figure 11.  The Intelligence Synthesis Continuum.  The meaning-making to decision-
making to problem-solving continuum is supported by privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties (PCRCL) compliant  knowledge (KM), information (IM), and risk management 
(RM) programs as well as the intelligence analysis (IA) and synthesis (S) processes 
within the HSIE.  Decision-making is based upon PCRCL compliant risk-informed 
applied intelligence and problem-solving is enabled by effective plans, policies, and 
practical application.  This figure is the result of research synthesis from previously cited 
sources. 
Defining The All-Hazards Intelligence Analyst 
 HSIE intelligence professionals.  Analysts, U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management job series 0132, are grouped in the intelligence series of professional 
positions concerned with “work in the collection, analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and 
dissemination (Office of Personnel Management, 2009, p. 26)” of information and 
intelligence.  Within the HSIE, the 0132 series of intelligence professionals perform 
national and departmental intelligence functions in DHS component intelligence 
programs (CIP) (Homeland Security Committee, 2016, p. 11).  Although not specifically 
titled as all-hazards intelligence professionals, their all-hazards and all-crimes duties are 
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evident by the missions of the FCs, ISACS, and other CIPs where they are employed in 
the HSIE.   
 An all-hazards approach by 0132 series intelligence professionals is further 
emphasized in the Crosswalk of Target Capabilities to Core Capabilities FEMA 
document.  In it, the former Target Capabilities List (TCL), published by DHS in 2007, is 
compared with updated NPG capabilities that recognize the variety of ACTN threats and 
the core preparedness responsibilities that includes intelligence and information sharing 
to provide anticipatory intelligence regarding emerging or imminent threats to the United 
States, its people, property, or interest through the intelligence cycle (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2011, pp. 7-8). 
 To produce all-hazards risk-informed applied intelligence products that are 
PCRCL compliant, 0132 series intelligence professionals must abide by the institutional 
policies and programs that establish the foundation of the HSIE’s pluralistic intelligence 
approach.  Again, PCRCL compliant KM, IM, and RM programs and intelligence 
analysis process are the four core competencies of the enterprise’s intelligence synthesis 
system.  This means, all-hazards analysts in the HSIE must be proficient in their 
knowledge about intelligence generation (i.e., DIKI), the intelligence process and 
reasoning (i.e., CASA and RREI), sharing and communicating intelligence assessments 
(i.e., SC), and integrating and applying intelligence into the client’s requirements or 
purpose (i.e., 4As and 3Ps).  In other words, all-hazards analysts must have content 
knowledge of know how and know what (Schleicher, 2018, p. 235)—know how the 
intelligence process, intelligence generation, and intelligence communication is 
conducted and know what is in the STE and ACTN subject matter. 
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 Applied knowledge foundations.  A person’s knowledge content is based on 
four separate but converging areas adapted from the pedagogical knowledge content 
model: (a) knowledge of the learning process, (b) knowledge of the subject matter, (c) 
knowledge of the contexts of the environment, and (d) knowledge of the audience, 
student, or customer (Whitman & Kelleher, 2016, p. 159).  In relation to HSIE all-
hazards analysts, this means having knowledge in the CASA intelligence process; 
knowledge in the STE and ACTN systems; knowledge the HSOE and the operational 
context; and knowledge about the client, customers, and their requirements.  
Additionally, two other knowledge content models are useful for understanding the all-
hazards analysts’ position within the HSIE: the 3i model and the instructional core model 
to be explained in the next section.  
 Knowledge of content areas. An analyst’s knowledge content areas about the 
process, subject matter and its context, and the client are illustrated in two other models.  
First, the 3i model depicts the union of intelligence analysts and their interpretation of the 
criminal environment; then it depicts the decision-maker’s impact on the criminal 
environment; and lastly, it depicts the influential relationship between the decision-maker 
and the intelligence analysts (Eck, Clarke, & Petrossian, 2018, p. 19).  This triadic 
knowledge content model of the analyst, the subject matter, and the client adds the 
relationship types that are typically exercised between participating people and the 
subject: how the analyst interprets (i.e., understands) the subject matter; how the analyst 
and client influence each other during the intelligence analysis process (i.e., establish 
trust) ; and what impact the subject matter and the client have on each other (i.e., 
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intelligence product acceptance).  Another similar knowledge content model is the 
instructional core. 
 The instructional core model is triadic with a teacher, the student, and the subject 
matter content.  Similarly, this model emphasizes the interactive relationships between 
them: how well the teacher understands the curriculum and the subject matter content; 
how well the student understands the subject matter content (i.e., the impact of cognitive 
engagement); and the teacher’s influence on the student’s understanding and cognitive 
engagement.  Like the 3i model, the instructional core depicts the two participants and the 
subject matter as well as their types of relationships (Whitman & Kelleher, 2016, p. 153). 
 These knowledge content and instructional core models underscore the 
knowledge creation, intellectual capital, and intelligence generation capacity of the 
analyst and client relationship with the subject matter.  This synergistic relationship is 
bounded by the four core intelligence synthesis competencies of KM, IM, RM and 
intelligence analysis.  To better illustrate this concept, I have created the applied 
intelligence core model that shows interactive relationships among the all-hazards 




Figure 12.  The Applied Intelligence Core Model.  The relationships among three 
knowledge content areas of the subject matter (i.e., content), the analyst, and the 
customer are depicted in this figure.  Analysts must interpret and understand the content 
to build an influential and trusting relationship with the intelligence customer, so the 
customer will accept the intelligence product and understand its impact on the decision-
making process.  This figure is the result of research synthesis from previously cited 
sources. 
 
 Knowledge of core competencies.  Analysts have been called “knowledge 
workers” (Lowenthal, 2015, p. 158) because of their intimate involvement with its 
maturation process from raw data to intelligence.  Researcher and author Andreas 
Schleicher states:  
The more knowledge that technology allows us to search and access, the more 
important becomes deep understanding and the capacity to make sense out of 
content.  Understanding involves knowledge and information, concepts and ideas, 
practical skills and intuitions.  But fundamentally, it involves bringing them 
together, integrating and applying them, in ways that are appropriate to the 




The correlation between this explanation about the essentials of creating and applying 
knowledge by educators is relevant to intelligence analysts who must use technology to 
gather and analyze extensive amounts of data and information; synthesize it with context, 
conceptual frameworks, and customer requirements; and then integrate and apply it into a 
problem-solving setting.   
 All-hazards analysts, like educators or business consultants, must know the 
content of their subject and profession well enough to go beyond just offering an 
assessment and take time to teach it to their clients—clearly, within the bounds of 
professional discretion.  From this understanding of the HSIE’s four institutional core 
competencies, its pluralistic intelligence context, and the applied intelligence core model, 
I have identified four core competencies of all-hazards analysts: (a) critical reasoning 
abilities (i.e., think), (b) knowledge and synthesis capacity (i.e., know), (c) 
communication skills (i.e., speak), and (d) applied intelligence abilities (i.e., act) that I 
will discuss next. 
 Critical reasoning abilities.  This is the analysts’ ability to combine a deliberate 
critical reasoning process (e.g., critical thinking steps) with creative out-of-the-box 
thinking.  This is the combination of structured and unstructured thinking that is both 
systematic and unbounded thus allowing elaborative understanding of problems.  
Elaborative thinking connects new knowledge to familiar knowledge so analysts can 
think divergently and creatively about the problem and its solutions (Schleicher, 2018, p. 
232).  An analyst’s critical reasoning abilities are simply stated as think and represents 
their ability to interpret the subject matter content. 
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 Knowledge and synthesis capacity.  This is the analysts’ capacity to integrate 
technology (e.g., sensors, instruments, and software applications) into the critical 
reasoning process to synthesize large amounts of data and information from multiple 
sources, disciplines, and jurisdictional perspectives.  Although all-hazards analysts cannot 
be a subject matter experts (SME) in all scientific disciplines, they must be able to 
comprehend the relevant baseline data points, recognize relationships, reveal patterns, 
and organize it into useful information that will become relevant knowledge and applied 
intelligence.  This is the synthesis process and it is stated as know; it represents the 
analysts’ capacity to understand the subject matter content. 
 Communication skills.  An analyst must have effective written and oral 
communication skills to convey the results of their work to their clients.  An organized 
process and format for presenting intelligence alerts, assessments, and advice that is 
based on clearly stated facts, claims, presumptions, and assumptions, is structured 
communication.  Structured communication is stated as speak and it represents the 
analysts’ ability to positively influence the client’s trust in their analytic ability and 
acceptance of the intelligence product. 
 Applied intelligence ability.  Finally, an analyst must know how to apply their 
knowledge and intelligence products in a productive manner.  Recall, analysts assert the 
4As of alert, assess, anticipate, or advise to inform decision-makers.  The applied 
intelligence ability of analysts is referred to as act and it represents their ability to 
influence clients and customers during planning, policy formulation, and practical 
application (3Ps) of their intelligence products.  It is noteworthy at this point of the 
analysis discussion to point out that actionable intelligence and applied intelligence differ 
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slightly.  Actionable intelligence implies that decision-makers and practitioners will use 
the intelligence to act quickly, or in the near-term, in an operational context.  Applied 
intelligence implies that they will use it for other purposes such as operational or 
emergency planning and policy formulation. 
 All-hazards analysts’ core competencies synthesis.  The four competencies of an 
all-hazards analyst that are derived from the institutional core competencies and 
pluralistic intelligence frameworks, are used to form the foundation of the AH-ISM and 
are illustrated in figure 13.  The applied intelligence core model of the analyst, customer, 
and content relationships is indirectly evident in the structure of the baseline ISM.  
Moreover, the DIKI maturation of raw data into intelligence is evident in the left to right 




Figure 13.  The Baseline Intelligence Synthesis Model (ISM).  This model represents the 
intelligence synthesis capacity created from a systems component model (e.g., process, 
function, structure, and purpose) that is aligned with the four core competencies of an 
analyst (e.g., think, know, speak, and act).  In this model, the critical reasoning process 
and intelligence cycle, the knowledge generation function, and the structured 
communication skills are inputs into the synthesis process that produces applied (i.e., 
actionable) intelligence.  This baseline model is the conceptual foundation of the All-
Hazards Intelligence Synthesis Model (AH-ISM).  This figure is the result of research 
synthesis from previously cited sources. 
 
 Professional development.  The all-hazards analysts’ core competencies are 
education based meaning they can be taught so they are within the institutional purview 
of professional development.  Analysts, like any other practitioner in other career fields, 
enhance their content knowledge through a professional development process consisting 
of the three domains of learning: (a) institutional education, (b) operational “on-the-job” 
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training, and (c) experience-based self-development (Department of the Army, 2012, pp. 
1-2).  An HSIE analyst’s minimum required academic education is at the secondary 
education level, with additional operational or research experience if possible, and 
preferably have a four-year degree from a higher-level education institution (The Global 
Advisory Committee, 2015, p. 4).   
 Additional education, training, and self-development are acquired through HSIE 
intuitional programs like the network of Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers 
(Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, 2018) and FEMA Emergency Management 
Institute online training courses (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018).  
Altogether, these formal and informal training resources, even though they include 
interdisciplinary, interagency, and multijurisdictional topics, are primarily law 
enforcement-centric and lack a true all-hazards approach to analysis training (Global 
Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2007, 2010; The Global Advisory Committee, 
2015). 
 Intelligence analysts’ mindset.  The combination of intuition, formal and 
informal education, training, and experiences congeal as the analysts’ mindset.  A 
mindset is like a world view because it forms the conceptual framework of how an 
analyst approaches and frames an analytical problem.  The think-know-speak-act applied 
intelligence mindset, is an elaborative analytic embarkation point for the all-hazards 
analyst.  It helps them to establish the analysis approach to the subject-matter, the initial 
APOE, and operational boundaries within spatial, temporal, and contextual parameters.  
Additionally, it helps them establish rapport with their client and earn their trust.  The 
HSIE all-hazards analyst must be proficient in the institutional core competencies of KM, 
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IM, RM, intelligence analysis; PCRCL compliance; and, their professional competencies 
of critical reasoning, communication, and intelligence synthesis and application (see 
figure 14).  Thus, the think-know-speak-act mindset serves as a good start point for any 
analyst.  The ISM model completes the analysis phase of my thesis and it will be the start 




Figure 14.  The Baseline Intelligence Synthesis Model (ISM) including Knowledge Content Areas and 
Knowledge Management Tasks.  The merging of the institutional core competencies (e.g., KM, IM, RM, 
and intelligence analysis), the knowledge content areas (e.g., knowledge of process, subject matter, the 
customer, and context) and the analysts’ professional competencies (i.e., think-know-speak-act) are 
illustrated in this figure of the baseline intelligence synthesis model.  This model represents the systemic 
production of risk-informed applied intelligence that is privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties compliant.  
This figure is the result of research synthesis from previously cited sources. 
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 In conclusion, my analysis of the United States’ homeland security and 
intelligence domains offered a reductional analysis of the homeland security operational 
environment (HSOE) and the homeland security intelligence enterprise (HSIE) to identify 
their essential systems components and entities.  Then, by a relational analysis and an 
interdisciplinary approach, I presented the transrelational similarities among several all-
hazards disciplines within the HSIE.  Lastly, I integrated these interdisciplinary findings 
into the HSIE, as well as the HSOE, and created a baseline ISM to illustrate the 
institutional and professional core competencies of IC and HSIE intelligence analysts.  
Although not specifically addressed in this chapter, I evaluated the relevance and 
usefulness of my analytic efforts throughout my analysis phase of research thus utilizing 
the RREI method (e.g., reduce, relate, evaluate, integrate).  My evaluative analysis will 
be discussed at the end of chapter V by using the CORE reflexivity method. 
 The ISM is the starting point for the creation of an all-hazards version of the 
model to help analysts understand the processes, functions, structures, and purpose for 
generating all-hazards risk-informed applied intelligence that is privacy, civil rights, and 
civil liberties compliant.  In chapter V, I will build upon the baseline ISM to create the 
AH-ISM for use by HSIE practitioners in support of the National Preparedness Goal.  
Furthermore, I will present interdisciplinary examples of the AH-ISM to illustrate its 
applicability in a multidisciplinary, multiagency, and multijurisdictional intelligence and 







 My research findings are depicted in two conceptual models about common 
intelligence synthesis core competencies that are unique to the HSIE, the intelligence 
synthesis model (ISM) and the all-hazards intelligence synthesis model (AH-ISM).  Both 
models are systems-based and constructed from institutional and professional core 
competency traits of the intelligence and analysis career fields.  The ISM’s systems 
components of process, function, structure, and purpose are based on the integration of 
the intelligence analysis process, the knowledge management (KM), information 
management (IM), and risk management (RM) institutional programs and the critical 
reasoning, knowledge synthesis, communication, and applied intelligence professional 
competencies of intelligence analysts.  Also, the U.S. Constitutional guarantee of privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties (PCRCL) compliance is integrated into the baseline ISM 
and the AH-ISM.  The shorthand memory aid for the analysts’ professional competencies 
that form the visual structure of both models is think-know-speak-act. 
 The systems components of the ISM are formed by (a) the CASA intelligence 
process (e.g., collect, analyze, synthesize, and apply); (b) the DIKI knowledge generation 
function (e.g., data, information, knowledge, intelligence); (c) CEWB structured 
communication (e.g., claim, evidence, warrant, backing) to be discussed in this chapter; 
and, (d) the 3Ps and 5PM applied intelligence purposes (e.g., policy, plans, practice; 
prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, recover).  The ISM is the baseline model for 
producing risk-informed applied intelligence that is privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties compliant for intelligence clients, customers, and consumers.  Moreover, it is the 
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conceptual framework for meaning-making in support of the decision-making process 
and problem-solving results. 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the AH-ISM and give examples of its 
transdisciplinary application within the HSIE.  By adding the HARTE crisis event 
continuum alongside the DIKI knowledge generation continuum, the ISM acquires an all-
hazards functional focus.  The combined system components of the DIKI and HARTE 
functions represents the infusion of all-source, all-crimes, all-agencies, all-jurisdictions, 
and all-disciplinary information to generate intelligence products for all-hazards 
intelligence clients.  This description presents all-hazards synthesis as a robust systemic 
process as well as an analytical mindset. Thus, the AH-ISM is an all-hazards model with 
applications in emergency management, critical infrastructure protection, systems safety 
engineering, and any other homeland security component intelligence program (CIP) that 
relies upon risk-informed applied intelligence products for operational safety and security 
success. 
The All-Hazards Intelligence Synthesis Model 
 The all-hazards HSOE is an intelligence challenge for HSIE analysts.  This 
pluralistic operational environment is full of all types of ACTN hazard sources and active 
threats to numerous STE systems like neighborhoods, public infrastructure, and private 
businesses requires a pluralistic analytical mindset to comprehend.  However, the HSIE’s 
intelligence analysis training standards for its 0132 series analysts are primarily based on 
crime analysis standards (Department of Justice, 2007, 2008, 2012).  To improve this 
institutional training deficit, a common all-hazards analytical framework is needed.  Such 
a universal intelligence analysis and synthesis model would offer a shared touchstone for 
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the HSIE’s community-of-practice in their coordination and collaborative efforts at 
fusion centers, ISACs, and FSLTT operational centers across the nation.  The AH-ISM 
would help unify intelligence analysts who work in and with law-enforcement agencies, 
incident commands, emergency management, risk management, the natural sciences, 
health sciences, and systems safety engineering disciplines. 
 The AH-ISM is a systems-based model, so it is inherently transdisciplinary and 
applicable in all disciplines that contribute to or conduct ACTN and STE intelligence 
synthesis and research.  It’s graphic representation of intelligence synthesis makes it an 
appealing interdisciplinary model that is easily shared and referenced by analysts.  
Referring to figure 13 once again, the model visually depicts its functional system 
component as a combined DIKI and HARTE continuum moving towards the applied 
intelligence purpose from left to right corresponding with the think-knowledge generation 
to act-knowledge application competencies (flowing through the synthesis center point).  
It depicts the process system component of the CASA continuum connecting into the 
DIKI and HARTE continuum (at the synthesis center point) flowing from the top 
corresponding with the think-knowledge organization competencies.  The AH-ISM 
depicts the structure system component and the CEWB structured communication 
continuum connecting into the DIKI and HARTE continuum (at the synthesis center 
point) flowing from the bottom corresponding with the speak-knowledge transfer 
competencies shown. 
 The informational flow of the ISM and AH-ISM is through and towards the 
intelligence synthesis transformational function and then on to its applied intelligence 
purpose.  The model’s structure creates a visual and functional quad-chart with four 
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counterclockwise-following areas beginning in the upper-left, to lower-left, to lower-
right, and to the upper-right.  The functional significance of these four zones are 
represented by the four RREI analysis activities of reduce, relate, evaluate, and integrate 
respectively.  These four RREI analysis phases are subphases of the analysis step in the 
CASA process.  The AH-ISM is depicted in figure 14 which is presented after the 
following discussion about the think-CASA and RREI processes. 
 The think all-hazards intelligence synthesis processes.  The think process of the 
AH-ISM is built upon research, discovery, and problem-solving methods such as the 
intelligence cycle, the scientific research method, critical-thinking strategies, and 
business analysis methods (Pherson & Pherson, 2017, p. 48).  The think process is an 
organized method of gathering, analyzing, assessing, evaluating, and integrating data, 
information, and intelligence into a final intelligence assessment or anticipatory estimate 
product.  For example, critical-reasoning strategies, like the medical field’s clinical-
reasoning process (Stern, Cifu, & Altkorn, 2015), begins with questions and ends with 
drawing conclusions and presenting findings.  Similarly, the scientific method begins 
with defining the problem and ends with presenting conclusions (Pherson & Pherson, 
2017, p. 48).  And, the intelligence cycle that is used by the IC, DOD, and law 
enforcement, has up to six steps: (a) planning, (b) requirements, (c) collection, (d) 
processing and exploitation, (e) analysis, and (f) dissemination (Lowenthal, 2015).   
 For conceptual simplicity, I will use a generic and easy to remember four-step 
intelligence process in the AH-ISM: (a) collect, (b) analyze, (c) synthesize, and (d) apply 
(CASA).  Each step of the CASA intelligence process has substeps that will be explained 
in the following sections.  Discernibly, CASA is the general intelligence process and 
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RREI is the narrower analysis process and both flow into the central intelligence 
synthesis function along with the DIKI and HARTE functions and CEWB structured 
communication. 
 Collect: gathering all-hazards data and information.  The first phase of the AH-
ISM’s CASA knowledge organization and intelligence process is the collection of raw 
data, information, knowledge, and available intelligence products for the follow-on 
intelligence analysis phase.  Previously, I discussed how the analytic approach (AA) and 
APOE influences the intelligence synthesis process by determining the targets, activities, 
and assets to be researched and analyzed.  Analysts and clients determine if analysis will 
focus on a specific known threat targets (i.e., target-centric analysis), the activities of 
unknown targets (i.e., activity-based analysis), or specific STE assets and their 
vulnerabilities (i.e., risk-informed analysis).  Furthermore, the AA helps determine the 
APOE selection like a geographic zone, an entity, a whole system, or one of its system 
components (e.g., a process, infrastructure, or functional components). 
 The AA and APOE influence the collection process as much as the client’s 
requirements and the types of systems data to be collected.  Also, the three systems 
characteristics of identifiable, detectable, and measurable (IDM) determine the collection 
sources, methods, and sensor types.  Recall, identifiable characteristics are generally 
descriptive and can be positional.  This means an entity’s identity can be determined as 
well as its location.  Detectable characteristics are the identifying characteristics (i.e., 
signatures) that are emitted, reflected, or otherwise discoverable by people and the 5INTs 
technical collection sensors.  Likewise, detection means spatiotemporal characteristics of 
an entity are discoverable.  Measurable characteristics are the signatures that reveal an 
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entities identifying characteristics shape, size, color, chemical composition, or any other 
characteristic that an instrument can qualify or quantify for analysis.  Discovery of IDM 
is accomplished by the 5INTs as well as MODES-S/I as discussed in chapter IV.  Thus, 
collection, in the AH-ISM’s CASA process, is influenced by the client’s requirements, 
IDM, AA, and APOE; and, it is accomplished by the 5INTs and MODES-S/I sources and 
means. 
 Analyze: understanding all-hazards and the meaning-making process.  Analysis 
is the second phase of the AH-ISM’s CASA knowledge organization and intelligence 
process.  Analysis is the central process of the all-hazards and all-source intelligence 
synthesis system.  It encompasses the reduction of collected data, information, 
knowledge, and prior intelligence into relevant baseline data points, discovering their 
relationships, evaluating their veracity, and integrating them into a finished intelligence 
product.  Indeed, analysis is the heart of the HARTE all-hazards intelligence synthesis 
process.  The AH-ISM’s RREI analysis process steps are: (1) reduce, (2) relate, (3) 
evaluate, and (4) integrate. 
 Reduce: the reductional analysis quadrant.  Reduce is the first step of the analysis 
phase and it is primarily concerned with categorizing and coding the collected data.  It is 
conceptually and functionally placed in the upper left-hand quadrant of the model 
between the CASA intelligence process and the DIKI function. This location indicates 
that reductional analysis begins when raw data is collected and then transferred to 
analysts, so it may be broken down into its constituent systems, system components, or 
basic entities (i.e., baseline data points) before it enters the DIKI function.  After raw data 
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is processed in the relate step, it is ready to move into the DIKI function and the next step 
of relational analysis. 
 Reductional analysis of collected ACTN and STE datum is conducted in this 
quadrant to identify basic attributes, characteristics, variables, and any other pertinent 
entity components.  This is done, for example, by entity analysis, coding, and 
categorizing of specific hazard sources, activators, preliminary relationships, active 
threats, crisis phenomenon, and STE assets.  Although the analytic approach (e.g., target-
centric, activity-based, or risk-informed) and the APOE will have an influence, the 
reductional analysis primary targets are ACTN hazards and threats, the 6Is activators, and 
the S3E / PIE STE systems or assets. 
 Relate: the relational analysis quadrant.  Relate is the second step of the analysis 
phase and it is concerned with connecting and combining the reduced baseline data 
points.   It is conceptually and functionally placed in the lower left-hand quadrant of the 
model between the DIKI and HARTE function and CEWB structured communication.  
This location indicates that relational analysis begins when baseline data points are linked 
together to discover links, nodes, networks, and the types of relationships among them.  
At this point, relational analysis starts the transformational process of raw data into useful 
information and establishing an evidentiary base for structured communication. 
 Relational analysis of ACTN and STE baseline data points is conducted in this 
quadrant to discover sequences, patterns, relationships, anomalies, and meanings among 
dormant hazards, active threats, and crisis events as well as STE systems components.  
Preliminary content, comparative, spatial, temporal, and association analysis are some of 
the analytic methodologies done in this step before useful information becomes content 
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knowledge about the subject matter.  Moreover, at the end of the relational analysis step, 
evidence and preliminary claims are established and included in structured 
communication formats. The relational analysis primary targets are ACTN hazards and 
threats, the 6Is activators, ATN relationships (e.g., activities, transactions, and networks) 
and the S3E / PIE STE systems or assets. 
 Evaluate; the evaluative analysis quadrant.  Evaluate is the third step of the 
analysis phase and it is concerned with refining useful information and acquired 
knowledge into a structured intelligence product.  Evaluative analysis collates the refined 
information so its cumulative intelligence value (CIV), to be explained later, is 
substantiated as verifiable content knowledge to be integrated into the client’s 
intelligence assessment.  It is conceptually and functionally placed in the lower right-
hand quadrant of the model between CEWB structured communication and the final 
stages of DIKI and HARTE knowledge content’s maturation into applied intelligence.  
Evaluate is the meaning-making confirmation step of RREI. 
 During the evaluative analysis step, the intelligence product is tailored for the 
client based on the analyst’s understanding of the client’s requirements as well as 
evaluation of its claims, evidence, supporting facts, presumptions, and assumptions.  This 
is the phase of the RREI process when analysts reassess their professional competencies 
of think, know, and speak before they act by integrating their content knowledge into 
intelligence alerts, assessments, anticipatory estimates, and offering advice to decision-
makers.  Evaluative analysis of intelligence is conducted in this quadrant to objectively 
scrutinize the relevance of patterns, themes, anomalies, concepts, and context about 
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ACTN hazards and threats, STE systems, as well as the client’s intelligence product 
needs. 
 Integrate: the integrative analysis quadrant.  Integrate is the fourth step of the 
analysis phase and it is concerned with the final production of intelligence products that 
are tailored to the client’s requirements.  Integrative analysis, as the term indicates, 
integrates content knowledge of the subject matter and the customer into a product that is 
fit for issuing alerts (i.e., early warning) and actionable intelligence, providing 
intelligence assessments (i.e., situational awareness), offering anticipatory intelligence 
estimates (i.e., risk-informed future scenarios), and decision-making advice if requested 
by the client.  It is conceptually and functionally placed in the upper right-hand quadrant 
of the model between DIKI and HARTE intelligence generation and the CASA 
intelligence process indicating the cyclic nature of intelligence analysis.  Client and 
customer feedback, after-action reviews, and the need to build upon previous knowledge 
means CASA and RREI are recurring process. 
 The integrative analysis step is an interdisciplinary collaborative effort to ensure 
the intelligence product meets the all-hazards needs of the HSIE client who is charged 
with supporting or carrying out the 5PMs of the NPG (e.g., prevent, protect, mitigate, 
respond, and recover).  During integration, HSIE analysts and clients must consider the 
influence and impact of the 5PMs and the 3Ps (e.g., planning, policies, and practice) on 
the CIV of the intelligence product.  By the way, the integrate step is the last opportunity 
for analysts to mitigate any unrealistic or unobtainable high expectations of their clients 
who may not understand the capabilities and limits of technical intelligence collection 
systems or the overall intelligence process.  The integrative analysis primary targets are 
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the 5PMs, the 3Ps, and the client’s requirements.  Figure 15 depicts the RREI analysis 
process integrated with the AH-ISM. 
 
 
Figure 15.  The All-Hazards Intelligence Synthesis Model Including the RREI Analytic Process.  The AH-
ISM combines the DIKI and HARTE continuums to show the parallel transformative processes of 
knowledge generation and crisis events.  Both continuums converge in the intelligence synthesis process as 
well as the applied intelligence purpose of the HSIE.  The RREI analysis process flow is depicted in the 
four quadrants of the AH-ISM beginning with (a) the collection of raw data from the CASA process (i.e., 
intelligence cycle), (b) through the data to information function (i.e., knowledge generation), (c) into 
structured communication as knowledge, then (d) through the knowledge to intelligence purpose (i.e., 
applied intelligence).  The applied intelligence purpose continues along the continuum from the AH-ISM’s 
meaning-making purpose on to decision-making and problem solving.  Although not fully depicted in this 
figure but indicated by the right pointing arrows, applied intelligence products also follow a similar time 
continuum from alerts to actionable intelligence to situational awareness assessments to anticipatory 




 Synthesize: interdisciplinary and multijurisdictional all-hazards intelligence 
integration.  Synthesis is the third phase of the AH-ISM’s CASA knowledge 
organization and intelligence process.  Considering the RREI analysis phase is the heart 
of the intelligence synthesis process and it is focused on the production of the integrated 
and tailored intelligence product for the client, synthesis should be considered in a 
broader multidisciplinary, multiagency, and multijurisdictional context.  Although RREI 
is an all-source all-discipline analytic process, synthesis considers the AH-ISM’s 
multiplicity in the context of its communities-of-practice and interest.  Synthesis 
evaluates and integrates the variety of products, participants, and perspectives of the 
HSIE, HSOE, and IC.  Another perspective of synthesis is to consider the RREI analysis 
process as the means for generating intelligence capital, or hard-currency intelligence 
products, within the AH-ISM; and, synthesis is the means for generating intelligence 
capacity from the AH-ISM.  Along these lines, synthesis is an investment by and into the 
intelligence community-of-practice. 
 Generating intelligence capital.  Intelligence capital is the cumulative intelligence 
value (CIV) currency of the AH-ISM’s applied intelligence products.  Following the 
applied intelligence core model of figure 11, the CIV of an intelligence product is its 
estimated low or high value to the client based on three criteria: (a) analyst-content 
understanding and interpretation, (b) analyst-customer influence and trust, and (c) 
customer-content impact and acceptance.  As depicted in figure 16, high level estimates 
of these three criteria push the intelligence products CIV to a higher level.  Clearly, a 
high CIV is a vote of confidence in the analyst’s ability to generate intelligence capital.  
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The more intelligence capital within the HSIE, the more intelligence capacity it will 
acquire. 
 
Figure 16.  Building Intelligence Synthesis Capital: The Cumulative Intelligence Value 
(CIV) Estimate.  A high level CIV is like the hard-currency intelligence products of the 
HSIE.  The better an analyst interprets and understands the content, the more likely a 
customer will accept the product and its impact on the decision-making process.  
Likewise, the analyst’s influence will increase as well as the customer’s trust level.  
Altogether, this is the intelligence capital and CIV of the AH-ISM.  This figure is the 
result of research synthesis from previously cited sources. 
 
 Generating intelligence capacity.  Intelligence capacity is primarily tacit and elicit 
knowledge resource-centric whereas intelligence capital and the CIV are product driven.  
Like the National Preparedness System that creates preparedness capacity for the nation, 
the AH-ISM’s synthesis process, centrally located in the model, generates intelligence 
synthesis capacity for the HSIE.  The input sources of intelligence synthesis are clearly 
depicted in the ISM and AH-ISM as institutional and professional core competencies (see 
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figure 13).  Additionally, the RREI analysis process inputs intelligence capital to the 
multidisciplinary, multisource, multiagency, multijurisdictional, and multiechelon 
synthesis resources.  Intelligence synthesis capacity value (ISCV) estimation is closely 
related to the evaluate step of the RREI process; however, it is more broadly focused 
beyond the intelligence product and on the overall intelligence system’s capacity to meet 
the needs of the homeland security and intelligence domains. 
 ISCV estimation is closely related to the evaluate step of the RREI process; 
however, it is more broadly focused beyond the intelligence product and on the overall 
intelligence system.  Inputs from PCRCL policies and law, FSLTT agencies at fusion 
centers, private critical infrastructure intelligence from ISACs, and a host of other IC and 
DHS CIPs are examples of the many public and private jurisdictions, governmental 
echelons, disciplines, and sources of intelligence.  This is both the input and outputs of 
synthesis that are depicted in the AH-ISM.  Like the CIV, ISCV estimates of low to high 
value are desired to attain the highest possible confidence levels of intelligence synthesis 
capacity.  Figure 17 illustrates the ISCV inputs from the RREI steps into the intelligence 





Figure 17.  Building Intelligence Synthesis Capacity: The RREI Analysis Inputs.  
Analysts and customers can estimate the overall intelligence synthesis capacity value 
(ISCV) by estimating the value levels of the RREI analysis inputs as well as the process, 
function, structure, and purpose system components of the AH-ISM.  Importantly, 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties considerations are included in the synthesis 
process.  This figure depicts the ISCV of the AH-ISM from the RREI values ranging 
from low to high: (1) estimate the data and data sources credibility, reliability from 
reductional analysis; (2) estimate the information quality and relevance from relational 
analysis; (3) estimate the knowledge and evidentiary veracity from estimative analysis; 
(4) estimate the intelligence product relevance and persuasiveness from integrative 
analysis.  The CIV and ISCV are closely related; however, the CIV is generally RREI 
product-centric whereas the ISCV is AH-ISM capacity-centric.  This figure is the result 
of research synthesis from previously cited sources. 
 
 Apply: integration of risk-informed applied intelligence into the decision-
making process.  Apply is the fourth and last phase of the AH-ISM’s CASA knowledge 
organization and intelligence process.  After collection, analysis, and synthesis resulting 
in a finished intelligence product with a CIV that satisfies the client’s requirements as 
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well as an ISCV that contributes to the HSIE’s communities-of-practice and interest, all-
hazards analysts must take the next step of applying their knowledge and integrating the 
intelligence product into the decision-making process.  This final step is dependent upon 
the quality of work that was gained by applying their professional competencies 
alongside the institutional competencies.  To effectively alert, assess, anticipate, and 
advise (4As) HSIE clients, customers, and consumers, all-hazards analysts must fully 
utilize their knowledge of the intelligence process, the subject matter, the customer, and 
the operational context (i.e., think-know-speak-act).  Additionally, they must combine 
knowledge management, information management, risk management, intelligence 
analysis principles, and PCRCL compliance into the apply phase of the AH-ISM. 
 The know all-hazards intelligence synthesis functions.  The know function of 
the AH-ISM is grounded in the maturation of raw data into refined intelligence.  
Although this is not a truly linear process with a well-defined beginning and end, it is 
more easily depicted as such in the left to right function to purpose arrow as seen in 
figure 14.  It is a continuum that begins with the collection of raw data, useable 
information, previously generated knowledge, and published intelligence products and 
continues to be refined and updated as new data and information is acquired.  Knowing is 
continuous and analysts are knowledge workers—this is a fundamental concept of the 
AH-ISM that applies to the parallel HARTE crises event continuum based in the 
transformation of dormant hazards into realized crisis events. 
 The dual flow of DIKI and HARTE is fed by the CASA processes and throughout 
the RREI analysis process.  This knowledge generation function ultimately produces 
synthesized all-hazards intelligence products that are integrated into a homeland security 
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operational plan, an institutional policy, or a departmental mission directive in support of 
the NPG.  Notably, the DIKI and HARTE function also supports the body of knowledge 
of practitioners and academic researchers. 
 The HARTE model’s hazard to threat transformation.  The AH-ISM’s 
functional continuum depicts the infusion of data and information into the hazard 
transformation process.  The basic concept of this transformational continuum begins 
with a dormant hazard source that interacts with an activator to become an active threat.  
Then, the active threat is directed towards a STE asset thereby threatening its potentially 
exposed and unsecured vulnerabilities.  This interaction between and active ACTN threat 
and a STE system develops into a realized crisis event such as an incident, disaster, or 
catastrophe when its exposed and unsecured vulnerabilities are overwhelmed.   
 The HARTE model’s activators and relationships.  This HARTE 
transformational flow is more simply stated as hazard to threat to crisis event.  However, 
it also consists of interactive activators and the relationships among the ACTN and STE 
system’s components and entities.   Although they are not specifically addressed in a 
single citable publication, I have tentatively placed activators and initiating mechanism 
into six types (the 6Is) that I will use for simplicity in my research discussion: (a) 
initiators, (b) influencers, (c) instigators, (d) inciters, (e) ignitors, or (f) inhibitors.  
Certainly, relationships are central to the HARTE all-hazards crisis event model because 
they determine how hazard sources interact with activators and how threats interact with 
STE systems.  This crisis generation process is aligned with the state change process and 




 Relationships among systems and entities can be placed into three general 
categories based on their associations through (a) activities, (b) transactions, and (c) 
networks (ATN) (Antony, 2016, pp. 17-42; Biltgen & Ryan, 2016, pp. 55-67).  Physical 
and non-physical things (i.e., entities), can be associated or related together by what they 
do.  For example, motorcycles are modes of transportation as well as planes, trains, and 
automobiles and what they do, their functional purpose, is transport people.  This type of 
activity association also contributes to their utility as proxies for people.  This means if a 
vehicle (i.e., a proxy entity) can be located, then its associated owner, operator, or 
passenger (i.e., the target entity) also can be located. 
 Transactional associations or relationships means something is given or received 
between two entities like money, sustenance, data, or information.  Although the 
activities of the entities may not be the same or even remotely similar, they still can be 
linked by a transaction.  For example, a legitimate bank can be linked to an organized 
crime syndicate by a financial transaction.  Networks also may link entities together 
through online social media networks or virtual communities.  Another example is 
natural trophic levels that are essentially nourishment networks (i.e., ecosystems) 
consisting of different types of animals, plants, and people that are directly and indirectly 
related.  The association of entities by ATN relationships is a way of considering how the 
HARTE crisis event continuum functions. 
 The HARTE model’s crisis events.  The National Response Framework (NRF) 
and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) discuss the incident command 
system (ICS) and the Stafford Act Emergency or Major Disaster Declaration (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013, 2016, p. 28).  Within these publications the types and levels 
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of disasters are discussed and range from small in scale and scope single incidents to 
emergency declarations to disaster declarations to large scale catastrophes.  For the 
purposes of simplicity in my research discussions, I will refer to the typed of crisis events 
as incidents and emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes as IDC.  This acronym will 
represent the scale and scope of incidents that require implementation of ICS under the 
NIMS as well as Stafford Act disaster declarations and large-scale catastrophes across 
multiple jurisdictions or regions. 
 To summarize the know all-hazards intelligence synthesis functions, consider the 
mnemonics and acronyms that I have introduced thus far.  Hazard sources and threats are 
adversarial, cyber, technological, natural (ACTN) and affect social, technological, and 
environmental (STE) systems such as populations, infrastructure and institutions, the 
economy and environment (PIE) or, said in another way, social, engineered, economic, 
and environmental (S3E) systems.  ACTN hazard sources are generally activated by 
initiators, influencers, instigators, inciters, ignitors, or inhibitors (6Is).  Relationships 
among ACTN, STE, and the 6Is are either activity-based, transactional, or through shared 
networks (ATN).  And, lastly, realized crisis events resulting from the interactions among 
dormant hazards, activators, relationships, and active threats are either incidents, 
disasters, or catastrophes (IDC). 
 The all-hazard crisis event predicate model establishes that ACTN threats, STE 
targets, and their potentially exposed and unsecured vulnerabilities converge in a time 
and location nexus.  Like the interdisciplinary event triad depicting handlers of offenders 
(i.e., threats), guardians of victims (i.e., STE assets), and managers of STE and 
vulnerabilities, the integration of the HARTE crisis event model and the all-hazards crisis 
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event predicate illustrates the nexus of ACTN, 6Is, STE, IDM, time, location, the 3Ps, 
and the 5PMs (see figure 18).  This is an interactive conceptual model meaning it should 
trigger analytic thinking about the significance of FSLTT and private sector analysts and 
decision-makers in their roles as ACTN and STE handlers, guardians, and managers to 
prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover from all-hazards crisis events. 
 
Figure 18.  The Integrated HARTE Crisis Event Model and All-Hazards Crisis Event 
Predicate.  This model illustrates the interactive coordination and cooperation roles of 
homeland security intelligence and operations practitioners who serve as ACTN and STE 
handlers, guardians, and managers.  The nexus of the crisis event (i.e., the HARTE 
model) in time and location (i.e., the crisis event predicate) with public and private sector 
handlers, guardians, and managers underscores the significance of effective planning, 
policy formulation, and practical application of missions to accomplish the five 





 The speak all-hazards structured communication structure.  Intelligence 
synthesis system structure is exemplified in several ways: it is the institutional vertical 
and horizontal hierarchy structure like the HSIE’s operational components, their CIPs, 
and their institutional missions affiliation with the IC; it is the formal and informal 
information sharing structures of HSIE and HSOE communities-of-interest and practice 
networks; and it is the information technology structure that facilitates the HSIE’s 
collection requirements and intelligence generation purpose.  The AH-ISM’s structural 
focus stems from knowledge management’s knowledge transfer task and from the 
analysts’ knowledge-of-the-customer competency.  Together, they emphasize the 
importance of the all-hazards analysts’ effective communication skills in the form of 
structured communication (i.e., speak). 
 Integrating Toulmin’s argumentation model into the AH-ISM.  Structured 
communication in the AH-ISM is based on Stephen Toulmin’s structured argumentation 
method ( Clark, 2017; Inch & Warnick, 2010; Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016).  Structured 
argumentation is “a framework to make assumptions, reasoning, rationale, and evidence 
explicit and transparent” (Clark, 2017, p. 125).  It structures evidentiary data, 
information, assumptions, presumptions, terms, concepts, hypotheses, and claims—that 
are derived from the intelligence process and data transformation function—into an 
organized (i.e., structured) format.  Hence, the term structured communication rather than 
argumentation because analysts are primarily required to transfer knowledge and 
intelligence products to their clients rather than argue about it.  The Toulmin model of 
organizing claims, evidence, warrant, and backing (CEWB) is easily integrated into a 
final intelligence synthesis product. 
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 CEWB in structured communication.  Toulmin’s model of argumentation is based 
on the premise that a claim (i.e., an analytical conclusion) is derived from evidence (i.e., 
data and information), the warrant (i.e., the linking reasoning) that connects the claim and 
data, and the backing of more facts or accepted presumptions (Inch & Warnick, 2010, p. 
43).  For example, the claim-conclusion that illegal narcotics are being distributed by a 
local gang is based on police surveillance and testimonial evidence-data.  Furthermore, 
the claim and the evidence are linked by the warrant-reasoning that police presence is 
absent in the community and the backing that research has proven the absence of a 
guardian increases the opportunity for crime in a location.  This CEWB method forms the 
analytic basis for structured communication in the AH-ISM. 
 Analytic claims can also be called conclusions or assertions because they are 
intended to put forward a claimed proposition that is data or evidentiary derived.  
Additionally, analytic claims place the burden-of-proof on the analysts who make the 
claim because it is their responsibility to justify their conclusion with evidence, the 
warrant, and relevant backing.  This evidentiary burden severs to strengthen their own 
content knowledge as well as that of the client (Walton, 2014, p. 116).  Ultimately, it also 
builds trust between analysts and clients (see figure 11). 
 Assertions, presumptions, and assumptions in structured communication.  At this 
point, it is important to note the differences between assertion (i.e., analytical claims), 
assumptions, and presumptions that are likely to be included in intelligence products.  As 
previously stated, assertions are evidence-based claims that carry the burden of 
justification.  Assumptions, on the other hand, do not require evidentiary backing and 
have no burden of justification.  Indeed, assumptions can be lies.  Presumptions are 
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tentatively accepted as unproven claims; however, a presumption must be proven or 
justified when challenged (Walton, 2014, pp. 116-117).  Often, intelligence products 
contain presumptions along with assertions that are based on explanatory, testimonial, 
circumstantial, corroborative, and factual evidence, data, and information (Clark, 2017, 
pp. 125-126). 
 This CEWB structure of presenting, or communicating, analytical claims, 
conclusions, and assessments based on organized supporting evidence is necessary for 
gaining the trust and confidence of an intelligence client.  Clearly, the CIV—the 
intelligence capital—of an intelligence product is higher when CEWB veracity is high.  
Likewise, the ISCV—the intelligence capacity—of the intelligence synthesis system is 
higher when CEWB and CIV are consistently valued as high by intelligence clients and 
customers. 
 Analytic structured communications are based on the Toulmin model and 
institutionally prescribed formats that guide analysts in their core competencies of 
knowledge organization, generation, transfer, and application.  An analytical product’s 
format must have “a structure—discrete parts, some superior or subordinate to others” 
(Newsome, 2016, p. 288).  For example, structure is provided by academic publications 
and standards that are adopted by the scientific or intelligence communities like the 
Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, the U.S. Army’s 
operations order format (e.g., situation, mission, execution, sustainment, command and 
signal), and the U.S. Army’s intelligence estimate tabs (e.g., terrain, weather, civil 
considerations, intelligence preparation of the battlefield products) (Department of the 
Army, 2014, pp. C-2 - C-17).  The information and intelligence that an analyst 
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communicates to the client in each of these examples should be derived from the CEWB 
model.  An all-hazards analyst cannot effectively apply the 4As without a structured 
communication method based on CEWB analytic reasoning and product presentation. 
 The act all-hazards applied intelligence synthesis purpose.  The last systems 
component of the AH-ISM is its ultimate purpose to produce risk-informed applied 
intelligence that is privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties compliant.  At the analytical 
level of the all-hazards analyst, this purpose is summed up as act.  In other words, 
analysts have the responsibility to act within the scope of their duties to apply the 4As in 
support of their intelligence clients and customers.  At the intelligence synthesis level of 
the AH-ISM, this purpose is the integration of applied all-hazards intelligence into the 
HSIE and HSOE domains.   
 The act competency and applied intelligence purpose completes the intelligence 
synthesis system.  Together with think, know, and speak, as well as the other systems 
components of function, structure, and process, the ISM can be depicted as an open 
system with its functional components of input, transformation, and output.  Figure 19 
illustrates the ISM as an open system that combines knowledge organization, generation, 




Figure 19.  Intelligence Synthesis as a System.  The ISM and AH-ISM models are based 
on an open system model.  This figure depicts the systems components and core 
competencies that were used to create the ISM and AH-ISM.  It sequentially depicts (1) 
the data and contextual inputs, (2) the analysis and synthesis transformational processes, 
functions, and structures, and (3) the purposeful outputs of the intelligence synthesis 
system.  This figure also aligns think-know-speak-do professional competencies with the 
KM, IM, RM, and IA institutional competencies that are included in the model.  This 
figure is the result of research synthesis from previously cited sources. 
 I have introduced no fewer than 34 acronyms that are AH-ISM specific in the 
analysis and discussion chapters about building the ISM.   These acronyms are systems 
based and derived from the institutional and analyst’s professional knowledge core 
competencies as well as the mission directives and legal requirements placed on the 
HSIE.  An acronym-only illustration of the AH-ISM may help with organizing and 
visualizing it from a different perspective by placing these acronyms in their appropriate 





Figure 20.  AH-ISM Acronym Only Illustration.  This figure represents each acronym 
that is relevant to building the AH-ISM in their appropriate position to help with 
organizing and visualizing the model.  T is think, K is know, S is speak, and A is act.  KO 
is knowledge organization, KG is knowledge generation, KT is knowledge transfer, and 
KA is knowledge application.  IM is information management, KM is knowledge 
management, RM is risk management, and IA is intelligence analysis.  CASA is collect, 
analyze, synthesize, apply.  DIKI is data, information, knowledge, and intelligence.  
HARTE is hazards, activators, relationships, threats, and crisis events.  CEWB-SC is 
claim, evidence, warrant, backing and structured communication.  3Ps is policy, plans, 
and practice.  ACTN is adversarial, cyber, technological, and natural.  STE is socio-
technological-environmental systems.  IDM is identify, detect, and measure.  S3E is 
social, engineered, economic, and environmental.  PIE is population, infrastructure and 
institutions, economy and environment.  6Is is initiators, influencers, instigators, inciters, 
ignitors, or inhibitors.  ATN is activities, transactions, and networks.  CIV is cumulative 
intelligence value.  ISCV is intelligence synthesis capacity value.  PCRCL is privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties.  CCC is clients, customers, and consumers.  5PM is 
prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover preparedness missions.  4As is alert, 
assess, anticipate, and advise.  RREI is reduce, relate, evaluate, and integrate. 
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 Altogether, analyst, all-hazards intelligence products, and their intelligence clients 
are parts of the whole homeland security domain’s problem-solving system.  Through 
meaning-making intelligence assessments and anticipatory estimates, analyst support the 
decision-making process of emergency and operational planning, policy formulation, and 
the practical application of those plans and policies.  In turn, they contribute to the NPG’s 
missions of prevention, protection, mitigation, recovery, and response as well as the 
overall safety, security, and resilience of the nation’s population and resources.  
However, decisions alone do not solve homeland security problems—action is required 
for practical application of plans and policies. 
Interdisciplinary Examples of AH-ISM Function Models 
 The AH-ISM is easily adapted to include many other multidisciplinary functional 
and purposeful continuums that support all-hazards intelligence synthesis.  For example, 
law enforcement and the judicial systems applications include the evidentiary burden-of-
proof continuum ranging from mere suspicion to reasonable suspicion to probable cause 
to beyond-a-reasonable-doubt to complete certainty (Carter, 2009, p. 63; Walton, 2014, 
pp. 52-54).  Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberty (PCRCL) application includes the first 
amendment activity protection continuum ranging from routine to expressive to 
precursory to conclusive activity (Global Advisory Committee, 2012; Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013, 2018).  Another PCRCL application is behavioral and 
ideologic centric and ranges from non-traditional or diverse to controversial to extreme to 
criminal.  And lastly, another example would be health services test-treatment continuum 
ranging from pretest, test, treatment, post-treatment (Stern et al., 2015, pp. 5-6).   
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 Like the HARTE crisis event continuum, these multidisciplinary functional and 
purposeful continuums require inputs from system components that are similar to the 
CASA and RREI processes, the DIKI knowledge generation function, and CEWB 
structured communication to be applied, thus becoming actionable, by decision-makers in 
their respective homeland security contributing disciplines.  To be sure, these pluralistic 
intelligence examples of ACTN hazards, evidentiary, and procedural continuums 
depicted in figures 18 – 25 are applicable to the AH-ISM as well as the broader all-
hazards HSIE and HSOE.  Although these figures only depict functional and purposeful 
continuums, each associated discipline has unique processes and structural system 
components that contribute relevant data, information, and knowledge into its intelligence 
synthesis system.  Complete selected AH-ISM examples will be presented in the 
subsequent section of this chapter. 
 Law enforcement and justice disciplines function examples.  Law enforcement 
and related judicial training is the common program of instruction for DHS intelligence 
analysts.  Consequently, they are primarily trained in the all-crimes analysis aspects of 
the HSOE with an understanding of how the DIKI knowledge generation process builds 
upon the functions and purposes of burden-of-proof, evidence, evidential persuasiveness, 
PCRCL protected activities, behaviors, ideologies, and in PCRCL compliance by 
institutions and individuals.  Additionally, the health care, systems safety engineering, 
and cybersecurity professionals also understand how the DIKI knowledge generation 
process builds upon the functions and purposes of epidemiologic and diagnostic clinical 
reasoning, cyberattacks, and technological accidents and mishaps.  Each career field is a 
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contributing discipline to the homeland security operations and intelligence domains 
committed to safety, security, and resilience. 
 Burden-of-proof.  Burden-of-proof is a legal standard “for what is to be 
considered a proof in evidential reasoning in law” (Walton, 2014, p. 1).  It is used in a 
court of law, so a judicial decision can be made in a case even though all the facts are not 
known.  Burden-of-proof standards contribute to the law enforcement and judicial 
continuum of figure 21. 
 
Figure 21.  The Burden-of-proof Continuum.  Burden-of-proof and evidentiary reasoning 
ranges from an inconclusive state to a conclusive state.  It begins with mere suspicion of 
a crime without evidence to reasonable suspicion based on the criminal predicate.  From 
the criminal predicate nexus, it moves to probable cause that allows for legal detention, 
search, and arrest of the offender to criminal conviction based on judicial reasoning that 
is beyond-a-reasonable-doubt.  It concludes with complete certainty that also is 
evidentiary based.  Not all facts must be known throughout the burden-of-proof 
continuum because assertions can be based on accepted presumptions.  This figure is 
derived from descriptions and explanations in Burden-of-proof, Presumption and 
Argumentation by Douglas Walton (2014) and Law Enforcement Intelligence by David L. 
Carter (2009). 
 Evidence and persuasiveness.  Evidential reasoning in law, like burden-of-proof, 
is coupled with persuasiveness to help a law enforcement officer, jury, judge, or 
intelligence analyst “move forward to a conclusion under conditions of uncertainty, lack 
of knowledge and even inconsistency” (Walton, 2014, p. 1).  Figure 22 depicts evidential 
reasoning and persuasiveness coupled together in a single continuum.  Alongside the 




Figure 22.  The Integrated Evidence and Persuasiveness Continuum.  The evidential 
persuasiveness continuums range from the lowest level of persuasiveness and the type of 
evidence to the highest level of persuasiveness and its type.  The least persuasive type of 
evidence to most intelligence clients is statistical, followed by abstract textual, then 
concrete textual, on to the most persuasive form of visual evidence.  This figure is 
derived from descriptions and explanations in Intelligence Analysis: A Target-centric 
Approach by Robert M. Clark (2017) and Burden-of-proof, Presumption and 
Argumentation by Douglas Walton (2014). 
 Behavior and ideology.  Although some behaviors and ideologies are considered 
offensive, controversial, and extreme by some people in society, they are not inherently 
or legally criminal.  Behavior and ideology are PCRCL protected until they meet the 
criminal predicate test of convergent people or organizations, the codified elements of 
crime, in time and place.  The criminal predicate standard must be met before PCRCL 
protected behaviors and their associated ideology become criminal thus justifying law 
enforcement intervention or intelligence activities focus (see figure 23). 
 
Figure 23.  The Behavior and Ideology Continuum.  PCRCL protected behavior and 
ideology converges with criminal behavior in the criminal predicate when probable cause 
is established that a crime is or will be committed.  The range of behavior and ideology 
begins with PCRCL protected non-traditional or diverse to controversial to extreme.  
Extreme behavior that exhibits criminal intent (e.g., ideological terrorism) as established 
by the criminal predicate is probable cause for law enforcement intervention.  This figure 
is derived from descriptions and explanations in Law Enforcement Intelligence by David 
L. Carter (2009). 
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 Activities.  Like PCRCL protected behavior and ideology, protected activities, 
even though some may consider them offensive, controversial, or extreme, are not 
criminal until the criminal predicate nexus occurs (see figure 24). 
 
Figure 24.  The Activities Continuum.  PCRCL protected activities (i.e., protest and 
demonstrations) converge with criminal activities, like ideologically motivated behavior, 
in the criminal predicate when probable cause is established that a crime is or will be 
committed.  The range of activities begins with PCRCL protected routine activity to 
expressive activity to precursive activity (i.e., potentially demonstrative of a criminal 
predicate).  It concludes with conclusive activity that is demonstrative of a criminal 
predicate.  This figure is derived from descriptions and explanations in Law Enforcement 
Intelligence by David L. Carter (2009). 
 PCRCL compliance.  DHS, hence the HSIE, is required by law to conduct its 
CIPs and operational components in a manner that complies with the minimum legal 
standards of PCRCL protections for U.S. persons.  DHS policy design and practice are 
intended to go beyond minimum legal compliance and enhance individual liberty “when 
there is no countervailing harm to the Department’s homeland security mission” (Civil 
Rights / Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of 
Fusion Centers, 2013, p. ii).  Figure 25 depicts the PCRCL compliance continuum. 
 
Figure 25.  The Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Compliance Continuum.  
Institutional and individual compliance with PCRCL laws and policies range from non-
compliant to enhanced compliance with minimum legal compliance between the two 
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extremes.  DHS strives for enhanced PCRCL compliance by implementing extra 
institutional policy-based provisions. This figure is derived from descriptions and 
explanations in Law Enforcement Intelligence by David L. Carter (2009) and Civil Rights 
/ Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion 
Centers published by DHS (2013). 
 Health care disciplines function example.  Health care professional must 
determine when testing and treatment of a patient is necessary.  This clinical reasoning 
process is called the test-treatment threshold (Stern et al., 2015) and it is easily integrated 
into the natural history or progression of disease continuum beginning with exposure and 
ending with the preferred outcomes of cure or containment and the undesirable outcomes 
of disability or death (Gordis, 2014).  Figure 26 depicts this integrated continuum that is 
supported by the clinical reasoning process. 
 
Figure 26.  The Integrated Epidemiological and Diagnosis Test-Treatment Continuum.  
The epidemiologic natural history of disease and the clinical reasoning diagnostic test-
treatment thresholds combine to form this figure depicting the hazard to crisis event 
continuum in the health care fields.  It begins with exposure to a disease hazard source to 
the optimal treatment end state of cure or containment or the undesirable results of 
disability or death.  This figure is adapted from Epidemiology by Leon Gordis (2014) and 
Symptoms to Diagnosis by Scott C. Stern, Adam S. Cifu, and Diane Altkorn (2015). 
 Cybersecurity function example.  Cybersecurity and cyber-law enforcement must 
comply with PCRCL protections as well as the burden-of-proof and evidential reasoning 
standards.  Figure 27 depicts the actions of both cybersecurity practitioners and cyber-




Figure 27.  The Cyber Kill Chain Continuum.  Cybersecurity response actions and the 
weaponization of cyber tools are depicted in this figure ranging from cyber-
reconnaissance of the cyber system or person to the cybersecurity response or the cyber-
criminal’s achievements.  The criminal and crisis event predicate is exemplified in this 
cyber kill chain continuum (e.g., target / victim, offender / threat, cyber place / 
vulnerabilities, and the intent to commit a cyber-crime).  This figure is adapted from 
Gaining the Advantage: Applying Cyber Kill Chain Methodology to Network Defense 
published by Lockheed Martin (2015). 
 Technological systems safety function example.  Technological accident and 
mishap investigations are not necessarily criminally focused unless evidence of a 
criminal predicate is discovered by systems safety engineers or investigators.  Until then, 
accident and mishap investigations are focused on the technical and technological causal 
factors rather than adversarial or criminal causal factors (see figure 28). 
 
Figure 28.  The System Mishap Continuum.  Systems safety is focused on the hazard 
source to crisis event continuum depicted in this figure resulting in a technological 
mishap or accident.  The transitional HARTE crisis event continuum, that includes 
activators (i.e., initiating mechanisms) and relationships (i.e., contributing factors), are 
evident in this technological continuum.  This figure is derived from Hazard Analysis 
Techniques for System Safety by Clifton A. Ericson II (2016). 
Interdisciplinary Examples of the AH-ISM 
 Five interdisciplinary examples of completed AH-ISMs are presented in this 
section to illustrate that the model is replicable and scalable across disciplines and in its 
scope.  The AH-ISM can be reproduced in law enforcement, cybersecurity, systems 
engineering, health care, and the natural science to name a few.  It can be adjusted in its 
scale and scope to reflect the myriad of processes, functions, and communication 
structures resident in intelligence and security fields.  The purpose of the AH-ISM, 
however, remains the same regardless of the disciplinary field that replicates it: to 
provide synthesized applied intelligence. 
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 The adversarial and law enforcement AH-ISM.  A competed AH-ISM portrays 
the parts and whole of the intelligence syntheses system.  Each of the four systems 
component of the AH-ISM are represented as the think-know-speak-act competencies 
and each of the DIKI and HARTE dual functions and purposes form the centerline of the 
model.  The CASA processes and CEWB structure feed into the knowledge generation 
and applied intelligence production purpose of the model.  The law enforcement CASA-
think process is depicted by two complementary processes that promote the critical 
reasoning and knowledge organization core competencies: the SARA and NCISP 
intelligence processes (Carter, 2009; Eck et al., 2018; Ratcliffe, 2016).  Both of these 
crime analysis models emphasize the systemic collection, analysis, synthesis, and 
application of relevant data about crime and criminals.   
 The DIKI and HARTE-know functions are depicted by the burden-of-proof 
function model that emphasizes the necessity of processing raw data (i.e., suspicion) into 
useable information (i.e., criminal predicate); then, into knowledge and intelligence (i.e., 
probable cause and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt).  The CEWB structured communication 
is depicted by the various law enforcement relevant products of crime statistics, 
investigative reports, crime maps, and testimony and emphasizes the knowledge transfer 
and communication skills core competencies.  Finally, applied crime intelligence is 
depicted as integrated law enforcement policies and programs like Intelligence-Led 
Policing, training, or even judicial conviction based on the complete certainty of 




Figure 29.  An Interdisciplinary Adversarial and Law Enforcement AH-ISM Example: 
The Law Enforcement SARA Process, the NCISP Intelligence Process, and The Burden-
of-proof Continuum.  This figure represents the entire AH-ISM from an adversarial and 
law enforcement disciplinary perspective.  It depicts the dual DIKI and HARTE functions 
alongside the burden-of-proof function.  It also depicts the CASA process alongside the 
SARA and NCISP processes as inputs into the knowledge generation and applied 
intelligence purpose.  It also depicts the CEWB structured communication input 
alongside law enforcement formatted reports and other products.  The output of this 
adversarial and law enforcement AH-ISM is risk-informed applied intelligence that is 





 The cybersecurity and law enforcement AH-ISM.  The combined cybersecurity 
and law enforcement CASA-think process is depicted by two complementary processes 
that promote the critical reasoning and knowledge organization core competencies: the 
SARA intelligence and cyber defense processes (Carter, 2009; Eck et al., 2018;  
Lockheed Martin, 2015; Ratcliffe, 2016).  Both of these adversarial and cyber-crime 
analysis models emphasize the systemic collection, analysis, synthesis, and application of 
relevant data about crime and criminals.  Together, they provide key evidential data 
inputs into the cybersecurity focused AH-ISM. 
 The DIKI and HARTE-know functions are depicted by the combined cyber kill 
chain and cyber-response function models that emphasizes the necessity of processing 
raw cyber-forensic data into useable information; then, into knowledge and intelligence 
for effective cybersecurity response and forensics.  The CEWB structured 
communication is depicted by the various law enforcement relevant products related to 
cyber forensics, crime statistics, investigative reports, crime maps, and testimony and 
their emphasis on the knowledge transfer and communication skills core competencies.  
Finally, applied cyber-crime intelligence is depicted as integrated cyber-crime and 
cybersecurity policies, programs, training, or even judicial conviction based on the 
complete certainty of persuasive cyber-forensic evidence derived from cyber-intelligence 





Figure 30.  An Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity AH-ISM Example: The Law Enforcement SARA Process, 
The Cyber Defense process, and the Cyber Kill Chain Continuum. This figure represents the entire AH-
ISM from a cybersecurity, adversarial, and law enforcement disciplinary perspective.  It depicts the dual 
DIKI and HARTE functions alongside the combined cyber kill chain and cybersecurity response functions.  
It also depicts the CASA process alongside the SARA and cyber-defense processes as inputs into the 
knowledge generation and applied cyber-intelligence purpose.  It also depicts the CEWB structured 
communication input alongside cybersecurity and cyber-forensics law enforcement formatted reports and 
other products.  The output of this cybersecurity, adversarial, and law enforcement AH-ISM is risk-
informed applied cyber-intelligence that is PCRCL compliant.  This figure is the result of research 




 The technological mishap AH-ISM.  The systems safety engineering CASA-
think process is depicted by two complementary processes that promote the critical 
reasoning and knowledge organization core competencies: the systems safety research 
and systems engineering processes (Ericson, 2016).  Both of these technological hazard 
analysis models emphasize the systemic collection, analysis, synthesis, and application of 
relevant data about technological hazards, mishaps, and accidents. Together, they provide 
key evidential data inputs into the technological mishap investigation focused AH-ISM. 
 The DIKI and HARTE-know functions are depicted by the technological hazard 
and mishap continuum that emphasizes the necessity of processing data into useable 
information; then, into knowledge and intelligence for effective technological mishap and 
accident investigations.  The CEWB structured communication is depicted by the various 
accident investigation and systems engineering products related to technological 
accidents and their emphasis on the knowledge transfer and communication skills core 
competencies.  Finally, applied systems safety engineering intelligence is depicted as 





Figure 31.  An Interdisciplinary Technological Mishap AH-ISM: The System Research Process, the 
Systems Engineering Process, and the System Mishap Continuum.  This figure represents the entire AH-
ISM from a technological and systems engineering disciplinary perspective.  It depicts the dual DIKI and 
HARTE functions alongside the technological mishap and safety engineering functions.  It also depicts the 
CASA process alongside the systems safety research and systems engineering processes as inputs into the 
knowledge generation and applied technological hazard and mishap investigation and intelligence purpose.  
It also depicts the CEWB structured communication input alongside systems safety and investigation 
formatted reports and other products.  The output of this technological mishap AH-ISM is risk-informed 
applied investigative and intelligence products that are, if applicable, PCRCL compliant.  This figure is the 




 The natural hazard (earthquake) AH-ISM.  The earthquake natural hazards 
CASA-think process is depicted by two complementary processes that promote the 
critical reasoning and knowledge organization core competencies: the geological, 
geographic, and environmental research process and the scientific problem-solving 
process (Montello & Sutton, 2013; Pherson & Pherson, 2017).  Both of these natural and 
environmental hazard analysis models emphasize the systemic collection, analysis, 
synthesis, and application of relevant data about natural hazards, threats, and crises. 
Together, they provide key data inputs into the natural hazard analysis and intelligence 
synthesis focused AH-ISM. 
 The DIKI and HARTE-know functions are depicted by the earthquake crisis event 
continuum that emphasizes the necessity of processing geological and seismic data into 
useable information; then, into knowledge and intelligence for effective natural crisis 
event study.  The CEWB structured communication is depicted by the various geological 
and environmental products related to natural hazards and emphasize the knowledge 
transfer and communication skills core competencies.  Finally, applied natural hazards 
research and intelligence are depicted as applied homeland security domain safety, 




Figure 32.  An Interdisciplinary Natural Hazard AH-ISM Example: The Geological, 
Geographic, and Environmental Research Process, the Scientific Problem-Solving 
Process, and the Earthquake HARTE Continuum.  This figure represents the entire AH-
ISM from a natural hazards perspective.  It depicts the dual DIKI and HARTE functions 
alongside the earthquake crisis event process.  It also depicts the CASA process alongside 
the geological and scientific problem-solving processes as inputs into the knowledge 
generation and applied natural hazard intelligence and research purpose.  It also depicts 
the CEWB structured communication input alongside scientific research and study 
formatted reports and other products.  The output of this natural hazard AH-ISM is risk-
informed applied intelligence and research products that are, if applicable, PCRCL 
compliant.  This figure is the result of research synthesis from previously cited sources. 
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 The natural hazard (disease or Contamination) AH-ISM.  The disease or 
contamination natural hazards CASA-think process is depicted by two complementary 
processes that promote the clinical reasoning and knowledge organization core 
competencies: the diagnosis and prognosis clinical reasoning processes and the 
epidemiological and diagnosis test-treatment processes (Gordis, 2014; Stern et al., 2015).  
Both of these natural disease and epidemiological hazard analysis models emphasize the 
systemic collection, analysis, synthesis, and application of relevant data about natural 
hazards, threats, and crises. Together, they provide key data inputs into the natural hazard 
analysis and intelligence synthesis focused AH-ISM. 
 The DIKI and HARTE-know functions are depicted by the disease or 
contamination diagnostic continuum that emphasizes the necessity of processing 
diagnostic and epidemiologic data into useable information; then, into knowledge and 
intelligence for effective natural crisis event investigation and research.  The CEWB 
structured communication is depicted by the various diagnostic and investigative medical 
research products related to natural hazards and their emphasis on the knowledge transfer 
and communication skills core competencies.  Finally, applied natural hazards research 
and intelligence is depicted as applied homeland security domain safety, security, and 








Figure 33.  An Interdisciplinary Natural Disease or Human Caused Toxin Illness AH-ISM Example: The 
Diagnosis and Prognosis Clinical Reasoning Processes and the Epidemiological and Diagnosis Test-
Treatment Continuum.  This figure represents the entire AH-ISM from a natural hazards and epidemiologic 
perspective.  It depicts the dual DIKI and HARTE functions alongside the disease or contamination 
diagnostic continuum.  It also depicts the CASA process alongside the diagnostic and epidemiological 
clinical reasoning processes as inputs into the knowledge generation and applied natural hazard intelligence 
and research purpose.  It also depicts the CEWB structured communication input alongside medical 
research and study formatted reports and other products.  The output of this natural hazard AH-ISM is risk-
informed applied intelligence and research products that are, if applicable, PCRCL compliant.  This figure 




The CORE Reflexivity Discussion 
 The CORE process of (1) critical examination, (2) organization, (3) reflection, 
and (4) evaluation helped me evaluate the process, analysis, and results of my research.  
The CORE process is intended to be done in a multimodal context to help researchers 
with the triangulation of data, information, and analytic findings by cross-examination of 
multiple types of literature sources—MODES or MODES-S/I.  It also is intended to help 
the researcher to flush out any biases and discrepant information.  Therefore, it is a dual-
purpose method meant for research process improvement and professional development 
of the researcher.  The CORE process of critical examination is based on six questions 
related to knowledge of organization (i.e., the research process), knowledge generation 
(i.e., the subject matter content), knowledge transfer (i.e., understanding and 
communicating with the audience), and knowledge application (i.e., understanding the 
operational context): 
 Critical examination: What did I learn and why?   
 Organization: How can I organize and display the content of what I 
learned? 
 Reflection: What was the research process or analysis method like and did 
it work?  How does it relate to the central research questions? Were there 
any biases or discrepancies? 




I will reword these CORE questions to reflect the homeland security and intelligence 
domains context of my research which also will serve as a fitting summary and 
conclusion to this thesis. 
 Critical examination of the AH-ISM’s applicability.  What did I learn about all-
hazards risk-informed applied intelligence and why is it important to the HSIE?  Framing 
my research in the bricolage philosophy allows for using already available and proven 
tools, methodologies, and ideas in a new and innovative way to advance understanding 
and knowledge about a topic.  I have attempted to do this during my research about all-
hazards analysis.  All the institutional programs, professional competencies, and systemic 
perspectives that I have drawn upon are currently being implemented in the homeland 
security intelligence domain.  What I have accomplished is a reframing of the know-what 
and know-how abilities of HSIE analysts into an alternate conceptual framework for 
visualizing and conducting all-hazards risk-informed applied-intelligence synthesis that is 
PCRCL compliant.   
 Central research question.  What is a unifying interdisciplinary all-hazards 
analysis and intelligence synthesis model for providing risk-informed applied intelligence 
in support of the United States National Preparedness Goal by the homeland security 
intelligence enterprise?  As discussed in chapters IV and V, the AH-ISM is a unifying 
conceptual framework that is pluralistic (e.g., transdisciplinary, interdepartmental, and 
cross-jurisdictional).  It contributes to understanding what (i.e., knowledge content) and 
how (i.e., knowledge generation, transfer, and application) HSIE analysts support the 
planning processes, policy formulation, and practical application of the NPG by DHS, its 
operational components, CIPs, and HSOE partners (see figures 29 – 33). 
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 Research questions. 
 1.  What are the current and common all-hazards analysis and intelligence 
synthesis methods used by analysts in the homeland security intelligence enterprise at 
fusion centers and in other intelligence production and information sharing 
organizations?  HSIE analysts employed at fusion centers, ISACS, or DHS CIPs utilize a 
variety of analytic methodologies to identify and analyze ACTN hazards, threats, and 
crisis events as well as STE assets and resources.  My research has presented three 
common analytical approaches, as many as 45 APOEs, and four analytical steps (see 
section analytic approaches and points-of-entry on page 117) that are used and available 
to HSIE analysts that are derived from academic textbooks, governmental publications, 
private publications, and other academic teaching and training resources about 
intelligence analysis. 
 2.  To what extent does current homeland security intelligence enterprise 
approved training and certification courses teach common all-hazards analytic 
methodologies to intelligence analysis students? HSIE analysts, OPM professional series 
0132, are primarily trained in law enforcement crime analysis techniques taught by DHS 
approved or certified institutions and contracted training courses.  Professional career 
advancement for analysts emphasized the importance of being subject-matter-experts not 
only in their educational disciplines, but also in selected ACTN topics.  Advancement in 
managerial and leadership positions requires a broader understanding of all-hazards (see 
the professional development section on page 147). 
 3.  What, if any, are the knowledge-centric and intelligence operations principles, 
programs, or policies that are relevant to the all-hazards analysis and intelligence 
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synthesis model?  Intelligence synthesis and all-hazards intelligence analysis are 
grounded in four institutional programs and processes about knowledge, information, 
risk, and analysis.  Also, analysts obtain four professional competencies from these 
programs that are relevant to all-hazards risk-informed applied-intelligence production 
(see figures 14 and 15). 
 4.  What, if any, are the homeland security operational environment’s socio-
technological-environmental system components that are relevant to the all-hazards 
analysis and intelligence synthesis model?  The social, technological, and environmental 
systems that comprise the HSOE’s assets, resources, and their ACTN hazard sources 
includes the national population, social communities, critical infrastructure, security 
institutions, economic resources and institutions, and environmental resources to name a 
few (see deconstructing the homeland security operational environment section on page 
85). 
 5.  What, if any, are the consequential relationships among socio-technological-
environmental systems and adversarial, cyber, technological, and natural hazards, threats, 
and crisis event systems?  The consequential relationships and activators among social, 
technological, and environmental systems that comprise the HSOE’s assets, resources, 
and their ACTN hazard sources includes crisis events such as incidents, disasters, and 
catastrophes.  The interactions between them led to the development of the HARTE crisis 
event model and continuum (see figure 7). 
 6.  To what extent is the all-hazards analysis and intelligence synthesis model 
replicable and applicable as an analytic model in the interdisciplinary homeland security 
intelligence enterprise?  The AH-ISM is a scalable, replicable, and an enduring model 
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because it’s system-based structure is universal and easily adapted to include more 
interdisciplinary processes, functions, and communication formats.  However, the 
purpose of the model to produce all-hazards risk-informed applied-intelligence does not 
change.  The AH-ISM is replicable for the same reason that its scale and scope can be 
changed.  It can be universally replicated in all disciplines that are concerned with 
systems, system components, and entities (tangible and intangible).   
 The AH-ISM is enduring because, as a conceptual framework, its core 
competencies are not entirely dependent upon contemporary technology and technical 
capabilities.  Certainly, technology and information management systems greatly enhance 
the application of the AH-ISM but its critical reasoning ability, DIKI and HARTE 
functions, and CEWB structured communication are conceptual frameworks that can 
endure exclusively within the analysts’ mind.  The AH-ISM can be scaled, replicated, and 
endure the test of time solely as a mindset, written down on paper in pencil, or in the 
microprocessor of a computer (see figures 14, 15, and 29 – 33). 
 Organization of the AH-ISM’s content.  How did I organize the knowledge 
generated about pluralistic intelligence synthesis and display the content of what I learned 
so it contributes to the homeland security studies body of knowledge?  The AH-ISM is a 
conceptual model that simplifies reality, so it required numerous visual models to convey 
its core concepts.  I relied upon triadic models to simplify the depiction of 
interdisciplinary systems, entities, and their relational links to show their similarities 
(e.g., the interdisciplinary all-hazards crisis event predicate in figure 5).  I also used 
continuums depicted by arrows to show directional flow in time and space to build the 
structure of the AH-ISM (e.g., the baseline ISM in figure 13).   
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 The frame (i.e., structure) of the model, based on informational and procedural 
flows, allowed for the visual inclusion of quadruple zones to depict areas of analytic 
activity (e.g., the AH-ISM including the RREI analytic process in figure 15).  These 
activity areas also included the core institutional and professional competencies of 
intelligence activities and analysts.  The positioning of these activities in four quad-chart 
zones also demonstrated their functional and sequential characteristics in the AH-ISM.  
Lastly, I used acronyms and mnemonics as memory aids such as think-know-speak-act.  
Another creative example is: ACTioN is the CORE MODE of the HSIE’s HARTE and 
CASA.  Analysts can have hours of fun in the break room creating their own (see figure 
19).  Regardless of the acronyms and mnemonic memory aids used, the AH-ISM is 
essentially a visual model that helps frame the conceptual framework of systems-based 
intelligence production. 
 Reflection about the AH-ISM research process and research questions. 
 Bricolage, CASA, MODES, RREI, CEWB, and CORE.  What was the bricolage 
research philosophy, CASA process, MODES resources, RREI analysis method, CEWB 
structured communication, and CORE method like and did it work?  Bricolage is a 
worldview as well as a research philosophy focused on social, political, and historical 
context.  It involves the researcher’s interpretation and making-sense about “the 
complexity of everyday life and the data it constantly throws at us.” (Kincheloe & Berry, 
2004, p. 82)  Also, bricoleurs focus on “the act of interpretation in research, appreciating 
the distinction between describing a phenomenon and understanding it.” (Kincheloe & 
Berry, 2004, p. 83)  I have attempted to follow five principles of bricolage in my research 
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to better interpret, describe, and understand the phenomena of intelligence synthesis, 
hazards, threats, and crisis events.  The five principles are: 
 connecting the research objects to their many context. 
 appreciating the relationship between myself (the researcher) and the research 
topic. 
 connecting meaning-making to the human experience. 
 using textual references while not forgetting that meaning-making is a human 
experience. 
 building a bridge between these principles about understanding and meaning-
making to informed action (Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, p. 83). 
 Throughout my research, I followed the collect, analyze, synthesize, and apply 
process.  Notably, the format of the thesis chapters follows it: the introduction in chapter 
I established my analytic approach and APOE; the literature review in chapter II 
presented the collected materials; the analysis methodology in chapter III and the analysis 
results were given in chapter IV; and chapter V displayed and discussed the synthesis and 
application of my research.  I effectively used the MODES method to access and assess 
references, applied the RREI analysis steps during analysis, and attempted to follow the 
CEWB structured communication standard in my writing.  Finally, the CORE method has 
offered an appropriate structured method for conducting and communicating my research 
evaluation.  I assess the processes and methods that I used are suitable frameworks for 
conducting research and analysis. 
   Biases and discrepancies.  Were there any personal, professional, and academic 
biases or discrepancies revealed during my research process?  How did the research 
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process, biases, or discrepancies relate to the central research question about 
interdisciplinary all-hazards analysis and intelligence synthesis?  My personal biases 
towards balanced human and eco-centric national level policies and programs are evident 
in my supportive views of PCRCL compliance by intelligence and security agencies and 
personnel.  I believe in the government protection and civil respect of all people, 
regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, and cultural heritage, who comprise the 
nation’s population.  Lastly, my personal biases are significantly influence by my 
personal experience with human vulnerability and those people who are disadvantaged 
during times of loss.  It is during these times when individuals and families are 
overwhelmed, that reliable and fairly administered governmental protections and 
programs are needed the most.  Accordingly, I believe, or rather hope, my research will 
somehow help in the efforts of homeland security practitioners who provide comfort, 
safety, and security to those in need. 
 My professional bias is grounded in selfless national service that is not infringed 
upon by my political party affiliation nor an extreme affinity to any one race, ethnicity, 
religion, sex, or cultural heritage.  In my professional view, patriotism and loyalty to the 
ideals of the U.S. Constitution are paramount; yet, they are not inconsistent with 
acknowledge membership in the global community and respecting the dignity and civil 
liberties of all people in the world.  My academic biases are evident in my thesis research 
topic that is limited to homeland security and intelligence in support of national safety, 
security, and resilience objectives that comply with human-centric PCRCL compliance 
and the preservation of natural resources.  I believe constitutionally constructive 
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limitations placed on the intelligence community are necessary forcing mechanisms to 
ensure only the highest quality intelligence products are put forth. 
 Evaluation of the AH-ISM’s integration into the HSIE.  What is my conclusion 
about the research process that I used, my analysis methods, and the results of my 
research about interdisciplinary all-hazards analysis and intelligence synthesis (i.e., the 
AH-ISM), and how can it be integrated into future research?  It is my conclusion that the 
AH-ISM is a suitable model for visualizing and applying intelligence analysis and 
production.  Although it is not presented in this thesis as the only solution to the problem 
of an insufficient unifying analytical mindset in the HSIE, the AH-ISM is a useful tool 
for (a) interdisciplinary teaching intelligence analysis and synthesis to HSIE students, (b) 
establishing an academic program of instruction for institutional and professional 
development courses, (c) a frame of reference or mindset for interdisciplinary 
practitioners in the homeland security and intelligence domains, and (d) a practical 
guideline for interagency, interdisciplinary, and multijurisdictional coordination and 
cooperation efforts.  Also, the AH-ISM is meant to be used.  It is intended to be applied 
as a pluralistic intelligence synthesis tool for intelligence generation and sharing to 
promote better operational planning, policy formulation, and field practice within the 
HSIE. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Further research about interdisciplinary all-hazards intelligence synthesis is 
necessary because this thesis is only a cursory look at it from a systems perspective.  
Although the AH-ISM is a useful model, like useful information in the DIKI continuum, 
it is not a mature intelligence synthesis model and requires more research.  It has not been 
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scenario tested and practically applied as a proven intelligence model in the homeland 
security and intelligence domains.  Therefore, I recommend no fewer than four 
concentration areas for future research based on my CORE evaluation:  
 the extent of the AH-ISM’s practical application as an interdisciplinary all-
hazards teaching model to HSIE intelligence analysis students. 
 the extent of the AH-ISM’s practical application in establishing an academic 
program of instruction that is based on its four institutional core competencies, its 
four professional core competencies, U.S. Constitutional PCRCL compliance, and 
its systems component structure. 
 the extent of the AH-ISM’s usefulness as a systems-based framing mindset for 
interdisciplinary practitioners in the homeland security and intelligence domains. 
 the extent of the AH-ISM’s practical application in the pluralistic intelligence 
environment to include comprehensive modeling of transdisciplinary ACTN 
hazards, threats, and crisis events; STE systems, assets, and national resources for 
critical infrastructure protection; and FSLTT interagency and multijurisdictional 
applications as an all-hazards risk-informed applied-intelligence model. 
Echoing my earlier comment, I hope future research on the applicability, suitability, and 
effectiveness of the AH-ISM will contribute to the body of knowledge in the emerging 
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